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Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
ABSTRACT
The introduction of the European Directive on information and consultation and its 
implementation into United Kingdom (UK) law has increased the focus on 
workplace representation arrangements. However, existing research into non-union 
representation (NER) arrangements in the UK is limited. This research examines 
NER arrangements in nine UK firms and assesses their effectiveness in representing 
the needs of employees and employers. The research explores these issues by using a 
multi-variant analysis including employee surveys, interviews, focus groups, 
observation and internal company documentation.
The research attempts to address a number of research questions. First, what are the 
management strategies towards and objectives of NER arrangements? Second, are 
NER arrangements a complement to union representation or do they act as a 
substitute for union-based voice arrangements? Third, how effective are NER and 
union arrangements perceived to be at representing the interests of and providing 
voice for employees? Fourth, what are the perceived workplace outcomes of both 
NER and union-based voice arrangements? Fifth, what are the union responses and 
approaches towards NER arrangements? Sixth, what are the potential implications 
for employers, unions and NER-based voice arrangements in the future?
Overall, the evidence presented in this research questions the legitimacy of NER 
forms as alternatives to unions in effectively representing the interests of employees. 
The findings would also suggest that while trade unions may provide greater voice 
than NER arrangements, the strength of that voice is dependent on their responses to 
such arrangements and effectiveness in representing employees’ interests at the 
workplace. And that in turn depends on the union being perceived by the workforce 
as both representative and able to act independently. From a management 
perspective, allowing influence over workplace issues and at times an 
acknowledgement of differing interests may also be essential conditions for more 
effective decision-making processes in organisations.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE
1.1 History of non-union employee representation in the UK
With a few exceptions, it is apparent from existing research that little is known about 
the effectiveness of employee consultation and representation in United Kingdom 
(UK) non-unionised firms1, in particular how such non-union employee 
representation2 (NER) and consultation structures are composed, their independence 
from managerial influence, and their ‘representativeness’ (Gollan, 2000; Gollan, 
2001; Lloyd, 2001; Terry, 1999; Watling and Snook, 2003). In addition, little has 
been documented about the impact and influence of such structures on managerial 
decisions.
This doctoral thesis explores the development of NER arrangements and union 
responses to such arrangements. It also tracks the development of dual channel NER 
and union arrangements and examines the interplay between channels of NER and 
trade unions. In addition, this research examines management strategies towards 
representation, and the processes at play in situations when firms attempt to 
restructure industrial relations at the workplace.
1 Non-union firms in this context are firms which do not recognise a registered independent trade 
union for the purposes o f collective bargaining. It does not preclude that such firms may have union 
members. In Britain, the government’s Certification Officer has responsibility for deciding whether a 
trade union is fully independent o f employers under Section 5 o f the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) A ct 1992. In particular the Act states, ‘not under the domination or control 
o f an employer’ and ‘not liable to interference by an employer’. Key criteria may include: history, 
membership and organisational structure, and the way it is financed. Upon meeting these 
requirements, a certificate o f independence is issued in accordance with Section 6 o f the Act. Such 
trade unions may be industry or occupationally-based, multi-firm or single-firm based. For example, 
staff associations may be single enterprise-based and still deemed to be fully independent trade unions 
under the Act. (See Certification Officer, 2001 and Bryson, 2004 for further details).
2 NER structures can also be referred to as union-independent forms o f employee representation or 
alternative forms o f employee representation. However, it is recognised that while such representative 
structures may be formally independent o f trade unionism, they may also involve union
members. Moreover, these structures may operate with, against, or in the absence o f union 
organisation.
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Importantly, NER has tended to play a minimal role in many Anglo industrial 
relations systems (including the UK), with few formal processes or legal 
requirements3. However, the lack of representative structures covering increasing 
numbers of non-union employees due to declining levels of trade union density and 
legislative changes banning closed shop or compulsory union arrangements have 
prompted the current interest in NER structures.
While the capacity to operate NER arrangements in certain countries such as the US 
is severely curtailed, although not totally eliminated (Kaufman, 2003) under Section 
2(5) and Section 8(a)2 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), this is not the 
case in the UK. Such arrangements were in operation in the UK as early as the 1920s 
with the introduction of the Whitley Councils in the public sector (Gollan, 2000: 416; 
Taras, 1997). This first phase was part of a wider movement of industrial democracy 
that occurred during and just after the First World War in western industrial countries 
from 1917 to 1920. During this period, joint employer and employee bodies -  the so- 
called ‘Whitley Councils’ -  emerged. While many councils included a degree of 
trade union representation, their role was principally to represent all employees. 
Marchington (1994) has suggested that the origins of Whitleyism can be found in a 
mixture of socio-economic and political pressures at the time and a desire to integrate 
workers more closely within the enterprises in which they were employed. In 
addition to these developments, some companies were experimenting with other 
forms of non-union employee representation.
Notably, Spedan Lewis in 1929 set down the rationale for creating the John Lewis 
Partnership, which still exists today. This Partnership embraced included extensive 
employee participation and involvement with the formation of representative 
structures as its foundation. This included a ‘Branch Council’ made up of elected 
representatives, the managing director and some members of the management team. 
In addition, a second structure was created at a national level called the ‘Central 
Council’, of which 80 per cent of the 130 members are elected from all parts of the
3 However, there are formal requirements that health and safety committees be established in some 
union and non-union workplaces.
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company with management making up the remaining 20 per cent. The Central 
Council also provides the electoral college to appoint five directors to the 
Partnership’s Central Board of 12 (see Chapter Five and Appendix 3 for more 
details).
During the Second World War and the years immediately afterwards, the second 
major phase of collective participation primarily took the form of Joint Consultative 
Councils (JCCs) at workplace level (Kessler and Bayliss 1992) or Joint Production 
and Advisory Committees (JPACs). Both of these were part of a drive at government 
level to stimulate productivity growth and reduce conflict. Marchington (1994) 
estimates that by the mid-1940s there were over 4,000 committees in existence in 
engineering alone, covering in excess of 2.5 million workers, with numbers declining 
during the post-war part of the decade. Marchington (1994) suggests that the reason 
for the decline of such committees related to their abuse by management as a means 
to increase power and control, and the lack of real management commitment.
The 1960s and early 1970s also witnessed an increase of ‘staff associations’. In 1992 
total membership of such associations stood at 1,166,433 employees (IRS 1995: 7). 
As Industrial Relations Services (IRS) stated in 1995, the first annual report of the 
Certification Officer (CO) defined staff associations as: “Organisations, usually of 
white-collar w orkers,... whose membership is confined to the employees of a single 
employer (or associated employers) in sectors other than central or local government 
and the nationalised industries.” Moreover, while most associations evolved from 
employer inspired bodies, the IRS study found that most function as independent 
trade unions both in terms of the CO legal definition, and thus are included in the 
statutory list of trade unions maintained by the CO.
Principally their growth was greatly assisted by the establishment of staff 
associations in the UK finance sector in the 1970s and 1980s with 24,700 building 
society employees represented by staff associations. While some employees were 
members of certificated associations, many associations were not regarded as fully 
independent. Importantly, the trade association for building societies, the Building
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Societies’ Association (BSA), which was formed in 1869 and had a membership of 
238 societies representing approximately 99 per cent of the assets of the entire 
movement, refused to recognise and negotiate with existing industry-based trade 
unions (Winterton and Winterton, 1982). Following the introduction of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971 the BSA established a ‘staff relations advisory service’ and 
encouraged its member societies to form staff associations.
In 1974, the Federation of Building Society Staff Associations (FBSSA) was formed 
as a response to the introduction of the 1974 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 
with new criteria for independence and the creation of a new post of certification 
officer, which threatened their continuance (Winterton and Winterton, 1982). By 
1982 some 20 building society staff associations were affiliated to the FBSSA. 
Winterton and Winterton (1982) suggest that it was the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act 1974 that stimulated the development of staff associations in building 
societies.
The last major phase in non-union collective participation occurred in the 1970s with 
Britain’s accession to the EEC’s draft Fifth Directive with its proposals for worker 
members on boards of directors and harmonisation of company law. The entry of 
Britain into the EEC and the election of a Labour government in 1974 led to the 
establishment of the Bullock Committee of Inquiry, which proposed a degree of 
employee representation at board level. However, the subsequent White Paper in 
1978 watered down the Bullock majority proposals and they were not implemented.
In recent years there has been renewed focus on such arrangements due to European 
developments, in particular the introduction of the European Directive on 
Information and Consultation. While the Directive arguably represents a significant 
development in terms of promoting and enhancing work representation, some 
commentators (Bercusson, 2002; Scott, 2002) have suggested that the effectiveness 
of the Directive will be questionable given the UK Government's less than 
enthusiastic response to and support for the original proposal in November 1998. The 
Blair Government persisted in its reservations by blocking and weakening the
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Directive during its drafting. It is argued that this has resulted in a watered down and 
potentially ineffective piece of legislation. Scott (2002: 2) argues that while there are 
a number of interpretations over the impact of the Directive, it may leave the UK 
with the worst of both worlds -  neither decent works councils, nor strengthened 
unions. While this conclusion is open to debate it does highlight the challenges for 
representation in the UK posed by the Directive.
1.2 Legal perspectives and the Information and Consultation 
Directive
The importance of NER arrangements in the UK has been highlighted by recent 
initiatives from the European Commission. On 11 March 2002, a general framework 
for informing and consulting employees in the European Community was formally 
adopted and came into force on 23 March of the same year4. This Directive will 
eventually apply to undertakings or businesses in member states with at least 50 
employees (or establishments with 20 employees or more), and will require them to 
inform and consult their employees in good time about issues directly affecting work 
organisation, job security and employment contracts regarding terms and conditions. 
More specifically, the new Directive will require employers under a legal obligation 
to inform their staff on a continuing basis about matters such as firm performance 
and strategic planning5.
While the Directive offers a substantial degree of flexibility in relation to the shape 
of information and consultation arrangements, some commentators have suggested 
that this proposal implies the establishment of national-level works councils in the 
UK, or at least in non-union establishments some form of non-union employee 
representation (Gospel and Willman, 2002; Gospel and Willman, 2003). For some 
member states, notably the UK, it will require organisations to have much more 
extensive employee consultation processes than are currently in place. Importantly,
4 Official Journal (Directive N o.2002/ 14/EC).
5 The UK Information and Consultation o f  Employees (ICE) Regulations based on the Directive are 
being introduced in phases: firms with more than 150 employees were covered from 6 April 2005 to 
set up information and consultation procedures; firms with more than 100 employees but fewer than 
150 have until 6 April 2007; and those firms with more than 50 employees but fewer than 100 will be 
included under the Directive from 6 April 2008.
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the Directive requires workplace bodies comprising elected representatives and 
consultation to be structured in such a way that these representatives and their 
constituencies can influence management decisions.
The European Directive is a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees and goes well beyond communication or consultation arrangement per se. 
Clearly, the spirit of the Directive -  if not the letter of the law -  is to provide greater 
involvement in and influence on organisational decision-making processes. The 
European Commission in 1998 stated that the aim of the Directive was to not only 
keep employees informed of management decisions but, more broadly to provide as a 
social objective enhanced employee rights and increasing employee involvement 
over a range of enterprise issues6.
In November 1998, the European Commission proposed a Council Directive 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees. The 
European Commission (1998) stated that:
This initiative is an essential step in completing the EU ’s social dimension 
and in achieving the creation o f an adaptable, high-skilled and motivated 
workforce, because o f the role o f information and consultation in 
developing adaptability and contributing to increases in productivity.
The European Commission suggested that this proposal complements existing 
national and EU provisions and legislation, and seeks to ‘fill the gaps and 
inadequacies that have been identified in the long process of consultation’. In other 
words, the proposal is seen by the Commission as building upon the ‘piecemeal’ 
nature of existing Community law, enhancing the impact of the existing directives on 
collective redundancies and safeguarding employees’ rights in the event of transfers
6 A call for further EU action regarding consultation rights was made after the closure o f  the Renault 
plant at Vilvoorde in Belgium because the consultation processes were seen as inadequate under EU  
legislation. Following this case, the Commissioner responsible for social affairs and employment at 
the time, Padraig Flynn, reaffirmed his commitment to extend employee rights. In June 1997, the 
Commission initiated a first round o f consultations on the advisability of legislation based on the 
procedure outlined in the Social Policy Agreement annexed to the Maastricht Treaty (Gollan, 2001).
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of undertakings. It was argued that creating a general framework for employee 
information and consultation at the EU level would make these legislative provisions 
more effective, comprehensive and workable. The Commission also highlighted that 
‘consultation between employer and employee is based on a dialogue and exchange 
of views’, including decisions likely to lead to substantial changes concerning work 
organisation and contractual relations and an ‘attempt to seek prior agreement on the 
decision concerned’ (European Commission, 1998).
Importantly, speaking after the adoption of the proposal, the then Employment and 
Social Affairs Commissioner, Padraig Flynn, stated:
This is an important day fo r  social Europe, as, after a long phase o f 
preparation and consultation, we are presenting an important tool in the 
search fo r  greater adaptability in the workforce. The Commission’s 
proposal provides a framework within which the Member States and the 
social partners can ensure an effective and balanced involvement o f  
workers in a more positive and flexible approach to reorganisation and 
change, especially the modernisation o f work organisation (European 
Commission, 1998).
On the date of the formal agreement and adoption of the Directive, the European 
Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, said: ‘This Directive provides a 
‘fail-safe’ protection for employees and, used intelligently, can be a modem business 
tool. Enlightened self interest is already driving companies to anticipate and manage 
change. Many businesses already involve employees in this. All businesses should 
provide a baseline level of involvement’.
Generally speaking, it can be argued that firms set up NER forms to provide a more 
structured basis for employee involvement and/or for purposes of union avoidance. 
Regardless of the motivations of employers in setting up NER arrangements, the UK 
Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations (based on the
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European Directive7) require effective consultation for all employees in an 
establishment covered by the legislation. Thus it is important that an assessment is 
made of the appropriateness of the existing NER and union arrangements in 
satisfying these requirements. Under proposed arrangements, the implications of not 
satisfying these requirements could be greater legislative intervention in management 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, not meeting these requirements could 
increase dissatisfaction towards management and result in lower productivity and 
performance and more industrial action.
This research will focus on the effectiveness of NER and union arrangements in 
representing the needs of employees in providing employee voice (see chapter two 
for definitions and meanings of employee voice) by the legitimate expression of 
collective aims of workers, and will assess the outcomes of NER and union 
responses to NER arrangements.
1.3 Management perspectives towards NER arrangements
Another recent development to renew the focus on NER arrangements has been the 
growing emphasis on employer-sponsored employee involvement arrangement’s 
which are aimed at direct engagement with workers in autonomous or semi- 
autonomous team approaches based on productivity enhancement and continuous 
improvement. The impetus for this development has been heightened global and 
domestic competition, information and skill-intensive production systems, shortened 
product and technology life cycles and a greater focus on employee expectations of 
involvement in workplace issues and satisfaction at work (Taras and Kaufman,
1999). This has resulted in leading firms developing and implementing new work 
systems with traditional command and control systems replaced by more 
decentralised decision-making, job restructuring through teamwork systems, and 
enhanced opportunities for employee involvement and participation.
7 Under current European requirements European Directives are required to be transposed into 
domestic national legislation before they become law.
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Leading advocates have described such approaches in terms of high involvement 
management, high commitment management or high performance work systems 
under a mutual gains approach (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Guest, 1995; Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie, 1984; Lawler, 1986; Levine, 1995; Levine and Tyson, 1990; 
Wall and Wood, 2005; Walton, 1985; Wood, 1996)
Taras and Kaufman (1999: 2) suggest that for many medium and larger-sized firms 
employee participation and involvement is representational in nature for reasons of 
cost and efficiency. While traditional collective bargaining arrangements are an 
avenue for such employee involvement, many employers ‘have neither the basic 
inclination nor economic incentives to recognise and bargain with trade unions, nor 
do the majority of workers express a desire for union representation’ (p.2).
Kaufman and Taras (1999: 2) go on to state:
As a consequence, interest in and experimentation with alternative non­
union representational structures has proliferated in recent years 
among the management advocates o f industrial democracy. By 
promoting greater opportunities fo r  employee voice in non-union 
situations, these representational groups not only serve management 
interests in improved productivity and communication, but also ensure 
that employee interests in equitable terms and conditions o f 
employment are factored into management decision making.
While this research is concerned with non-union representation rather than more 
direct forms of employee involvement and consultation, it examines more direct 
forms when they are complementary to NER arrangements.
Importantly, it is suggested that NER arrangements are an integral element in 
providing the diffusion of information provision and employee involvement through 
consultation as a means to enhance organisational performance. According to Taras 
and Kaufman (1999), the discussion of NER by its advocates is embedded in the
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rhetoric of HRM. Opponents view NER arrangements as simply company-initiated 
‘subterfuge to pacify and deceive workers, who might otherwise seek union 
representation’ (Taras and Kaufman, 1999: 16). As such, they describe NER 
arrangements as ‘brittle’ and unions as ‘durable and independent’.
Alternatively, proponents view NER arrangements as a means to foster ‘genuine 
labor-management harmony, thus NER arrangements are cooperative compared to 
unions which are considered adversarial’ and encourage a ‘singularity of purpose’ 
between workers and managers for the good of the common enterprise, or a 
‘mutuality of interests’ based on a win-win outcome as part of the strategic HRM 
agenda (Taras and Kaufman, 1999: 16).
However, when NER is viewed through the industrial relations lens (rather than the 
HRM agenda) a number of issues can be identified and exposed. In essence, 
industrial relations academics and commentators assume that the interests of workers 
and employers are inherently different or mutually exclusive of one another. These 
differences and conflicts are resolved through the use of collective bargaining with 
an independent representative agency representing the interests of workers (i.e. trade 
unions) and the use of conflict resolution mechanisms and processes (i.e. conciliation 
and arbitration). Under this pluralistic perspective, the workplace is viewed in terms 
of power bargaining and conflict resolution. It is suggested by some commentators 
that the capacity of NER arrangements to produce ‘win-win’ outcomes is constrained 
and limited due to the lack of effective power and capacity to achieve employee 
outcomes (Taras and Kaufman, 1999).
For some firms, NER arrangements are part of a progressive vision of employee 
relations (Taras and Kaufman, 1999: 9) embraced both by early welfare capitalist 
philosophies (Jacoby, 1997) and by a modem high performance workplace focus. 
Taras and Kaufman (1999: 9) suggest that firms become committed to NER ‘because 
of its value to the development of harmonious relations with workers, and the belief 
that it has the capacity to deliver tangible benefits to the firm and its workforce 
(although these benefits appear difficult to quantify)’. Moreover, in unorganised
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workplaces little is known about why employees represented by non-union 
arrangements reject or show little interest in trade union representation. Examples in 
North America have included Imperial Oil (Taras, 2000), which was coined ‘fortress 
Imperial’ due to employees’ reluctance to embrace trade unions, and Delta Airlines 
(Kaufman, 2003). Jacoby (1997) highlights this within the context of ‘welfare 
capitalism’ where comprehensive employee involvement and people-centred 
programs were able to reduce the effect of union organising campaigns.
Thus NER arrangements can also be perceived as organs aligning common interests 
of employees and employers, while unions can be perceived as more independent 
entities. As such unions can be seen as operating in separate domains, in pursuit of 
agendas that sometimes conflict with those of employers. This line of argument 
would suggest that NER arrangements are complementary to unions although 
through co-existence may develop interdependences with union arrangements.
Taras and Copping (1998) have suggested that NER traditionally involved three 
themes: efficient production and quality improvements; workplace democracy and 
representation; and removal of incentives for workers to join trade unions. NER 
forms may range from very structured arrangements with regular meetings of elected 
worker delegates to less formal forums with employees meeting line managers on an 
ad hoc basis.
The research in this thesis endeavours to determine whether NER and unions can be 
regarded as continuum or as a separate domain (Kim, 2004). The continuum 
argument posits that NER structures and unions pursue similar goals by satisfying 
similar needs of employees. The separate domain thesis (Kaufman, 2000) states that 
NER aligns workers with management goals, while unions have different goals 
which may diverge from employer interests. Kim’s (2004) research would also 
suggest that employees perceive unions and NER arrangements as satisfying 
different types of employee needs, thus are seen as performing different functions.
Paul J  Gollan 19
th e  L ondon Schoo l of E c o n o m ic s
a n d  P o l i t ic a l  S c ie n c
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
1.4 Research Questions
This thesis will attempt to address a number of research questions:
• First, what are the management strategies towards and objectives of NER 
arrangements?
• Second, are NER arrangements a complement to union representation or do 
they act as a substitute for union-based voice arrangements?
• Third, how effective are NER and union arrangements perceived to be at 
representing the interests of and providing voice for employees?
• Fourth, what are the perceived workplace outcomes of both NER and union- 
based voice arrangements?
• Fifth, what are the union responses and approaches towards NER 
arrangements?
• Sixth, what are the potential implications for employers, unions and NER- 
based voice arrangements in the future?
These questions have several consequences for the research outcomes. It is envisaged 
that they will provide a framework for examining NER arrangements in terms of 
independence, autonomy, and resources. Moreover, how these factors influence 
employee perceptions of trust in management, and levels of influence and power in 
the decision-making processes will also be explored. The research questions also 
allow an analysis of the different employment relationships, such as those between 
employees and management, between employees and their representatives, and 
between the representatives and senior management. The thesis will also explore the 
‘want’ and ‘have’ gap between expectation and satisfaction based on three 
dimensions -  distributive issues, employee advocacy issues and mutual interest 
issues.
In attempting to address the research questions this thesis will examine the main 
theories concerning non-union employee representation. It is argued by some 
commentators that non-union employee representation arrangements are union
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avoidance mechanisms either by intent or by effect -  workers are less likely to 
unionise because the perceived instrumentality of joining a union is lowered. Such 
arrangements -  it is maintained -  exert strong inhibiting factors on the process of 
unionisation due to the fear of reprisal by management, or alternatively good 
management practices render unions unattractive and unnecessary. On the other 
hand, if employers reduce wages and conditions (voluntarily or involuntarily due to 
labour or product market conditions or pressures for unit labour cost reductions) to a 
level lower than that in more unionised plants or workplaces, they create a condition 
for union activity and presence. Thus, the longevity of non-union employee 
representation is said to be dependent on matching or exceeding the achievements of 
union arrangements. This thesis also examines the drivers for unionisation and 
assesses the inhibiting and facilitating conditions that have a moderating effect on 
employees joining unions.
1.5 Structure
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter Two explores the concept of voice, and how and why non-union voice 
arrangements are introduced in firms. Management behaviour in terms of strategies 
and attitudes towards voice will also be examined. The next section examines 
developments in voice arrangements in general and NER structures in particular. The 
current evidence in the UK is reviewed, examining existing survey and case study 
research into non-union employee representation and briefly highlighting the 
available research and debates on consultation and representation. In particular, the 
scope, structure and presence of NER arrangements in the UK are examined, 
outlining some important themes from the existing research into voice and NER 
arrangements. The following section looks at issues of power and influence, 
autonomy and independence within the context of NER arrangements. Finally, a 
summary of the main issues is presented.
Chapter Three explores the current debates concerning NER arrangements from an
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international context. The chapter reviews the current literature and debates around 
three core themes: First, management strategies towards NER arrangements and if 
such arrangements are used by management as a complement or substitute for union 
representation; Second, the perceived effectiveness and workplace outcomes of NER 
arrangements. This section also explores if perceived effectiveness and the likely 
outcomes have any relationship with management’s reasons for establishing NER 
arrangements, or are they unimportant; Third, conditions of unionisation and union 
responses to NER voice arrangements. In particular, are trade unions likely to have 
more influence if they work with and ‘colonise’ NER arrangements, or are NER 
arrangements a threat to their existence and thus act to marginalise such bodies. 
Finally, having reviewed this debate the chapter concludes by developing a 
framework of management strategies towards NER arrangements and union 
responses to such arrangements.
Chapter Four sets out the methodological approaches adopted in this research and 
presents a rationale for using such approaches. The empirical research was conducted 
over a period of approximately seven years (1998 to 2005) and involved case study 
analysis, using interviews, company documents, employee surveys, focus groups and 
observation. A fundamental feature of the research design was to use an approach 
allowing the rich evidence and complex issues to emerge from such dynamic 
processes (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004). The emphasis on rich and detailed 
information in the case study approach by utilising qualitative and quantitative 
methods can be useful in explaining social processes and outcomes. It can also be 
argued that a combination of methods provides the best means to understand the 
‘delicate and intricate interactions and processes occurring within organisations’ 
(Hartley, 1994: 209) as a means to triangulate and thereby improve validity in 
analysing the results. While the interviews and observation provided explanations for 
why certain policies and procedures were adopted, the questionnaire gave insights 
into employee perceptions and attitudes of their effectiveness and outcomes.
Chapter Five examines NER structures in the UK by assessing management 
strategies, processes and practices of NER arrangements in nine organisations -
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Sainsbury’s pic (hereafter referred to as Sainsbury’s); John Lewis Partnership; HP 
Bulmers Ltd (hereafter referred to as Bulmers); Grosvenor Casinos; Ciba Specialty 
Chemicals; Panasonic (Matsushita) UK, Eurotunnel (UK) (hereafter referred to as 
Eurotunnel), News International Newspapers (hereafter referred to as News 
International) and South West Water . The nine organisations were selected to 
provide insights into the strategies of management in establishing NER structures 
and to review the processes and practice of such arrangements. The nine cases were 
also selected on the basis that either their structures were well established (thus 
capable of showing their potential effectiveness), or were recognised as leading 
companies in their field or market (examples of good practice behaviour) and had 
recently adopted NER arrangements as part of their industrial relations strategy. 
These nine organisations have also provided a means to further explore management 
strategies towards NER arrangements in light of formal union recognition procedures 
as part of the UK Employment Relations Act 1999 and the anticipated European 
Directive on information and consultation.
Chapter Six examines the environment of what would appear to be a widening 
‘representation gap’ developing in many organisations. There has been considerable 
discussion about the effectiveness of NER structures as communication devices and 
mechanisms for employee involvement, or as a substitute for unions in the collective 
bargaining process. The underlying debate centres on whether NER forms make 
trade unions unnecessary, or whether NER forms have a different but complementary 
role to that of unions at the workplace. This thesis will attempt to address these 
issues by examining the experience of non-union and union representation 
arrangements at HP Bulmers, Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Eurotunnel, News 
International and South West Water (SWW). These organisations were chosen to 
provide insights into the strategies of management in establishing NER structures 
and union responses to such arrangements, and to shed some light on the outcomes 
and implications for management, trade unions and employees of these 
arrangements.
While it can be argued that firms set up NER arrangements to provide a more
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structured method for employee involvement and/or for purposes of union avoidance, 
this chapter focuses on the effectiveness of union responses in providing voice 
through bargaining, consultation and representing the needs of employees. As a 
means to explore these issues, a review of union strategies and tactics of 
‘colonisation’ and ‘marginalisation’ of NER arrangements is undertaken. Issues of 
industrial relations instability, and management and union intentions are also 
explored by reviewing representation arrangements before and after union 
recognition at Eurotunnel and Ciba Specialty Chemicals and examining increased 
union influence on the Bulmers Employee Council (EC), News International Staff 
Association (NISA) and SWW Staff Council (SWWSC).
Chapter Seven further explores the Eurotunnel case study. Despite the rising 
importance of NER, few studies have examined employees’ commitment to and 
participation in union and NER arrangements in the same workplace. The chapter 
examines the interplay between non-union and union representative arrangements at 
Eurotunnel (UK) and assesses their effectiveness in representing the needs of 
employees over a five-year period. This section evaluates the results of two 
employee surveys at Eurotunnel -  one carried out before union recognition in 1999 
and another conducted after union recognition at the end of 2002, assessing the views 
of non-union employees and union members towards trade unions and the Company 
Council (CC). Importantly, the chapter examines the pros and cons of both NER and 
union arrangements. It also gives some indication of the important representation and 
consultation issues from the perspective of employees at Eurotunnel generally, and 
of the effectiveness and interplay between union and non-union representative 
structures in the organisation.
Chapter Eight synthesises the major issues surrounding NER arrangements and the 
implications for public policy are examined. In particular, this chapter highlights the 
perceived effectiveness of both NER arrangements and the trade unions in providing 
a more effective means of representation and consultation in terms of management 
relations, employee participation and the quality of communication and consultation. 
Finally the chapter also assesses the future implications of this research for re­
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shaping workplace representation and outlines the research limitations and strengths 
of the research in light of current developments in workplace representation. The 
research also highlights the potential impact of the Information and Consultation of 
Employees (ICE) regulations for management strategies and union responses to 
NER. In conclusion, the chapter explores the challenges of employee representation 
for employers, unions and government policy regarding the structures needed for 
effective consultation and employee representation.
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CHAPTER TWO 
VOICE AND NON-UNION EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATION: STATE OF PLAY
2.1 Introduction
The first section of this chapter explores the concept and meaning of voice, and how 
and why non-union voice arrangements are introduced in firms. The next section 
examines developments in voice arrangements in general and NER structures in 
particular. It examines NER by reviewing current survey research and examining the 
scope, structure and practices of NER voice arrangements in the UK. The following 
section examines issues of power and influence, autonomy and independence and 
highlights certain theoretical insights as a means to explain representation 
arrangements. Finally, an overview of the main issues is presented.
2.2 Definitions and meanings
Employee Voice
A number of researchers have attempted to define voice and as such there are 
variations between definitions. Bryson (2004: 220) defines voice in terms of the 
possibility of two-way communication between management and employees, thus 
giving employees the opportunity to voice their wishes and concerns, and to voice 
them regularly. According to Dundon and Rollinson (2004: 52) in simple terms 
‘employee voice can be described as methods that provide for employees to have a 
say in matters that affect them’. Greenfield and Pleasure (1993: 193-4) define 
workers ‘voice’ as a communication that has the power to persuade and is a 
legitimate expression of the collective aims of those workers.
Moreover Dundon et al. ’s (2004:1149) research into the meaning and purpose of
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employee voice suggests that it is best understood as a complex and ‘uneven set of 
meanings and purposes with a dialectic shaped by external regulation, on the one 
hand, and internal management choice, on the other’. They concluded, ‘that the 
degree to which voice practices are embedded in an organisation is much more 
important than reporting the extent of any particular individual or collective schemes 
for employee voice’ (2004: 1149).
Prosser from the Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU) argues that 
‘collective voice achieves what the lone voice could never do: it humanises and 
civilises the workplace’ and stating that collective representation is the foundation of 
a partnership relationship that brings positive benefits for business’ (Prosser, 2001, as 
cited in Dundon et aL, 2004: 1154). McCabe and Lewin (1992) define voice in two 
ways: first, as an expression of grievances at work by employees to management, and 
second, as participation and involvement of employees in the decision-making 
processes.
After reviewing the variety of meanings Dundon et aL (2004: 1152) identify four 
different manifestations of voice. First, voice can be articulated as individual 
dissatisfaction that is aimed at a specific problem or issue with management. Second, 
voice can be an expression of collective organisation which is a countervailing 
source of power to management (for example through trade unions). Third, there are 
voice arrangements which contribute to management decision-making and are 
concerned primarily with efficiency and productivity improvements (often coupled 
with high involvement management and high commitment initiatives). Fourth, 
another form of voice can be expressed through mutuality of interest in the form of 
an employee-employer partnership aimed at securing long-term viability and 
sustainability for the organisation and its employees. Overall, the application of and 
rationale for voice at the workplace may be based on economic, moral/ethical or 
pragmatic grounds.
In light of the literature, two issues concerning voice can be highlighted: first, the 
way employers articulate employee voice in the light of regulation, and second the
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linkages between employee voice and employee satisfaction and its perceived 
effectiveness.
Regarding the articulation of voice in light of regulation, Dundon et a l  (2004) 
suggest this is dependent on how deeply the arrangements are embedded into the 
organisation. This goes beyond the frequency of a set of voice practices or the 
number of arrangements. Rather, it implies a systematic alliance and alignment of 
purpose and practice of voice arrangements covering issues of concern with 
employer and employee outcomes. Dundon et a l  (2004: 1167) also argue that the 
depth of consultation and negotiation both in distributive and integrative terms 
incorporates a broader set of strategic policies.
The second issue of the link between employee voice and employee satisfaction and 
perceived effectiveness is problematic, given that the actual contribution of a voice 
mechanism to various outcomes may be diffuse and complex, and it is thus difficult 
to isolate its impact. Importantly, this may also rely on the extent to which a voice 
mechanism is embedded in an organisation. As Dundon et a l  (2004:1167) suggest, 
consequently we are largely dependent upon management’s and employees’ 
assessments of the perceived impact of voice on attitudes and behaviour at work. As 
Dundon et a l  (2004:1167-1168) also argue, ‘should assessments be made in terms of 
merely having a voice (ie the process) or in terms of how things may be changed due 
to voice (ie the outcomes). ...Broadly speaking, employee voice is primarily a loose 
and imprecise notion that was seen to contribute to competitive advantage but also as 
part of a general and broader bundle of human resource practices’.
Finally, Dundon and Rollinson (2004:53) argue that employee voice mechanisms are 
often defined according to management’s own interpretations of what the expression 
of voice is taken to mean, thus shaping the prevailing climate in an organisation and 
the extent of influence which employees feel they have on matters that affect them.
In this thesis, voice is defined as the means not only to communicate or consult but to 
potentially influence the decision-making process. However, it could be argued that
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influence provides the foundation for power and the expression of that power 
through industrial ‘muscle’, and consequently it is acknowledged that voice and 
influence are linked, but are nonetheless different constructs with different purposes.
NER voice arrangements
More specifically, in structure terms NER voice arrangements can take a number of 
forms in the UK with the precise structure and level of the NER arrangements 
varying considerably. They may take the form of peer review panels, safety 
committees, works councils, consultative councils/committees or joint consultative 
committees. In addition, the official terminology varies between jurisdictions and 
even among research surveys. But in reality the variations in terminology do not 
equate to differences in function. This lack of commonality between NER structures 
are a result of the absence of prescriptive legal requirements and definitions 
associated with NER structures in the UK.
Due to the complexity of and the variations in NER arrangements precise definitions 
are problematical. However, five elements can be identified. First, only employees in 
the organisation can be members of the representative body. Second, there is no or 
only limited formal linkage to outside trade unions or external employee 
representative bodies. Thirdly, a degree of resources is supplied by the organisation 
in which the employee representative body is based. Fourthly, there is a 
representation of employees’ interests or agency function, as opposed to more direct 
forms of individual participation and involvement8. Finally, such structures represent 
all employees9 at the establishment or workplace.
In addition, the range of issues considered by a non-union form of representation 
varies considerably, and is often dependent to some extent on its level and structure 
in the organisation (i.e. ranging from workplace/work zone safety committees to
8 Other forms o f direct participation may include TQM teams, self-managed work teams and quality 
circles. Importantly, these forms o f direct participation are not representational in nature as they 
include every worker in the work group. Research from the European Works Council Study Group 
has suggested that direct employee involvement is lower in organisations with formal representative 
structures. This may imply that direct and indirect employee involvement are to some extent acting as 
substitutes (Fenton-O’Creevy, Wood and Callerot 1998: 24).
9 These structures may include union members where present.
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company-wide joint employee-management structures) (also see Gollan, 2000: 410- 
411). Some structures may also have management representation (often as chair) and 
involve union representatives.
In more conceptual terms Taras and Kaufman (2006: 515) define NER voice 
arrangements as:
...one or more employees who act in an agency function fo r  other 
employees in dealings with management over issues o f mutual 
concern, including the terms and conditions under which people 
work. Selected workers’ representatives meet with managers, 
usually in committee-type structures in which communication and 
exchange o f thoughts is fostered. Representatives usually are 
internal to the company and serve in leadership roles fo r  limited 
terms. NER is based on a quid pro quo between managers and 
workers. In setting up such plans, management expects that the 
plans will encourage cooperative, advisory, and consultative modes 
o f interaction so that friction points between management and 
employees can be lessened or eliminated. In taking on a 
representational function, workers expect that NER will provide a 
meaningful forum fo r  employee voice, a capacity to influence 
managerial decision-making, and recognition by managers that 
workers have a right to respectful treatment.
2.3 Scope and presence of NER voice arrangements
Using data from the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), 
the extent of NER forms, such as joint consultative committees (JCCs) can be 
assessed. In 1998, 20 per cent of non-union workplaces in the UK reported the 
presence of NERs at workplace level and 27 per cent of workplaces did not have a 
workplace-level committee but had a committee that operated at a higher level in the 
organisation (Cully et al., 1999). This is in contrast to the first findings from the
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2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (Kersley et a l , 2005), which 
indicated 14 per cent of workplaces with 10 or more employees had a workplace- 
level committee, and 25 per cent had a higher level committee. Overall, two-fifths 
(or 42 per cent) of all employees worked in a workplace with a workplace-level joint 
consultative committee compared with 46 per cent in 1998 (Kersley et al., 2005: 14).
Evidence from WERS98 has indicated that only 11 per cent of workplaces had a 
representative committee at the workplace as well as at a higher level in the 
organisation (Cully et a l  1998: 12). This would suggest only limited adoption of an 
integrated collective consultation strategy in UK organisations, with such structures 
either located at workplace level dealing with a narrow range of workplace issues, or 
with consultation structures located at higher levels of the organisation far removed 
from workplace involvement (also see Cully et a l  1999).
Bryson’s (2004: 214) analysis of successive Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
of workplaces with 20 or more employees suggests that between 1984 and 1998 the 
proportion of workplaces with union only voice arrangements fell from 24 to 9 per 
cent, while the proportion of workplaces with solely direct voice mechanisms rose 
nearly threefold, from 11 to 30 per cent.
This is significant given the overall reduction in collective industrial relations (Cully 
et al., 1998: 28) and the widening of what has been termed the ‘representation gap’ 
(Freeman and Rogers, 1993: Towers, 1997). In particular, this was particularly 
evident in the fall in union recognition from 66 per cent in 1984 to 45 per cent in 
199810 (Cully et a l ,  1998: 15). In addition, there was an increase in the number of 
workplaces without union members, from 36 per cent in 1990 to 47 per cent in 1998. 
It has also been suggested that even where union recognition and union-employer 
agreements were secured, there was a ‘hollowing out’ of worker representation with 
half of all workplaces with worker representatives in the WERS98 survey having no 
negotiations over any issues (Cully et a l  1998: 110). It has been suggested that this 
transformation ‘points to many trade unions “withering on the vine”, and where
10 Workplaces with 25 or more employees.
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traditional industrial relations procedures remain in place they increasingly come to 
resemble a “hollow shell’” (Bacon and Storey, 2002: 408; Hyman, 1997).
Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000) compared the findings of the previous workplace 
surveys for the period from 1984 to 1998. A fundamental change over the period was 
the proportion of employees without access to active consultative structures through 
“functioning consultative committees” (committees that regularly meet and discuss 
important issues at the workplace). Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000) paint a bleak 
picture for such institutions and suggest that these committees may actually be 
declining, in step with the fall in trade union membership over the period. 
Consultative committees were present in only a quarter of workplaces in 1998, 
compared with just under a third in 1984. The proportion of employees in 
workplaces with a consultative committee also fell from 50 per cent to 43 per cent 
over the same period.
This research also highlights the importance of the complementary presence of a 
trade union and consultative committees at the workplace. It suggests that 
workplaces that do not recognise a union are significantly less likely to have a 
consultative body. Only a third of non-union workplaces had a joint consultative 
structure compared to around three-quarters of workplaces where a trade union is 
recognised. In addition, the findings suggest that consultative committees are not 
enduring institutions of employee representation.
Between 1990 and 1998 just over one-in-ten workplaces operating through this 
period discontinued their consultative committee. However, analysis of successive 
workplace surveys in the series from 1984 to 1998 in workplaces with 25 or more 
employees suggests that the proportion of employees without access to voice 
mechanisms remained relatively stable at around 17 per cent (Bryson, 2000). This 
study also highlighted the increase in direct forms of employee involvement and 
participation in UK workplaces. During the period from 1984 to 1998 the incidence 
of representative-only structures halved, while direct voice channels increased 
threefold (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Changes in employee voice arrangements from 1984 to 1998 
(percentage)
Type of voice arrangement 1984 1990 1998
Union only11 24 14 9
Union and non-union 43 39 33
Non-union only 17 28 40
No voice 16 19 17
Representative voice only 29 18 14
Representative and direct voice 45 43 39
Direct voice only 11 20 30
No voice 16 19 17
Weighted base 2,000 1,997 1,991
Unweighted base 2,019 2,059 1,920
Source: Bryson (2000) adapted from  Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000), Tables 
4.13 (p. 122) and 4.15 (p. 127) Base: all workplaces with 25 or more employees
More challenging for the future of trade union arrangements are the attitudes of 
employers. The WERS98 findings also indicated that only around a third of 
managers were in favour of employees being union members (Cully et al., 1998:87). 
This is significant given that the WERS98 survey findings also suggest that 
management attitudes crucially affect union presence and effectiveness in the 
workplace (Cully et al. 1998: 19).
Millward, Bryson and Forth’s (2000: 69) review of the WERS98 data also suggests 
that while the proportion of workplaces in the survey where management gave 
employees no information fell from 22 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent in 1998 with a 
greater proportion of managers providing information on financial matters, ‘there 
remained a substantial minority of employers divulging little information to their
11 Union voice is defined as one or more recognised trade unions or a joint consultative committee 
meeting as least once a month with representatives chosen through union channels.
12 Non-union voice is defined as a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month with 
representatives not chosen through union channels, regular meetings between senior management and 
the workforce, briefing groups etc.
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workforces’ with the unionised workplaces twice as likely to provide such 
information as non-union workplaces.
Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000) research also posits that while formal NER voice 
mechanisms help to promote communication in the workplace and are more effective 
in enhancing responsiveness of management to specific employee issues, they also 
appear less effective than unions at promoting fair treatment for employees in 
general.
The first findings of WERS 2004 would also point to an increase in direct 
communication in the private sector. Some 82 per cent of managers in the private 
sector held meetings with their entire workforce or team briefings in 1998, compared 
with 90 per cent in 2004. There was little change in the public sector during this 
period. The findings from WERS 2004 first findings also indicate that only 34 per 
cent of all employees in workplaces with 10 or more employees were union members 
and 64 per cent of workplaces had no union members. Importantly, union members 
made up a majority of the workforce in only 18 per cent of all workplaces in the 
survey (Kersley et a l  2005).
2.4 Structures and practices of NER voice
As Butler (2005: 273) notes, qualitative data on NERs is limited and piecemeal, 
consisting largely of a handful of isolated case studies (see below), along with some 
impressionistic conclusions. Given the decline in trade union coverage, Millward et 
a l  (2000: 108) highlight the importance of NERs by stating ‘it is now ever more 
pertinent to examine the incidence of other forms of employee voice’. However, 
Butler (2005: 273) argues that the incidence p erse , ‘tells us little if anything about 
the dynamics and outcomes of the voice process. Ultimately there is a need for in- 
depth qualitative data to unravel such issues’.
Previous case study research in the UK details the composition, structures and 
processes involved in NER arrangements (Cressey, 1985; Cressey, Eldridge and
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Maclnnes, 1985; Flanders, Pomeranz and Woodward, 1968; Gollan, 1999; IDS,
1989; IDS, 1994; IDS, 1995; IDS, 1997; IDS, 1999; IDS, 2005; IRS, 1996;
Littlefield, 1996; McLoughlin and Gourlay, 1994). A review of the case study 
research indicates that in a large majority of firms the main aim of NER 
arrangements was to increase consultation and communication, with few having a 
bargaining role (in-depth discussion of management strategies towards NER is 
provided in Chapter Three). It would seem from their stated objectives that 
management view NER structures solely as a means to increase company 
productivity and efficiency, and to promote an understanding of company policy 
rather than as an effective forum of collective representation for the interests of 
employees rather than management.
The most important link between members of NER arrangements and those who are 
being represented is the process and procedures for appointing representatives. While 
the literature would suggest that these NER structures have some formal procedures, 
with most having secret individual ballots organised by the personnel departments 
for terms of up to three years, others had representatives appointed by management. 
The majority of companies operate a qualification period for membership of the 
committees (usually six months to two years’ service with a minimum age 
requirement), although this is not always enforced. The majority also exclude 
employees involved in disciplinary procedures.
Another important issue regarding the representativeness of committee members is 
the interaction of the views of those represented and the representatives themselves. 
The election process is the most obvious form of interaction, but other forms are less 
evident. While few companies address this issue, some companies allow 
representatives ‘reasonable time’ away from their places of work to seek the views of 
employees. In addition, shift employees who attend meetings are often not paid, nor 
are their travel expenses reimbursed. Moreover, few companies provide induction 
programmes involving training in communications, interviewing, time management 
and business for employee representatives.
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A review of case study research in the UK by Beaumont and Hunter (2003); Bonner 
and Gollan (2005); Broad (1994); Butler (2005); Cressey et al. (1985); Dietz, Cullen 
and Coad (2005); Dundon and Rollinson (2004); Gollan (2000, 2001, 2002a, 2003b); 
Kirkbride (1986a, 1986b); Lloyd (2001); McLoughlin and Gourlay (1994); Terry 
(1999); and Watling and Snook (2003) have reinforced the finding that for a large 
majority of non-union firms the main aim of collective consultation is to increase 
information and communication, rather than negotiation or bargaining. Thus NER 
arrangements appear to have limited ability to influence wages policy, strategic 
issues and organisational change. Most of these organisations see non-union 
representation and consultation as providing a more effective channel of 
communication than unions, stressing more ‘harmonious’ and less conflictual 
relations with the workforce, thus building and encouraging an atmosphere of mutual 
co-operation.
An important issue regarding the representativeness of NER arrangements is the 
number of representatives per employee and the frequency of meetings. Previous 
case study research also highlighted considerable variation in the range of employees 
covered by such arrangements. Committees were either based on an actual area in the 
organisation or on function, or a combination of the two. Some included 
management representatives as well as shopfloor employees.
In these studies, committees vary from around 10 to 12 employees per representative 
to between 200 and 500 plus. These committees have different levels of 
representation (workplace, division and company) with the average being around 40 
to 60 employees per representative. This variation in the ratio of employees to 
representatives would suggest considerable differences in terms of their ability to 
effectively represent the views of employees.
Most committees have a mix of employee and management representatives with the 
majority of committee members representing employees. However, most committees 
are chaired by senior management, usually the managing director or senior divisional 
director, who has the authority to veto decisions taken by the committee. In addition,
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some committees can only make recommendations to management but not formal 
decisions. Frequency of meetings in the sample ranges from once a month to twice 
yearly, with the average being around every two months. Some companies also make 
provision for special meetings where necessary.
The case studies reveal a further area of concern -  the attempt to distinguish between 
-bargaining and consultation. Some have suggested these two aspects go to the core 
of the effectiveness of such bodies (Terry, 1999), while others have suggested that 
NER arrangements may have many different functions, purposes and roles, with 
negotiation and bargaining a relatively insignificant part of the process (Gollan, 
2005). Findings from the case studies would suggest that in reality the negotiated 
agreement then took the form of a recommendation to corporate management or, as 
previously mentioned, the chair (most often senior management) had the right of 
veto. Notably, there was an absence of matters relating to financial, investment and 
company strategy. It must be questioned whether this form of ‘consultation’ and 
‘negotiation’ would be able to exist in a unionised environment.
Dundon and Rollinson’s (2004: 157) case study research in four non-union firms 
indicated that all the NER arrangements in their study were designed and controlled 
by management and where employees could contribute, their contributions were 
limited to those issues deemed ‘appropriate’ by management. They also highlight 
that on more substantive issues (such as wages or conditions), ‘only a small number 
of employees in all these case studies were satisfied with the arrangements to speak 
to their employer’ (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004: 157).
The research also reveals that few organisations allowed consultation over individual 
grievances, although there were some organisations which encouraged 
representatives to accompany individual employees through grievance or disciplinary 
procedures. This lack of representation over individual grievances would therefore 
not signify an alternative to the grievance handling role of a trade union. In addition, 
many companies use some form of external mechanism for resolving disagreements. 
It must then also be questioned whether these arrangements have any influence
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without the ability to impose sanctions on organisations in the interests of those 
represented (as is the case with trade unions). This would appear to undermine the 
effectiveness of these committees in this respect.
Additional research from the WERS98 survey by Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000) 
posits that while formal non-union voice mechanisms help to promote 
communication in the workplace and are more effective in enhancing responsiveness 
of management to specific employee issues, they also appear less effective than 
unions at promoting fair treatment for employees in general.
Oxenbridge et a l  (2001: 19) suggest that the issues most commonly discussed by 
existing consultative committees in both unionised and non-union firms relate to 
organisational change, including the implementation of restructuring, redundancy, 
short-time working programmes, harmonisation of terms and conditions following 
company mergers and acquisitions, and the transfer of workers after winning 
outsourcing contracts. The researchers argue that ‘the growth of consultation over 
such issues may offer an explanation as to why many employers were planning new, 
formal committees’ (Oxenbridge et a l, 2001: 20).
From this review of the research it would appear that NER arrangements have been 
viewed primarily as a means of increasing company productivity and efficiency, and 
promoting an understanding of company policy rather than as a forum of collective 
representation for promoting the interests of employees. As such two major themes 
appear to underlie these conclusions -  power and influence, and the level of 
autonomy and independence of NER arrangements.
2.5 Conceptual issues
From the above discussion of the research two major themes can be identified: one, 
the power and influence of NER voice arrangements; and two, their level of 
autonomy and independence from management. These themes are examined within 
the context of NER arrangements.
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2.5.1 Power and influence
It has been suggested by Butler (2005) that one of the more neglected areas in the 
case study literature on NER arrangements is a systematic analysis of the concept of 
power. As Butler (2005: 275) states, ‘notwithstanding the centrality of power to 
various facets of the employment relationship, the term remains poorly articulated’. 
Martin (1992: 2) notes, ‘orthodox industrial relations scholars have recognised the 
central importance of power, but not subjected it to conceptual analysis’ (also see 
Butler, 2005: 275).
According to Butler (2005), although less formally specified, power is an implicit 
theme within employee representation. However, in these instances the focus is more 
centrally on the inability of NERs to gain concessions via formally articulated 
grievances (ie observable rather than latent conflict). For example, Broad’s (1984) 
study of ‘DenkiCo’ raises issues relating to the organisation of work. Similarly in 
Lloyd’s (2001) study of ‘Aeroparts’, changes to shift patterns, work organisation and 
the distribution of overtime are ‘bulldozed’ through by management (Lloyd, 2001: 
322). A number of studies have suggested that the ability of NER forms to 
vigorously and proactively pursue a specifically employee set of goals is problematic 
(Butler, 2005: 274). Overall these studies would suggest that NERs have little 
influence in curbing managerial power rendering attempts to modify or frustrate the 
managerial agenda useless.
Poole (1978) is one theorist who has attempted a formal conceptualisation of power. 
His approach focuses on ‘manifest power’. According to Butler (2005), operationally 
‘manifest power’ can be captured through the development of the dimensions of the 
‘scope’ and ‘range’ of issues influenced (or controlled) by the representative agency. 
Scope may be viewed as a gradation of potential involvement ranging from negotiation 
at one extreme, down to the mere right to information at the other, with consultation 
occupying the intermediate territory. Range can be seen conceptually as a hierarchy, at 
the top of which are the traditional areas of managerial prerogative e.g. investment, job
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security and the pace of work. The setting of wages is customarily viewed as 
occupying an intermediate position, while more integrative issues such as hiring and 
training occupy the bottom rungs. Butler (2005) suggests that the intersection of these 
vectors can be used to provide a broad index of visible or manifest power.
Under voluntarist industrial relations systems an employer may dissolve or severely 
restrict employee involvement and influence over firm decision-making structures by 
channelling the power and activities of employee representatives into narrow roles 
(Hammer, 1997) (in the case of direct participation, narrowing the ‘domain’ and 
scope of issues).
The evidence would also suggest that voice arrangements and monopoly power 
mechanisms such as unions may be straightforward to acknowledge but in many 
other situations it is difficult to ‘disentangle the separate contributions of voice and 
monopoly power because the two often act together to reinforce each other’ (Verma, 
2005).
Interestingly, Dundon and Rollinson’s (2004: 156) research into non-union firms 
indicated an inverse relationship between the presence of a set of non-union voice 
arrangements, and employees’ perception of the utility and effectiveness in 
influencing the decision-making process. As an example, a firm in their study -  
Water Co. -  lacked any formal voice arrangement, yet employees reported a high 
degree of satisfaction regarding opportunities to express their voice and to influence 
management. However, in other firms -  Chem Co. and Delivery Co. -  which had a 
range of voice arrangements, a significant number of employees indicated 
dissatisfaction over such arrangements in terms of their effectiveness and influence 
over the decision-making processes.
2.5.2 Autonomy and independence
According to Butler (2005), in its simplest form autonomy relates to the sovereignty of 
the individual, or in a collective context, ‘the capacity for self government -  agents are
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truly autonomous if their activities are truly their own’ (Blackburn, 1996: 31). 
Importantly it can also be said that elected representatives may be seen as lacking in 
autonomy, if their will is under the control or manipulation of another (Butler, 2005).
While autonomy can be seen simply as freedom from external constraints, Butler 
(2005) argues that conceptually autonomy can be understood along two dimensions. 
The first concerns the degree of autonomy a representative structure has in terms of 
the extent to which the terms of reference, constitution, and overall representative 
framework are determined by employees and/or their representative agents.
Secondly, consideration is given to the autonomy of the resultant representative 
process and agenda. Butler (2005) further suggests that theoretically this mode of 
autonomy may be further sub-divided. One issue is whether representative agents are 
subject to explicit and/or implicit pressures that function as signposts curbing and/or 
sanctioning specific modes of behaviour. Butler (2005) also argues that this is linked 
to concepts of other latent or potential aspects of power and their actual realisation 
(Poole, 1978: 19). Research would also suggest that individuals’ perceptions of 
justice are influenced by the amount of control and autonomy they have over both 
processes and outcomes (Folger, 1986) based on the psychological beliefs of fair 
treatment of oneself (also see Hammer, 1997: 13).
Gollan’s (2002b) work on News International is significant in questioning the 
independence of NER structures. This analysis drawing on Kaufman and Kleiner’s 
(1993: 325) principal presupposition that such ‘employer sponsored structures’ are 
inherently flawed, given that they are usually created and controlled by management. 
As Butler (2005: 274) has suggested, this theme is reflected in the wider literature, 
where much of the data is demonstrative of an absence of institutional distance 
between delegates and their managerial sponsors, amid characteristic concerns that 
representatives are ‘in the pockets of management’ (Watling and Snook, 2001: 8). 
Given their questionable autonomy, the extent to which these institutions are free to 
formulate both policy and strategy independently is hence problematic. Interestingly, 
there is a notable tendency for NER arrangements to prove somewhat unstable, with 
the lack of independence serving to undermine the legitimacy of these institutions.
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Indeed in a number of the studies (Bonner and Gollan, 2005; Broad, 1994; Gollan, 
2001; Watling and Snook, 2001), NER forms are eventually ousted and superseded 
by trade union recognition agreements.
2.6 Overview
In summary the research reveals three main areas of concern: first, the attempt to 
distinguish between negotiation or bargaining and consultation; second, the ability of 
NER forms to resolve conflict and ‘deadlocks’; and thirdly the degree of 
independence NER forms have from management influence. It is argued that these 
three factors go to the core of the effectiveness of such bodies. Although a minority 
of the NER arrangements were allowed a degree of consultation, there were few 
instances where pay and conditions were negotiated. On the other hand, some 
researchers have suggested that NER may have many functions, purposes and roles, 
with negotiation and bargaining a relatively insignificant part of the process (Gollan, 
2001; Lloyd, 2001; Terry 1999).
A number of important points can be made from the research presented in this 
chapter. First, NER arrangements generally have limited access to resources (eg 
training) for establishing independence, thus reducing their ability to effectively 
evaluate the issues discussed at meetings and represent the views of employees. 
Second, most NER bodies are structured on a mixed basis of employee-elected 
representatives and appointed management delegates, with the latter occupying the 
most senior position of chair. The case study evidence also suggests that 
management is usually the party that controls the structure and agenda at meetings. 
While the election of employee representatives could give the impression of 
legitimacy to decisions, in reality this must be questioned. Third, most bodies are 
only given powers of recommendation to management or the chair has the right of 
veto over decisions. Fourth, unlike unions, few committees have negotiation and 
bargaining rights over pay and conditions, while consultation issues often lack 
financial, investment or strategic data. Finally, few of these bodies in practice fulfil 
the traditional trade union activities of grievance handling and conflict resolution,
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with such issues being dealt with by local managers or internal dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
Overall, the literature and research highlight fundamental problems with NER voice 
arrangements, with issues of conflict resolution in negotiations, the level of power and 
influence, and finally the autonomy and independence underpinning such concerns. 
While such issues in the wider industrial relations context can also be found in relation 
to trade union voice, the nature and resources of NER voice arrangements as 
managerial creations make this more acute.
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CHAPTER THREE
NON-UNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: A 
DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND
EXISTING RESEARCH
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the current debates concerning NER arrangements from an 
international context. The chapter reviews the current literature and debates around 
three core themes: First, management strategies towards NER arrangements and 
whether such arrangements are used by management as a complement to or 
substitute for union representation; Second, the perceived effectiveness and 
workplace outcomes of NER arrangements. This section also explores whether 
perceived effectiveness and the subsequent outcomes have any relationship to 
management’s reasons for establishing NER arrangements, or whether they are 
unimportant; Third, conditions for unionisation and union responses to NER voice 
arrangements are examined. Finally, having reviewed this debate the chapter 
concludes by developing a framework of management strategies towards NER 
arrangements and union responses to such arrangements.
3.2 Management strategies towards NER
A critical question in the debate is why firms introduce NER voice arrangements?
Flood and Toner (1997) have presented a conceptual framework indicating how a 
11Catch-22 situation is avoided in non-union firms. This is premised on the 
hypothesis that the fear of trade unions requires such firms to provide pay and 
conditions, job security and complaints procedures at least as good (and most often 
better) than in a comparable unionised environment. Thus any benefits derived from
13 For example, non-union firms may go to great expense to avoid union organisation, however they 
cannot take advantage o f the absence o f unions in offering less favourable pay and conditions than the 
market rate since this would give workers an incentive to join a union (Flood and Toner, 1997: 258).
Paul J  Gollan 44
th e  L ondon S ch o o l of E c o n o m ic s
a n d  P o l i t ic a l  S c ie n c -
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
non-unionism are dissipated by the extra cost in providing these benefits. However, 
they state that this Catch-22 situation can be avoided since the more adversarial 
climate associated with unions can be reduced. They go on to argue that non-union 
status may enable them to gain greater cooperation from employees in making 
unpopular changes and economies without the threat of industrial action, stoppages, 
demarcation or other forms of retribution. Flood and Toner (1997: 269) also state, 
‘Non-union status does afford the opportunity to build a strong company culture, and 
to design policies aimed at increasing motivation and co-operation’.
However, they also highlight a note of caution, stating that employers ‘cannot take 
unlimited liberties with employees just because they are not in a union. If they do, 
the unitary culture will show signs of strain and may break down, and in the worst 
case employees will turn to unions for support’ (Flood and Toner, 1997: 267-268).
The literature has identified two central issues as being at the core of management 
strategies towards NER -  the question of establishing a single or dual channel 
representative arrangement, and whether such arrangements are used by management 
as a complement to or substitute for union representation
3.2.1 Single or dual channel representation
Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003) see the rationale for employer demand for voice 
in terms of the product market model based on the beneficial effects on firm 
performance14. In particular, they explore the positive effects attached to 
representation in the workplace based on economic utility and psychological benefits 
(also see Freeman and Rogers, 1999). They see voice (including non-union 
representation) in the context of institutional economics with the emergence of
14 Research findings by Batt, Colvin and Keefe (2002) applying Freeman and M edoff s (1984) exit- 
voice model suggest that union institutions and management policies that facilitate voice can 
significantly reduce exit, despite significant declines in union density and controlling for team-based 
voice mechanisms, pay and other human resources practices that are affected by collective bargaining. 
Importantly, they suggest that union representation and direct participation (for example, problem 
solving groups and self-directed teams) may be viewed as complementary vehicles for employee 
voice at work.
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different voice arrangements based on a contracting problem -  ‘make or buy decision 
on the part of the employer’ (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 1).
As part of their analysis they suggest, ‘the probability of union voice within an 
establishment may be defined in terms of the values of and relationships between’ 
three variables: employee propensity to join a union; union propensity to organise at 
a workplace, and employer propensity to deal with a union (Willman, Bryson and 
Gomez, 2003: 2). Union voice may have a number of complex or varied 
combinations. For example, employees become active around a grievance or set of 
grievances and seek to join a union. A union may focus its organising activity within 
a particular workplace or industry and force the employer to recognise a union. Or an 
employer may pre-emptively recognise a union by choosing a particular union. 
Significantly, they suggest that, ‘employer preference for a particular voice regime is 
likely to be a prime factor in its emergence’. They also add that while employer 
preferences may change due to a number of factors (legislation, union campaigns, 
employee dissatisfaction, industrial action etc) there is ‘stickiness’ to regime choice 
based on the high cost of switching (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 4).
Applying transaction cost economics to employment, the decision to make (own 
voice) or buy (contract voice) is based on a number of factors. These include the 
specificity of the asset (the type of employee), frequency of the interaction (voice 
exchange through consultation and bargaining), its uncertainty (permanent or 
temporary employee and the need for a voice arrangement), and its governance 
structures (voice effectiveness and value). According to transaction cost economics, 
the more idiosyncratic or unpredictable situations are, and increase frequency of 
interaction and duration of exchange, the greater likelihood of the employer ‘making’ 
their own voice arrangement. Such a choice will be governed by bounded rationality 
and trust between parties (ie expectation of opportunism by the other party). The 
limitation of the model is explaining why there is continued existence of different 
governance mechanisms (or voice arrangements) for similar transactions (for 
example, consultation and bargaining).
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Making voice would require an employer to create a non-union voice arrangement 
which would be perceived as legitimate by employees. Buying voice would mean 
subcontracting out to a trade union all aspects of voice provision. Hybrid (or dual) 
forms of voice arrangements with a mixture of union and non-union voice structures 
could be established based on the nature of the transaction process (asset specificity, 
frequency and uncertainty) or the behaviour of the other party (boundedness of 
rationality, expectation or perception of opportunism and risk preference) (Willman, 
Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 6).
Employers may choose not to create voice either because they are not concerned with 
exit costs or the costs associated with the creation of voice exceed those of exit. 
Where voice is chosen within a transaction cost framework, three options can be 
identified:
• Buy (union) -  where an employer subcontracts one or more unions to 
establish voice. This involves a long-term contract of voice provision where 
an employer’s direct costs are low but the risk of supplier (or in this case a 
trade union) opportunism is high.
• Make (non-union) -  This is closely associated with the more sophisticated 
HRM approaches and involves employers choosing directly to provide a set 
of employee voice mechanisms and excluding third party intervention. While 
direct employer costs are high (and there is a risk that such arrangements may 
not provide the required level of voice), the risk of a counter behaviour from 
a third party (for example, trade unions) is greatly reduced. (Under current 
legislative arrangements on union recognition it is not totally eliminated 
given the threat posed by unions outside the firm or workplace when there is 
insufficient voice).
• Hedge (dual channel) -  Under this approach there is a mixture and co­
existence of union and non-union voice arrangements (Williamson, 1991). 
This may be seen as a form of employer hedging, with the employer
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attempting to control and balance both cost and risk (Willman, Bryson and 
Gomez, 2003: 6).
From an employer perspective the choice of which option to apply will be dependent 
on a number of factors and influences. For example, under the ‘make’ option a 
consideration for the firm will be its ability to hire HR specialists and expertise to 
generate institutional forms which elicit voice without the existence of a third 
independent party. In addition, the effectiveness and long-term survival of NER will 
also be dependent on acquiring the capacity and skills among employee 
representatives to maintain and increase the effectiveness of such arrangements. This 
may incur additional costs for the employer in terms of training, education and skills 
development. On the other hand, a key risk for buying in voice is the probability that 
the firm will have a totally non-opportunistic (weak union etc) or a counterparty 
(militant union etc). For example, if a union becomes more militant, the firm may 
seek to provide an alternative voice channel as a reliable alternative (Willman, 
Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 8).
Hedging is the highest cost option overall although the one with the lowest risk. 
Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003: 8) suggest that firms wishing to change existing 
arrangements are more likely to switch from wholly union or wholly non-union to a 
dual channel rather than switching from wholly union to wholly non-union single 
channels (or the reverse). They argue that if one channel is unsatisfactory (because 
the union is unreliable) or too costly (perhaps because of the number of personnel 
specialists required or being able to extract a greater share of profits) then hedging to 
a dual channel arrangement is more likely than the abandonment of sunk costs (see 
Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Voice regime: effectiveness, risk, direct cost and switching cost
Channel Buy (union) Hedge (dual) Make (NER)
Direct cost LOW HIGH HIGH
Switching cost HIGH HIGH LOW
Risk/Opportunism HIGH MED LOW
Effectiveness in 
meeting firm’s 
objectives
MED MED HIGH
(Adapted from  Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 23)
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In summary, under the ‘buy’ option the switching cost may be high due to the 
potential for industrial action and disputes. Equally, under the hedge option the set­
up costs may be high due to the establishment of a dual structure. However, 
switching from the ‘make’ option to either the ‘hedge’ or ‘buy’ option would involve 
little or no additional cost of recognising a union. Importantly, a number of factors 
might induce or encourage firms to switch voice arrangements: union voice is fragile 
with low union membership; interruptions to voice supply (strikes etc); where 
administrative costs rise; where employer-made voice is not viewed as legitimate by 
employees and is considered ineffective; or the union wage premium disappears.
Economists would suggest that firms have at their disposal a range of options for 
securing employee commitment, compliance, retention, motivation, and knowledge 
and information sharing. This can be conceptualised as ‘asset specificity’, where an 
employer experiences substantial exit costs and where the value of knowledge and 
information sharing is high, either due to a highly skilled workforce or where the 
nature of the product or service delivery requires highly trained, experienced or 
specialist personnel. Thus the employer is able to generate higher revenues and 
endure higher costs. However, as Chiles and McMackin (1996) suggest the risk 
preference of the employer may generate different choices in otherwise identical 
situations. For example, risk averse firms may opt for non-union voice arrangements 
(with greater cost) than union channels due to an overestimation of union risk.
As such may establish NER arrangements for the purposes of negotiation to reduce 
the likelihood of outside involvement by trade unions in organisational decision­
making, thus ensuring that negotiation processes are contained within the 
organisation. This may be due to the perception that an outside influence can distort 
internal processes and structures, impacting negatively on employee behaviour and 
organisational performance (Taras and Kaufman, 1999).
Freeman and Medoff (1984) highlight these integrative and distributive functions of 
unions both as bargaining agents over the distribution of the surplus of labour- 
management cooperation and as a collective voice to raise productivity. In other
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words, they impact on both the distribution and the size of the surplus. It is argued 
that these two activities can interfere with each other, in that the information shared 
in raising productivity can be used strategically to increase the share of the surplus. 
As such, it is suggested that cooperation can be fragile and tenuous. Freeman and 
Lazear (1995) also examine the two options facing collective voice arrangements 
such as a works council: to provide collective voice arrangements and to bargain 
over rents earned by the firm (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Distributional impact of works councils on surplus and cost
R(x): Total surplus 
generated by firmSurplus
(R)
R(c): running costs
S: Shares of 
employer & 
workers
R(o)
P: Firm’s 
profit after 
council costs
X(f) X(o) X(w) Works council power (X)
(Adapted from Freeman and Lazear (1995: 30)
Freeman and Lazear (1995) argue that both firms and employees are interested in the 
size of the surplus earned by the firm (R), and their relative shares (S). Thus works 
council decision power has three effects. It raises ‘R \  the total surplus earned by the 
firm, as works council input leads to better decisions. However, over time its power 
is too great for management to make effective decisions (so R then declines). 
Moreover, the works council is also used to bargain over shares of the surplus earned 
by the firm. According to their model ‘R’, reaches a maximum when the works
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council is given power level X(o), which is the socially optimal level of power for 
the works council. The employer wishes to maximise profits and lower the cost of 
works council facilities etc. and thus decides on the basis of P, and chooses the works 
council’s power to be X(f). If the employees also seek to maximise the size of their 
share of the surplus, they will want a works council with power X(w) (Marsden, 
2003).
From this model two conclusions can be made. First, the social optimum will lie in 
between the preferred levels of works council power of firms and of employees 
X(o)/R(o). Second, R(o) shows the surplus with no works council (no representative 
worker voice), so if profits are below that, the firm will not want a works council 
(Marsden, 2003). From these conclusions, three implications can be highlighted.
One, the parties might bargain towards the social optimum (especially if R(o) is 
greater than running costs). Two, the size of the gap between X(f) and X(w) can be 
reduced by taking distributive bargaining out of the picture. This can be useful 
because it minimises the role of distribution of rents at the firm level, and makes the 
workplace institution concentrate on work conditions and increasing the size of the 
surplus, rather than the distribution of the surplus. Thus workplace representatives 
can increase the rewards for their constituents only by increasing the size of the pie. 
Three, works councils should be mandatory because employers will not give them 
enough power voluntarily to provide their voice function for fear it will be used to 
bargain a greater share of the surplus earned by the firm.
Finally, legislative frameworks may encourage the adoption of voice arrangements. 
Appelbaum and Batt’s (1994) analysis of the impediments to the diffusion of high- 
performance work systems15 (including voice arrangements) suggests, ‘an important 
role for public policy in developing an institutional framework that would support, 
rather than undermine, the transformation to high-performance work systems’. They 
go on to argue, ‘A more hospitable institutional setting might enable recent or newly 
emerging high-performance systems to survive the challenges posed by low-wage, 
low-skill competitors and by poor macroeconomic performance (Appelbaum and
15 The High Performance Work Systems approach includes practices that invest in the skills o f the 
workforce and provide the opportunity and incentives for employees to use those skills effectively  
(also see Appelbaum et al., 2000).
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Batt, 1994: 159-160). In addition, Appelbaum and Batt (1994) have applied 
institutional theory as a means to explain labour-market adaptations prompted by 
trigger events generating the diffusion of new ‘solutions’ to employment/labour 
management problems. Importantly, the incentive for ‘first moving’ is likely to be 
asset specificity.
As such, it is argued that choices of channels of voice are made by ‘bounded rational 
employers’. Bounded rationality contains within it the assumption that agents 
(parties) are pursuing their own goals which may partly overlap and diverge. 
Moreover, under imperfect information there is a probability of ‘asymmetry’ based 
on each agent being better informed than the other about different aspects of their 
collaboration. In the context of employment and work this usually means that 
workers have more detailed knowledge of how to perform the work task, and 
management have greater knowledge and information about the entire production 
process and the business strategy employed (Marsden, 1999: 12).
It is also argued that switching costs are high with employers tending to ‘stick’ to 
existing arrangements; where switching does occur it tends to be to a dual channel 
voice arrangement (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2003). This is premised on the 
belief that employers make rational decisions/choices within certain constraints or 
pressures. A rational choice model sets out free choices for firms to maximise utility 
(benefits over costs). Under bounded rationality it is assumed that such choices are 
constrained by limited access to relevant information or employers are limited in 
their capacity to deal with all the necessary information, thus creating conditions for 
opportunistic behaviour by other parties.
Applying agency and incentive theory to employee participation may address the 
principal-agent problem and assist employers to make more informed decisions, 
since managers cannot easily monitor performance of their subordinates (creating 
incentives for employees to ‘shirk’)16. In addition, participation may create scope for
16 Agency theory recognises that the interests o f principals (owners) and agents (managers) are not the 
same and that the principal and agent must align their differing interests. NER and employee 
participation arrangements may play an important role in motivating employees and managers. 
Agency theory can also be influenced by a number o f psychological and social processes, for
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peer group pressures encouraging cooperative solutions. It could also be assumed 
that cooperation in the workplace gives rise to a prisoner’s dilemma problem (all 
would be better-off if no one ‘shirked’, but each one privately has an incentive to 
free-ride if they think it will go undetected). As such, colleagues may be better at 
detecting who is ‘shirking’ than supervisors and managers, thus voice may engender 
positive motivation via increased levels of employee participation leading to 
increased levels of commitment. Such peer group pressures can be reinforced by 
other procedures (appraisals and performance-related pay) which make pay 
dependent on team or firm performance.
Askildsen, Jirjahn and Smith’s (2002) research would seem to suggest that the 
combination of greater profit sharing and active owners in less complex and 
bureaucratic firms could lead to a reduction of principal-agent problems between 
owners and managers, increasing trust, and lead to more cooperative and 
participative employee-employer relations. This would make formal representation 
of employee interests through NER unnecessary and superfluous. However, they 
found the opposite in organisations which were complex, with NER arrangements 
and profit sharing important in creating more formal and cooperative employment 
relations. The research also found that firms with strong insider interests make both 
formal employee representation and adversarial employment relationships more 
likely.
Other influences
Studies in the UK have identified managerial attitudes as key to the existence of 
more formalised employee consultation and participation practices (Fenton-
example, procedural justice and notions o f fairness. The agency problem may have opposing effects 
on trustful employer-employee relations (Jirjahn, 2003). Managers’ incentive to break an implicit 
promise on behalf o f  short-term profits is lower than that o f  the owners since they obtain only a small 
proportion o f the short-term profits from the opportunism o f owners, although have a disproportionate 
personal cost from informal sanctions and actions by the employees. Thus it can be expected that the 
separation o f ownership and control can produce a more cooperative and participative employment 
relations environment. However, alternatively managers may take advantage o f their control and use 
their discretionary power for self-interest since managers retain control over information processing 
and dissemination. This discretionary power creates opportunities for managers to limit responsibility 
and authority and pursue individual over longer-term company goals thus managers’ rent seeking 
behaviour distorts the incentives for em ployees to increase effort and reduces loyalty to the firm 
(Askildsen, Jirjahn and Smith, 2002).
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O ’Creevey, Wood and Callerot, 1998; Kessler, Jennings and Undy, 2000; Millward, 
Bryson and Forth, 2000; Wood and Albanese, 1995; Wood and De Menezes, 1998; 
Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005). These studies suggest that underpinning such 
practices is a relationship based on a high level of trust between management and 
employees. It is assumed that employees can be trusted to make important workplace 
decisions that will result in greater productivity and effectiveness. Employees are 
therefore given the opportunity to develop their knowledge and skills so that they can 
make these decisions.
Other studies in the US (Kaufman, 2003) have suggested that formalised consultation 
and participation arrangements such as NER structures can also provide management 
with an opportunity to ‘fine-tune’ the employer message before sending it out and 
give it greater credibility with the workforce. It has also been suggested that 
employee representation can improve the efficiency of information collection, 
processing and dissemination within a complex firm structure with multiple levels of 
authority (Kaufman, 2003; Kaufman and Levine, 2000). Kaufman (2000) argues that 
by skipping the various layers which can filter and distort information, employees 
and senior levels of management are able to communicate directly with each other. 
This is particularly important in larger firms17.
3.2.2 Research on management strategies towards NER
Quantitative research
Interestingly in Australia, findings from the Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (AWIRS) series (Callus, et al., 1991; Morehead, et al., 1997) 
indicated that employees in unionised workplaces felt more dissatisfied than their 
counterparts in non-union workplaces18. In addition, unionised employees were less 
likely to be satisfied with or have trust in management. What these findings suggest
17 It has been suggested that the ‘insulation barrier’ created by hierarchy may encourage lower level 
management to minimise the true extent and level o f shop floor discontent to their superiors 
(Kaufman, 2003).
18 These findings would also suggest that only 30 per cent o f unionised employees compared to 52 per 
cent o f non-union employees were satisfied
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is that the presence of a union may reduce employee identification with corporate 
aims and approaches. This may explain why management in non-union firms which 
are willing to establish alternative voice arrangements often offer enhanced wages 
and benefits and encourage a culture and image of mutual employee and employer 
goals and objectives.
Furthermore, Willman, Bryson and Gomez’ (2003) research in Britain suggests that 
since 1984 there has been a steep decline in union-only voice arrangements, with a 
less marked decline in ‘dual-channel’ voice involving union and non-union channels 
in combination (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 12). Significantly, these options 
were offset by a steep increase in voice arrangements which did not involve unions. 
Interestingly, while there have been substantial changes to the extent of voice 
arrangements since 1984, the proportion of workplaces wanting some type of voice 
arrangement and those choosing no voice has remained relatively stable. As can be 
seen in Figure 3.2, since the early 1980s most unionised workplaces operate under a 
dual channel structure of union and non-union voice arrangements. However in the 
latter half of the 1990s, the figures would suggest a trend from ‘buying’ to ‘making’ 
voice (Willman, Bryson and Gomez, 2003: 12-13).
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Figure 3.2 Voice channel choice in Britain: 1984 and 2001
Probabilities in 1984 Probabilities in 2001
Firm Firm
Voice
84%
Voice
82%
No voice
16%
No voice
18%
Make - 
Non-union 
16%
H edge - Buy -
Dual channel Union
42% 84%
Make - 
Non-union 
40%
H edge - 
Dual channel 
33%
B uy-
Union
9%
Source: Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003:27)
For the period 1990-1998, just under a third of workplaces (29.5 per cent) switched 
voice regimes with 42 per cent moving to dual channel arrangements (hedging the 
risk attached to a single channel regime). Nine per cent of workplaces opted out of 
single channel union-only arrangements (only two per cent of workplaces opted for 
union-only arrangements). Interestingly, the ‘stickiness’ of such arrangements was 
reinforced with only just over five per cent of workplaces derecognising unions (or 
some 9 per cent of workplaces with a union in 1990) (also see Millward et al., 2000: 
125). As highlighted by Millward et al. (2000: 124-125), the decline in union-only 
voice was largely accounted for by continuing workplaces switching from single­
channel union representation to dual-channel arrangements.
Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003: 13) attribute the switch away from union-only 
to dual channel voice arrangements to, ‘employers [were] hedging against the 
increased risk of union-only voice delivering effectively for them’. They present 
three reasons for this. First, the decline in union density within unionised workplaces 
made it more difficult for unions to operate as effective agents for employers (also 
see Millward et al., 2000:139-145). Second, the decline in national and sectoral-level
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collective bargaining encouraged employers to negotiate pay and conditions directly 
with their workforce without the need for a third party (also see Millward et a l,  
2000: 145-149). This view was expressed by over half (54 per cent) of managers in 
unionised workplaces in 1998 and some 86 per cent of managers in non-union 
workplaces19. Third, while there were just under 10 per cent of workplaces (9.6 per 
cent) opting for non-union only voice arrangements within continuing workplaces, 
just under eight per cent (7.7 per cent) dispensed with non-union only arrangements, 
suggesting an increasing volatility and vulnerability of these arrangements. This 
would indicate that there is a lower switching cost under dual arrangements than 
under single non-union arrangements.
According to Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003: 14), cohort effects were more 
significant than behavioural change among continuing workplaces in the rise of non­
union only voice arrangements in the 1990s. They state that non-union voice was 
more prevalent in the post-1980 workplace cohort compared to the pre-1980 cohort 
suggesting that the post-1980 cohort of workplaces utilised a greater level of 
alternatives to union-only voice which continued in the 1990s.
As Millward et aVs. (2000: 124-125) findings show, the increase in non-union only 
voice arrangements between 1990 and 1998 was largely accounted for by new 
‘greenfield’ workplaces deliberately adopting direct employer-employee 
communication and consultation methods rather than union channels of 
representation. These workplaces were also more likely to adopt such practices than 
continuing workplaces. Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003: 15) argue that such 
mimetic behaviour is partly attributed to the application of benchmarking20. They 
cited evidence that 60 per cent of workplaces with non-union only arrangements had 
used benchmarking practices compared with 42 per cent of union-only and 54 per 
cent of dual channel regimes.
19 These figures are based on managerial respondents to the Workplaces Employee Relations Survey 
1998 in all workplaces with 10 or more employees.
20 According to Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003: 15), benchmarking can be defined as ‘examining 
the way things are done at other workplaces compared to this establishment’.
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Research would also suggest that the probability of non-union voice arrangements 
rises with the degree of product market competition. Willman, Bryson and Gomez 
(2003: 16) argue that, ‘with an increase in the number of competitors, the probability 
of any union involvement in voice -  either through union-only or dual channel forms 
-  decreases. Of interest also is that the probability of “no voice” also increases’.
Forth and Millward (2002: 15-16) also indicated in their research that product market 
pressures (for example, productivity targets and JIT inventory systems) are 
associated with an increased presence of direct communication as part of a non-union 
only voice regime21.
Willman, Bryson and Gomez (2003: 17-18) conclude that the increasing 
compositional shift from manufacturing to services associated with high levels of 
asset specificity increased the levels of non-union only voice arrangements.
However, in workplaces and firms with union-based arrangements, such change was 
likely to be part of a dual channel voice arrangement. Importantly, competition in the 
product market or service delivery would also encourage non-union voice 
arrangements due to pressures on rent sharing with unions (for example, profits and 
wages). In addition, such employers may also want to control labour supply and risk 
through increased voice at the workplace and greater input into decision-making 
processes.
They also state that the relative decline in cost associated with the ‘make voice’ 
option due to an increasing supply of HR and employment relations expertise and 
knowledge also encouraged the non-union only voice option. However, evidence 
would suggest that switching costs makes regime choice and change ‘sticky’, 
therefore rendering significant switching (for example, union to non-union and vice 
versa) rare. Significantly, it is worth noting that recent research by Batt, Colvin and 
Keefe (2002: 589) suggests that it would be a mistake to assume the provision of 
voice arrangements in the workforce is associated with increased productivity due to
21 Kaufman’s (2003) review o f high-level employee involvement at Delta Air Lines also suggests that 
greater outcomes can be achieved where customer service requires employees to have direct contact 
with customers, where it is important to business success and when the production process is complex, 
interdependent, and subject to significant external uncertainly. A highly skilled, educated and diverse 
workforce may also be a significant factor in potential performance outcomes.
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lower quit rates. Their findings suggest that the increased usage of voice 
arrangements may increase quit rates. This may reflect ineffectiveness of such voice 
arrangements or a lack of a coherent strategy by management towards employee 
voice.
It can also be argued that non-union voice mechanisms may on the one hand reduce 
the willingness of employees to join a union since the non-union voice arrangement 
satisfies their needs and thus increases perception of instrumentality. Alternatively, 
the limitations of alternative or non-union voice arrangements may actually increase 
the desire for unionisation since where voice arrangements are considered to be 
ineffective in satisfying their needs.
Bryson’s (2004: 214) research in the UK is arguably one of the few quantitative 
studies to examine the issue of effectiveness of union and NER voice arrangements 
in delivery of benefits for employees using data on employees’ perceptions of 
managerial responsiveness (Butler, 2005). Bryson (2004: 234) concluded that direct 
non-union voice is more effective than representative voice (whether union or non­
union). Importantly Bryson states, ‘The only voice regime that proves more effective 
than having no voice is the combination of direct voice and non-union representative 
voice and this only proved effective for non-members’. In fact, Bryson (2004) goes 
on to suggest that singular non-union representative voice is generally ineffective 
except when combined with direct voice whereupon it becomes more effective than 
any other voice regime22.
Bryson’s analysis focuses on the relative utility of non-union representative voice 
compared to unionised and direct forms (e.g. briefing and problem solving groups). 
The findings echo the case study results outlined below, suggesting that NER voice is 
ineffective (Bryson, 2004: 230). However, interestingly NERs are seen to be more 
effective when the representatives are elected, rather than appointed (ibid). However, 
as highlighted by Butler (2005) what this means in terms of the operational 
effectiveness of the voice process nevertheless remains questionable because what is
22 However, as Bryson (2004) states this type o f voice arrangement only covers around 10 per cent o f  
em ployees in Britain.
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actually evaluated in Bryson’s research are employee perceptions of managerial 
responsiveness, rather than any consideration of substantive outcomes.
Butler (2005: 284) suggests that, ‘on the one hand elected delegates may well be more 
vigorous and adept in holding management to account. Conversely, it is possible that 
the enhanced legitimacy afforded by the balloting process simply serves to bias 
employee perceptions’. Moreover, ‘although a residue of autonomy exists, 
representatives are nevertheless heavily and systematically exposed to managerial 
ideology. Such norms, once internalised, respond to the managerial agenda. This is the 
case particularly in strategically important areas such as wage determination, where 
the process is at its most intensive’ (Butler, 2005:284).
In addition, Beaumont and Hunter’s (2003: 7-11) secondary analysis of the WERS98 
survey data suggests that no single establishment relied solely on JCCs. Rather where 
JCCs did exist they were in combination with direct individual employee-based 
information disclosure and consultation arrangements (for example employee 
briefings). They also examined the effect of normal representative arrangements (JCCs 
etc) and direct consultation. They found evidence that while direct employee 
arrangements were more common than representative ones and were used more in 
organisational change, the combination of representative and direct arrangements had 
significant outcomes. These dual arrangements were commonly associated with 
positive measures of perceived (by management) organisational performance in the 
following areas: financial performance; labour productivity; quality of product; labour 
costs; management-employee relations; and employee involvement in the processes of 
change.
In an Australian study, Benson (2000) found that unionised workplaces were more 
likely than non-union firms to implement employee voice mechanisms, and non­
union workplaces less likely than union workplaces to use more HRM-associated 
voice mechanisms. Finally, the Benson study concluded that the presence of unions 
at workplaces significantly increased the number of voice mechanisms available 
compared to non-union workplaces and the more active a union, the greater range of
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alternative voice mechanisms are established.
Qualitative research
Beaumont and Hunter’s (2003) review of 16 firms in the UK preparing to address the 
information and consultation requirements under the European Information and 
Consultation Directive demonstrates a high degree of diversity in how organisations 
currently communicate and consult employees due to differing organisational 
structures, past history, market circumstances, organisational characteristics and 
corporate objectives.
From these findings Beaumont and Hunter (2003: 11) concluded that it seems 
important to both establish and maintain a complementary relationship between 
direct and representative sets of arrangements. They also suggest that ‘...it would 
seem to support the notion that direct communication is a powerful tool for 
downward communication, and that a JCC (or a similar NER arrangement) provides 
a representation mechanism for channelling feedback up the line, so that the 
combined effect would be to provide a complementarity or ‘fit’ that strengthens 
impact’ (Beaumont and Hunter, 2003: 9). However, they also caution about the 
nature of this interaction process ‘whereby ignoring one set of arrangements relative 
to the other, or sending inconsistent messages via the two sets of arrangements is an 
obvious major mistake to be avoided’ (Beaumont and Hunter, 2003: 11).
Haynes’ (2005: 261) research in the New Zealand hotel industry suggests that while 
union representation might be superior to non-union voice, given that the majority of 
workers in many countries do not have access to union membership, non-union voice 
provides a degree of influence (and in some instances a high level of influence) that 
would otherwise be denied in non-union workplaces.
Beaumont and Hunter (2005: 5) argue that the ‘process’ aspects of employee voice in 
the literature have been ‘seriously underplayed in relation to the consideration of 
structural issues such as the composition and remit of consultative groups, the
Paul J  Golian 61
th e  L ondon S ch o o l of E c o n o m ie s
a n d  P o l i t ic a l  S c ie n c -
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
frequency of meetings, etc.’ They go on to suggest that the process is both critical to 
outcome and heterogeneous in character. In essence, they define ‘process’ as a ‘series 
of steps leading to an outcome or decision involving a social interaction between 
management and employees or their representatives with the aim of reaching or 
confirming a decision affecting the mutual interests of the parties’ (Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2005: 5). According to their research, the interaction will be affected by a 
wide range of influences, in part from the structures, from the characteristics of the 
parties, the nature of the relationship between the employer and employees (and their 
representatives), the type of issues on the agenda, and the values and expectations the 
parties bring to the consultative process.
Moreover, the experience derived from such involvement, the nature of the 
information exchange and the ability to influence decisions will affect attitudes and 
perceptions, and as such will have a future impact on attitudes and behaviour 
(Beaumont and Hunter, 2005: 5). According to Beaumont and Hunter (2005), the first 
influence is the environmental or structural conditions in which consultation takes 
place. In particular, the level of union presence and influence, and the business and 
economic position of the organisation may present a number of conditions. 
Structurally, a single or dual channel for employee representation and the structure of 
the organisation either through multi-site or single site may also be important factors. 
Other factors may include whether the relationship between the parties is based on 
conflictual or consensual terms, the maturity of the consultation procedure, the 
experience of representation in the process, and the level of training provided for such 
representatives.
Luchak’s (2003: 115) study in a large Canadian utility organisation of voice and 
loyalty utilising Hirschman’s (1970) exit-voice framework indicates that feelings of 
attachment to an organisation and voice are not one-dimensional constructs. He 
found that employees with feelings of emotional attachment are less likely to use 
representative voice but more likely to use direct voice, while those attached for 
more rational or calculated reasons are more likely to use representative voice. Those 
employees feeling attached for either reason are found less likely to exit the
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organisation than those not feeling any attachment. Freeman and Medoff (1984) also 
came to a similar conclusion.
Luchak (2003: 130-131) goes on to suggest that while direct voice depends largely 
on management’s goodwill to act on employees’ suggestions (which is unlikely to 
occur where there is a serious conflict of interests), representative voice on the other 
hand can remove this potential conflict, since employees and their representatives 
can initiate discussion and create incentives for management to deal with employees’ 
concerns. However, this may be problematic since this type of voice heard will be 
from continuance -  committed employees who do not have a particularly strong 
desire to contribute to the organisation. He concludes that this requires rethinking the 
mechanisms of ‘voice’ with labour management committees or NER better suited to 
addressing problems in unionised environments. On a cautionary note, Luchak 
(2003: 131) argues that voice heard through these programmes is not likely to reach 
its potential unless the organisation clearly signals the value it places on workers’ 
inputs through such programmes.
Freeman and Medoff (1984) have argued that although unions can provide an 
effective method of collective employee 'voice', there may be an incentive for 
employers to provide some alternative collective voice mechanism where workplace 
union organisation is weak or absent23. The academic literature has identified the 
important role of unions in giving employees a voice, enabling them to express 
dissatisfaction with the working environment without fear of management retaliation 
through victimisation and of free-riding by their colleagues24. Thus, it is suggested 
that where unions are weak or non-existent this voice effect will be absent, or 
alternatively an employee may exercise voice through the exit option, although
23 The concept o f exit and voice was originally coined by Hirschman (1970) as a metaphor to redefine 
the social or economic relationship in terms o f  an disenchanted individual to exit (to leave the 
organisation) or voice (to demand a say) (see Hyman, 2005).
24 Freeman and M edoff s (1984) exit-voice model suggests a link between union voice and higher 
productivity and lower quit rates. It was based on the assumption that unions reduce the probability 
that employees will quit their jobs for two fundamental reasons. First, unions provide a voice 
mechanism through which employees gain higher wages than they could earn in a similar non-union 
job. Second, unions provide employees with a voice in determining other rules and conditions o f  
work, including policies that reduce pay inequality, grievance and arbitration procedures, and fairness 
in discipline procedures (Batt, Colin and Keefe, 2002: 574).
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Freeman and Medoff also argue that the exit option may be a less than optimal 
amount of voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Using Birch’s (1975) observations, 
Hyman (2005) notes that exit and voice may not be mutually exclusive; a person may 
exit vocally or a person may also stay in an unsatisfactory relationship but remain 
silent.
3.2.3 NER arrangements as a complement to or substitute for union 
representation
There has also been considerable discussion (Dundon, 2002; Dundon and Rollinson, 
2004; Foulkes, 1980; Gall and McKay, 2001; Golian, 2000; Kaufman, 2003; Kochan 
et a l, 1986; Marchington et a l, 1992; Marchington et a l, 2001; Oxenbridge et a l  
2003; Taras and Copping, 1998; Terry, 1999; Watling and Snook, 2003) as to 
whether NER arrangements act as a ‘substitute’ for unions or -  as some 
commentators have suggested -  as a ‘complement’ to management decision-making 
(see Table 3.2).
Paul J  Golian 64
th e  L ondon  S choo l of E c o n o m ic s
an d  P o l i t ic a l  S c ie n c
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
Table 3.2 Characteristics and objectives of non-union employee 
representation forms
Characteristics Complement Substitute
Representative
interest
Mutual
(win-win)
Conflictual
(win-lose)
Mutual
(win-win)
Bargaining
strategy
Integrative 
bargaining -  
positive sum 
problem-solving 
approach
Distributive 
bargaining -  zero 
sum wage 
bargaining
Integrative 
bargaining -  
positive sum 
problem solving 
approach
Process Co-determination/ 
Joint consultation
Representation of 
employee interests
Co-operation
Power Base Legally imposed or
management
initiative
Legally imposed or
management
initiative
Management
initiative
Channel of 
representation
Dual Single Dual
Rights Information, 
consultation, co­
decision making, 
limited veto powers
Information, 
consultation, 
limited workplace 
decision-making
Production line 
information, 
suggestion 
schemes, problem 
identification
Outcomes Equity and equality Internalisation of
employment
relations
Productivity
improvement
(Adapted from  Golian, 2000: 415)
One notion of a ‘substitute’ is that it serves in place of a union. It assumes employers 
create an alternative form of employee representation which employees will prefer to 
a ‘union’25. As Watling and Snook (2003: 268) indicate in their research, 
management pragmatism towards trade union recognition often concealed a ‘covert’ 
employee relations strategy which was bolstering the non-union structures as a 
process of union avoidance or substitution. However, as Taras and Kaufman (1999: 
14) suggest, 'It [NER] is no easy substitute for unions, and employers who believe 
they can use NER for this purpose are seriously deluding themselves'.
25 This view has been challenged because for many employers it is not important whether non-union 
employee representation structures can approximate unions as part o f  the collective bargaining 
process, since this may not be the objective or desired outcome. This is also linked to Ramsay’s (1977 
and 1983) notion o f cycles o f control where consultation (or any participation mechanism) is 
introduced by employers when they feel they are under threat from organised labour such as trade 
unions and discard it when such a threat is reduced or is dissipated (also see Marchington et al., 1992; 
Marchington et al., 2001).
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According to Taras and Kaufman (1999), this union substitution function works in 
two ways. First, at workplace level NER arrangements can be subverted to serve a 
union avoidance function by being a captive audience to management for the purpose 
of instilling anti-union messages and to ‘socialise workers to see the world through 
management eyes' (p. 19). Second, at a more institutional level NER neither instils 
worker activism or mobilisation -  either in the context of political action and social 
change, nor provides the close network of diffusion of such activism from firm to 
firm. Kochan et a l  (1986) term this approach as ‘union suppression’ employing 
methods of strong resistance in union organising drives, possibly involving the use of 
coercive employer strategies to retain a union free environment.
On the other hand, an entirely different notion is that alternative forms of employee 
representation make traditional union structures unnecessary in the sense that they 
transform the employment relationship, with other high commitment practices, into a 
mutually productive relationship. This notion is based on the premise that employees 
do not desire or need a protective agency through traditional bargaining per se (since 
this emphasises the adversarial, distributive element of the employment relationship) 
because their basic interests are satisfied. In this approach, the purpose of NERs is to 
encourage and foster an alignment of interests between employer and employees.
Kochan et a l  (1986) describe this union avoidance strategy as a union substitution 
approach which removes the forces or triggers for unionisation. Kochan et a l  (1986) 
suggest that it is primarily large firms which employ union substitution strategies 
since they have the financial resources and capacity to act as a substitute or 
replacement for traditional union activities. These are sometimes described as ‘soft’ 
human resource management approaches in retaining non-union status.
An alternative strategy is evident when traditional trade union structures and 
alternative forms of employee representation ‘complement’ each other, dovetailing in 
terms of form and function, as in the case of German works councils through the co­
determination process and industry-wide trade union bargaining. Chaykowski's
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(2000) research of the National Joint Council system and Taras’ (1997) study of the 
petroleum industry in Canada would suggest that union and NER arrangements can 
develop interdependencies and over time become complementary. As such, they are 
not directly substitutable because they are situated in separate domains, and 
interactions between them help each refine and focus on areas of special competency 
(Taras and Kaufman, 1999: 18).
The debate over whether NER arrangements are a complement or a substitute for 
union representation is based on two approaches: first, NER structures are an 
inherent ‘win-lose’ or ‘zero sum game’. For employees, this is based on the premise 
that an individual employee is inherently at a disadvantage in the employment 
relationship due to the monopoly power of the employer, and such arrangements act 
as a balance for such employer power. For employers, NER arrangements may be 
seen as the better of two evils, giving a degree of involvement in the decision-making 
process to an NER forum, while not relinquishing management control to a trade 
union.
Alternatively, NER structures can be viewed as an instrument through which both 
sides realise a ‘win-win’ outcome in the employment relationship or ‘positive sum’ 
game perspective, highlighting common interests between employers and employees 
and promoting a unitarist approach based on shared beliefs and goals, or a pluralist 
‘mutual gains’ approach emphasising a co-operative system of employment relations. 
This is referred to as ‘integrative’ bargaining based on a positive sum problem­
solving approach26. This approach has been most actively promoted by the current 
UK Government in its response to the EU Directive establishing a General 
Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees and the implementation of the 
ICE regulations into UK law27.
26 This perspective is encapsulated by human resource management (HRM) theorists advocating high 
commitment work practices and emphasising mutual gains in the enterprise (Kochan, Katz and 
McKersie, 1986; Walton, 1985).
27 See Department o f Trade and Industry (DTI) green paper ‘High Performance Workplaces: The Role 
o f Employee Involvement in a Modem Economy: A Discussion Paper’ (2002) and DTI consultation 
paper ‘High Performance Workplaces -  Informing and Consulting Employees’ (2003). The British 
initiative on information and consultation can be compared to proposals forwarded by the Dunlop 
Commission in the United States in the 1990s, which sought to enhance worker voice through 
increased information and consultation arrangements (Metcalf, 2003).
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However, Dundon (2002) and Edwards (1995) note that the ‘substitute’ or 
‘complement’ debates can oversimplify and/or polarise union avoidance strategies 
that are in practice very diverse and complex. Dundon (2002) suggests that the 
‘absence of industrial discontent or union membership “may” point towards some 
level of commitment or trust between an employer and employee’ (Dundon, 2002: 
236). Alternatively, it could reveal fear of management and abuse of management 
prerogative, or union membership may be less attractive to workers because 
employees in non-union workplaces can potentially earn market premiums 
underpinned by more individualised and productivity-driven remuneration 
arrangements.
While debates have been centred around the complementarity of NER and union 
voice arrangements, it must be recognised that much of the intellectual efforts to 
explain work behaviour and attitudes to improve workplace employer-employee 
relations have been embedded in a unitarist approach to employee relations. 
Unitarists assume a commonality of interests between employers and employees. 
While not denying the potential existence of employee-employer conflict, unitarists 
claim such conflicts are unnecessary and undesirable, and can be avoided by 
encouraging common interests and sharing aims and goals (Hammer, 1997). Unlike 
the pluralist perspective of the industrial relations approach, unitarists suggest that 
collective bargaining by employee representation in the form of trade unions to 
counterbalance employers’ power and grievance machinery to manage conflict are 
unnecessary because in an open, trusting employment relationship based on a 
commonality of interests, there will be no exploitation for private gain (Hammer, 
1997: 2).
The argument of Freeman and Medoff (1984) that in order for employee voice to be 
effective in influencing management behaviour it must be union voice, appears to 
reflect the prevailing view (Haynes, 2005: 260). According to this perspective, 
unions are both independent of management and provide an incentive for workers 
collectively to express preferences and -  unlike NER voice arrangements -  invest
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greater time and effort in forwarding employees objectives. Kahn-Freund once 
stated, ‘trade unions are more likely to be an effective force in redressing the 
imbalance of power than the law is, or ever could be’ (as cited in Dundon, 2002: 
244), although one could argue that the law may facilitate unions and thus be an 
effective force. However, Boxall and Haynes’ (2005) review of the findings of a 
linked series of worker surveys in the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
suggest that outside the US, non-union and union forms of voice are increasingly 
complementary which is to the benefit of workers.
In addition, Beaumont and Hunter’s (2005) study of information and consultation 
arrangements in the UK also identified two main strategies -  some firms were 
establishing a ‘single track’ approach with collective bargaining and consultation 
combined, while other companies preferred a more ‘dual track’ approach to 
representation arrangements.
In a study by Kim (2004) into union and NER commitment in three union and three 
non-union establishments in Korea, the findings would indicate greater employee 
perceptions of representative effectiveness, commitment and identification in union 
establishments than in non-union establishments. The evidence would support the 
notion that NER and unions represent different employee interests and NER aligns 
employees with management goals. Kim’s findings support the separate domain 
perspective with unions and NER voice mechanisms satisfying different types of 
employee needs thus performing different functions. In the 
complementarity/substitution debate these findings would seem to support the 
complementary perspective with these channels not directly substitutable, situated in 
separated domains and NER arrangements insufficient as a substitute for unions due 
to a lack of influence on primary distributive and employee advocacy issues.
Watling and Snook’s (2003) research suggests that non-statutory works councils in 
the UK cannot expect automatic workforce and management support if alternatives 
such as trade unions emerge. They state that in this sense, ‘works councils and trade 
unions are currently competitors rather than being complementary to one another’
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(p.268). They go on to argue that, notwithstanding the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC)28 acceptance of dual channel representation, their research ‘raises questions as 
to the future prospects for the revised EU Directive establishing a general framework 
for informing and consulting employees in the EU and attendant representational 
bodies’ (Watling and Snook, 2003: 268).
3.3 Effectiveness and outcomes of NER
The effectiveness and outcomes of NER arrangements may be influenced by the 
expectations that employers and employees place on such arrangements. For 
example, managers and employers may regard the involvement and consultation 
aspects of employee voice as desirable as a means to improve firm performance, 
for example, direct communications to inform employees of what managers expect, 
and employees providing suggestions to improve productivity. However, employers 
are less keen on the bargaining side of ‘employee voice’, for example, fighting 
redundancy plans or demanding higher wages in return for increased productivity.
Agency theory states that when the principal delegates to the agent, it wants an 
effective decision-making structure and one which leads to outcomes that maximise 
the principal’s goals (and not some other goals of the agent). Under such 
circumstances, unions will undoubtedly have different goals to those of employers, 
or the consultation and negotiation process may create an incentive to prolong the 
decision-making process and provide less than optimal outcomes for the firm 
because unions could avoid responsibility for difficult decisions. Thus there may be 
an incentive for employers to try to contain consultation and bargaining processes 
within the organisation.
Taras and Kaufman (1999: 15-16) have expressed this more succinctly, ‘very few 
employers are genuinely interested in fostering collective worker identity. [It's]...
Like inviting a pet bear into the house, there is an omnipresent fear that the creature 
cannot be controlled although it can be pacified, temporarily, by feeding it a rich
28 The TUC is the peak trade union body in the UK.
29 See Chapter Two for a definition o f employee voice.
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diet’.
For employees, a critical question is whether NER may approximate ‘voice’ more 
than traditional union structures. Commentators have argued that from a social 
perspective, the role of NER as bargaining agents (thus similar to traditional trade 
union forms) may be desirable for power equality or ethical industrial democracy 
reasons, and recognition that the employment relationship is not a ‘one-off exchange’ 
but a continuing relationship of unequal interdependence (Hyman, 2005).
Conversely, Taras and Kaufman (1999: 12-13) suggest that there might also be more 
instrumental reasons with NER arrangements able to produce better wages and job 
security than unions can deliver and thus can remain an attractive vehicle to some 
workers who prefer to remain non-union.
The thesis draws a distinction between the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘outcomes’. For employees, perceived effectiveness relates to the processes in 
satisfying and furthering their interests, while for employers it is a means to increase 
understanding of company policy and secure consent for organisational change. 
Outcomes on the other hand, are the impact of NER arrangements. For employers, 
outcomes may be a change in employee attitudes and behaviours or increases in 
productivity and performance, for example. For unions, one important outcome 
would be whether NER arrangements weaken or strengthen union presence.
Effectiveness o f NER
Taras and Kaufman (1999) highlight the fact that there is a natural instinct for 
industrial relations research to compare NER arrangements to unions, with little 
acknowledgement of or research into comparing NER to a situation of no 
representation. This, they say, raises the question of whether NER voice 
arrangements provide advantages to employees over no representation. Taras and 
Kaufman conclude that NER arrangements do indeed ’provide workers with benefits 
that exceed what they could accomplish on their own. The positive benefits include 
improved communication, both bottom-up and top-down, greater access to
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managerial decision-makers, and the venue and means to express voice opportunities 
for leadership and positions (Taras and Kaufman, 1999: 20).
Similarly in New Zealand, Haynes’ (2005) research into the lightly unionised New 
Zealand hotel industry over a ten-year period would suggest that while NER voice 
arrangements may be less effective than union representation, in a non-union setting 
they may provide a measure of influence that would otherwise be denied to such 
workers. His research suggests that while hotel management retain their traditional 
decision-making prerogatives and worker influence is constrained, there is evidence 
that interest in developing non-union voice channels to gauge employees’ concerns 
and interests at work is valued by management, albeit for instrumental reasons.
While such channels for voice may be less effective than union representation, in a 
non-union setting they may provide a measure of influence that would otherwise be 
denied such workers (Haynes, 2005).
Other evidence suggests that non-union voice can be as effective as union voice in 
furthering employees’ interests, especially where mutual benefits are involved 
(Haynes, 2005; Kaufman and Taras, 2000). Moreover, research by Haynes, Boxall 
and Macky (2003) and Haynes and Fryer (2001) into New Zealand’s experience of 
NER voice arrangements would suggest that rather than simply losing their (union) 
voice, many workers may have gained a new (non-union) one. Research from the UK 
by Bryson (2004) would further suggest that non-union forms of representative voice 
may not necessarily be less effective than union voice.
This would reconfirm evidence based on an analysis of WERS98 data which 
suggests that non-union voice is more effective than union voice in British 
workplaces in terms of eliciting (perceived) managerial responsiveness, although not 
in eliciting fair treatment (Bryson, 2004; Millward et al., 2000).
Based on research into the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS98) 
in the UK, Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000: 129) appear to reinforce these findings 
by suggesting:
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Employees with some type o f non-union voice arrangement generally fe lt 
that managers were better at keeping them up-to-date with proposed 
changes at the establishment than did those employees in workplaces 
without any formal voice mechanism. This was true whether non-union 
arrangements were found in isolation or together with union channels o f  
voice.
Boxall and Haynes (2005: 11) conclude in a review of a linked series of large scale 
worker surveys of employee voice in the Anglo-American world would, ‘Imply that 
the caricature of non-union voice practices as toothless or ineffective is misleading 
and should be avoided’. They go on to state:
The surveys suggest that contemporary workers see unions as 
relevant in traditional areas o f conflict -  such as pay bargaining -  
and very relevant in seriously dysfunctional workplaces or when they 
personally feel vulnerable in the labour market. They suggest, 
however, that workers are sceptical about the relevance o f unions to 
the developmental agenda o f skill acquisition and personal growth, 
which may now be dominating employee thinking about their 
working lives.
(Boxall and Haynes, 2005: 11)
Taras and Kaufman’s (1999: 13) North American evidence indicates that where 
union representation is strong (or at least where there is a valid union threat) NER 
arrangements are likely to be more effective for employees than they would be in the 
absence of unions. Taras and Kaufman (1999: iii) argue, ‘that in the long-run, non­
union representation works best when practiced in the shadow of a viable union 
organizing threat’. In their example of Imperial Oil employees in Canada, such 
structures are described as ’the toothless dog got molars' (1999: 13). They also 
predict that managerial attention to NER arrangements would diminish when co­
existing with a weak union movement (Taras and Kaufman, 1999).
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Taras and Kaufman (1999: 16) also suggest that when NER arrangements are 
examined through the lens of industrial relations laws and institutions, with an 
assumption that the interests of workers and employers are different, then the flaws 
of NER are starkly exposed. The way these industrial relations laws are structured is 
premised on the belief that there will be a conflict of interests between the employee 
and employer and conflict is natural in that relationship. Since there is an imbalance 
of power in the employment relationship then institutions such as unions and 
tribunals are established as a means to redress this perceived inequity and to channel 
this conflict of interests. They suggest that this pluralistic view of the workplace 
raises issues of power, influence, bargaining, confrontation, independence and the 
articulation of separate agendas (Taras and Kaufman, 1999: 16).
To reinforce this point, Haynes (2005) suggests that researchers have generally 
assumed that employees need to be able to exert measurable influence over high- 
level decisions if non-union voice is to be at all effective, otherwise it is considered 
to be of limited or no value to employees. However, as Haynes (2005: 261) argues 
citing Hammer (2000: 183), its value may derive from its ‘ability to satisfy basic 
psychological needs ... [including] the freedom of the individuals to make decisions 
about how, and sometimes when, his or her work should be organised and carried 
out.’ To support his claim, Haynes (2005) suggests that additional findings of recent 
large-scale surveys of worker attitudes appear to provide support for this perspective 
(Diamond and Freeman, 2001; Freeman and Rogers, 1999; Haynes et al.y 2005).
Haynes (2005: 261) concludes that researchers may be missing an important part of 
the picture; in private sector services, where unionism is fragile or absent, a more 
pertinent comparison would be between non-union voice and no voice at all’. Finally 
according to Haynes (2005: 268-269), while there is evidence to support the view 
that union representation is superior to non-union forms as a mechanism of employee 
voice. Nonetheless, he argues that there might be a possibility that non-union voice 
might have some value for workers in non-union environments. Dundon et a V  s 
(2005) recent findings on the dynamics of employee voice in Ireland would also
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suggest that participatory processes are more robust when the channels for the 
information and consultation serve dual purposes that accommodate both conflictual 
and cooperative outcomes.
As such, role theory may also be an important factor in the effectiveness of NER. 
Hammer (1997) posits that role theory can also be applied to NER forms. In essence, 
the theory suggests that management and employees have difficulty in moving 
beyond traditional roles into new cooperative relationships that require different 
definitions of behaviours and responsibilities. Underpinning this is the belief that 
certain roles produce patterns of behaviour in an organisational system based on 
norms, expectations and values of employees. This may be mediated by past 
experience of representative forms, developing arrangements for cooperation with 
common definitions of roles and obligations for employers and employees. In cases 
with little experience, without agreeable role definitions, each party attempts to 
define the respective roles that favour its own group interests.
Much case study evidence supports the view that NER achieves little in the way of 
effectiveness, is commonly viewed by managers and employees with cynicism, and 
is vulnerable outside of periods of growth (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004; Gollan, 
2001, 2003b, 2005; Terry, 1999).
Outcomes o f NER
Employer outcomes
Case study research in the UK by Bonner and Gollan (2005), Gollan (2000; 2001; 
2003a; 2005), Lloyd (2001), Terry (1999) and Watling and Snook (2003) have 
indicated that for a large majority of non-union firms the main aim of NER is to 
increase the flow information and communication, rather than negotiation. Most of 
these organisations see non-union representation and consultation as providing a 
more effective channel of communication than unions, stressing more ‘harmonious’ 
and less conflictual relations with the workforce, thus building and encouraging an
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atmosphere of mutual cooperation.
This agenda has been subsumed more recently within the debate surrounding the 
implementation of high performance work systems (Black and Lynch, 2004).
Leading advocates have described such approaches in terms of high involvement 
management, high commitment management or high performance work systems 
under a mutual gains approach (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; Kochan, Katz and 
McKersie, 1984; Lawler, 1986; Lawler et al., 1992; Levine, 1995; Levine and Tyson, 
1990; Wall and Wood, 2005; Wood, 1996). While such approaches represent a 
significant development, this thesis is primarily concerned with non-union 
representation rather than more direct forms of employee involvement and 
consultation30.
In this context, the concept of employee commitment has assumed importance as a 
significant factor impacting on organisational performance (Guest, 2002: 38). As 
Butler (2005) and others have suggested, given that commitment is commonly 
viewed as being allied to notions of involvement and empowerment, organisations 
are increasingly seeing the need to ‘recognise the importance, even the necessity, of 
maximising employee voice’ (Butler, 2005: 273; McCabe and Lewin, 1992: 112).
Research by Peccei et a l  (2005) indicated that while information disclosure tends to 
be greater in union than non-union workplaces, such higher levels of information 
disclosure do not translate into higher levels of ‘either employee commitment or 
organisational performance in the union contexts and such benefits are more 
associated with non-union workplaces rather than union workplaces (Peccei et a l , 
2005: 33). Apart from information on general financial and staffing information, 
information in union settings is more likely to have a weaker positive impact on 
performance outcomes than in non-union settings, and the impact is weakest where 
unions are strongest (Peccei et a l ,  2004: 33). The authors go on to say that access to 
certain operational information may have a negative impact, suggesting that unions 
may use such information for more opportunistic reasons. They conclude that greater
30 However, where appropriate more direct forms will be reviewed where they act as complementary 
to NER voice arrangements.
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company benefits can be gained from information disclosure in non-union than in 
union settings (Peccei et al., 2004:33).
More generally, Dundon et al.9s (2004) research into employee voice (including 
NER) suggests that there are three ways in which it can have a positive impact. First, 
valuing employee contributions might lead to improved employee attitudes and 
behaviours, loyalty, commitment and more co-operative relations. Second, it could 
lead to improved performance including increases in general productivity and 
individual performance due to lower absenteeism and greater teamwork. Thirdly, it 
could improve managerial systems by tapping into employees’ ideas, knowledge and 
experience, promoting greater diffusion of information and facilitating improved 
relations with trade unions.
Taras and Copping’s (1998) research into NER arrangements at Imperial Oil in 
Canada suggests a cautionary note. An important finding of their investigation was 
that the company allowed perceptions of 'worker power and influence to develop', 
and representatives 'over-estimated their capacity to halt corporate-level initiatives' 
(Taras and Copping, 1998: 39). Thus this experience contributed to ‘widened 
expectations-achievements gaps' creating frustration, lost of trust and the impetus for 
union organising certification (Taras and Copping, 1998: 39). Interestingly, Taras 
and Copping (1998: 40) also highlight that the principal inhibiting condition of 
unionisation 'was the desire by employees to give management a chance to correct its 
errors’. They state that employees worked with management until 'all vestiges of 
trust were dissipated. Had the company been more responsive to worker discontent... 
there is little doubt that the union would have failed', and employees were reluctant 
to form a union even though they were frustrated with voice arrangements.
The concept of ’welfare capitalism' has been explored in the US by Jacoby (1997) 
who suggests that NER voice arrangements are a sophisticated management strategy 
to reduce employee turnover and provide welfare support to employees through 
consensual employment relations. He argues that, as a result, the need for interest 
representation through traditional unions is reduced and replaced by more
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paternalistic approaches and management style. This can be achieved through higher 
pay, wide provision of employee benefits, and most importantly greater employee 
voice through participation arrangements, including non-union employee 
representation voice mechanisms. Thus employers gain greater organisational 
commitment from employees in exchange for their willingness to voluntarily forgo 
collective representation through an independent voice mechanism such as trade 
unions (Colling, 2003).
In his study of Delta Air Lines, Kaufman (2003) describes its management approach 
as ‘enlightened paternalism’, where employees frequently spoke of the company as 
‘mother Delta’ or the ‘family’ management model, which required great expense and 
effort devoted to securing and maintaining employee loyalty and esprit de corps. 
However, Taras and Kaufman’s (1999) review of NER arrangements in the US and 
Canada suggest that while it could be assumed that the creation of NER voice 
arrangements by some firms may be part of a welfare capitalism strategy in light of 
greater employment insecurities, it can also be seen in many workplaces as part of a 
‘high performance’ human resource management and more participative strategy, 
rather than a paternalistic model.
Fairris’ (1995: 494) historical study of US company unions31 during the 1920s 
suggests that such voice mechanisms cannot be understood entirely in terms of 
employers’ efforts to block independent unionisation or to foster greater worker 
loyalty through the paternalistic provisions of welfare capitalism. Fairris argues that 
these non-union voice arrangements were ‘mechanisms by which workers voiced 
their concerns about shop floor conditions to employers instead of exiting the firm' 
(Fairris, 1995: 494). According to Fairris (1995: 494), they were an effective method 
for addressing workers’ shop floor discontent, and as a result led to both increased 
productivity and enhanced safety and thus were ‘mutually beneficial for labor and 
management’.
In the US, Kaufman’s (2003: 25) research at Delta Air Lines would seem to confirm 
that if the motive and purpose of non-union voice arrangements is to foster
31 From a European perspective these can be considered non-union representation structures.
Paul J  Gollan 78
th e  L ondon S ch o o l of E c o n o m ic e
an d  P o l i t ic a l  S c i e n c
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
cooperative and positive employee relations, then employees feel satisfied with their 
jobs and will often express commitment to the company. As Kaufman therefore 
suggests, an indirect by-product of such voice arrangements is that many of the 
conditions that lead employees to seek outside representation are not present. 
However, Kaufman also argues that if firms establish NER arrangements for the 
explicit purpose of avoiding or keeping out unions, this may lead to negative 
outcomes as employees’ perceptions and expectations are not met and they quickly 
grow disillusioned (Kaufman, 2003: 25)
An interesting insight into employee views of NER was presented in the Freeman 
and Rogers (1999) survey of American private sector workers. Given a choice 
between joint committees, unions, or laws protecting individual rights, some 61 per 
cent chose joint committees, 23 per cent opted for unions and 16 per cent favoured 
individual rights (p. 151). When presented with the choice of a voice structure run 
jointly by employees and management or one run by employees only, 85 per cent of 
respondents to the study choose the first option (Freeman and Rogers, 1999: 142). 
More recent survey results have reconfirm these findings (Diamond and Freeman, 
2001; Haynes, Boxall and Macky, 2003; Pyman, Cooper, Teicher and Holland, 
2006).
Union outcomes
Regarding outcomes for unions, Hammer (1997: 9) argues that, ‘In the absence of 
legislation that legitimises indirect non-union participation, the effectiveness of such 
programmes depends on the goodwill, trust and power relationship between the 
parties’. Interestingly, research has shown that trust and legislation are interlinked 
indicating that specific representational forms can be effective if general legislation 
‘is sufficient to deter management from using committees, boards, or councils to 
make decisions that can hurt worker interests’ (Hammer, 1997: 10).
Others have suggested that the question is not whether NER structures will weaken 
unions, but rather whether unions will be prevented from developing a strong
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presence where there is an existing NER arrangement (Terry, 2003). In essence, this 
argument is based on the premise that ‘confident, assertive unionism can still make 
effective use of collective action to obtain management concessions’ (Terry, 2003: 
491). Based on UK evidence, Fishman (1995: 7) has stated, ‘There is surely no 
inherent reason why a works council should inhibit union growth’. These views are 
often linked to the notion of workplace ‘partnership’, which stresses the need to 
transform the traditional adversial and conflictual forms and behaviour to a 
consensus-based approach (Terry, 2003).
In contrast, other commentators have suggested that NER arrangements along the 
lines of works councils have ‘consolidated a more recent shift to non-unionism’ 
(Kelly, 1996: 56). This rationale is premised on the belief that employer-initiated 
structures are based on employers’ terms and cannot be effective in providing a true 
voice for employees’ issues and concerns because they institutionalise worker 
cooperation, thus limiting scope for trade union action (Kelly, 1996; Lloyd, 2001). 
Some argue that NER structures such as works councils are used by management as 
‘cosmetic’ devices (Terry, 1999) or are little more than ‘symbolic’ forms of 
representation (Wills, 2000) as a means to avoid trade unions. (These points are 
explored in more detail in the following section)
3.4 Conditions for unionisation and union responses to NER
Why do employees join unions?
There are a number of theoretical frameworks attempting to explain why employees 
may join unions, thereby providing a fuller picture of the possible union responses to 
NER.
Barling, Fullagar, and Kelloway (1992) argued that the unionisation process involves 
both the union recognition phase and a period of ‘socialisation’ or legitimatisation 
driven by workplace activism and commitment to the new union. The union begins 
campaigning -  sometimes referred to as the ‘pre-election’ phase-in -  which a union
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sets a position, and identifies and frames issues.
In addition, literature on union commitment stresses dual allegiance, whereby 
workers experience conflicting loyalties to their union and their employer (Newton 
and Shore, 1992). This is often cited as a reason for a firm to oppose unionisation in 
that unions are a rival for employee commitment. In the UK, Guest and Dewe (1991) 
examined employee ‘identity’ and ‘allegiance’ in three electronics plants along four 
criteria: union; management; dual union-management; and no identity. They focus on 
the ‘identity’ component as part of commitment (as distinct from the outcome 
elements such as turnover) which they break into three components: attitudinal (to 
what extent a union or management reflects an employee’s own views); interests 
over a number of issues; and finally, the sharing of interests with other groups (top 
management, line management, occupation, or other employees).
Their main findings suggest that one of the main antecedents of identity is job 
satisfaction, which is largely determined by the scope and level of employee 
involvement and participation. In addition, their findings would seem to indicate that 
the most positive firm-related outcomes are from dual management and union 
identity. In addition, Taras and Copping (1998: 25) highlighted the fact that the 
research ‘overlooks another actor/rival in the relationship -  the formal non-union 
alternative’. They argue that these workers might be balancing a triad of 
allegiances’.
Other influences on why people join unions could include external macro forces such 
as labour market conditions, market wage rates, public policy and legislation. More 
micro institutional context variables such as organisational/firm size, quality of 
management and supervision, systems of procedural justice and grievance 
procedures, human resource policies and union relations could also be considered 
important (these factors will be assessed in this research by using interviews, 
committee minutes and company documentation). Individual level factors could also 
be significant, such as the demographics of the workforce, previous experiences with 
and attitudes to unions, commitment to work, the perceived influenced of unions and
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the level of job satisfaction (these factors are explored here in this research via focus 
groups and survey responses).
Overall, three causal models attempt to explain why people join unions:
• Model A -  This model is initiated by an employee’s dissatisfaction which 
leads to a decision as to whether a union would assist in achieving their 
objectives (Wheeler and McClendon, 1991). This is normally associated with 
dissatisfaction with pay, working conditions, or job characteristics (Fiorito et 
a l  1986). As Kelly (1998) and Terry (2003) have described, ‘feelings of 
powerlessness’ or unfavourable sentiments toward company policy can also 
initiate the process of unionisation. Frustration over influence or level of 
participation in decision-making can also be a strong predictor of pro-union 
behaviour (Bomheimer, 1985).
• Model B  -  This model does not require the presence of dissatisfaction based 
on rational behaviour. An assumption under this approach is that employees 
survey the available alternatives and make rational, calculative decisions to 
maximise utility based on a belief that economic (pay rise etc) or non­
economic improvements (work & life balance, training, career progression 
etc) are achievable (Wheeler and McClendon, 1991). Importantly, Taras and 
Copping (1998: 25) argue that when dispute resolution mechanisms break 
down or become unreliable, workers turn to unions, with the most important 
factor in an employees’ decision to unionise being ‘instrumental’ rather than 
because of attitudes to collective consciousness or ideological attachment. 
This could be called ‘instrumental collectivism’ rather than ‘ideological or 
social collectivism’ (Haynes, Boxall and Mackey, 2003).
• Model C -  This model is based on notions of procedural justice under the 
psychological literature. Essentially this model suggests that if employees 
believe the procedures for attributing rewards and outcomes are fair and just, 
employees are more likely to accept distributional outcomes they consider to
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be adverse or not beneficial. Procedural justice can be contrasted with 
distributive justice. The latter relates to the actual distribution of rewards 
(how much each person gets), whereas the former relates to the procedures 
used to decide who gets them (eg by appraisals, measures of output etc).
NER and conditions fo r  unionisation
The UK literature is also rich with case studies examining the transformation of non­
union consultation and representation arrangements to more formalised union-based 
arrangements (Bonner and Gollan, 2005; Dundon and Rollinson, 2004; Dundon, 
2002; Gollan, 2001; Gollan, 2003b; Gollan; 2005; and Watling and Snook, 2003).
However, much of the literature is based on the assumption that there are rational 
choices for employees in their choice of voice arrangements. In particular, if 
employers match or exceed wages and conditions compared to comparable unionised 
workplaces, NER arrangements are perceived as effective and are maintained and 
supported by employees. However, if employers reduce wages and conditions 
(voluntarily or involuntarily due to labour or product market conditions or pressures 
for unit labour cost reductions) to a lower level than those in more unionised plants 
or workplaces, they create a condition for union activity and presence. Thus, the 
longevity of NER arrangements and prospect for unionisation is dependent on 
management strategies and approaches that match or exceed those of union-based 
arrangements (Taras, 1994; Taras and Copping, 1998).
Taras and Copping (1998:27-28) also state, ‘...dissatisfied workers in non-union 
plants are more likely than non-represented workers to seek union structures because 
they have existing leaders and have accepted the legitimacy of collective action’. It 
could also be argued that not only have employees accepted the legitimacy of 
collective action but may have great expectations over the likely success of such 
arrangements which have not been fulfilled (Gollan, 2003b).
As such, some commentators have argued that NER voice arrangements are union
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avoidance mechanisms either by intent or by effect, and workers are less likely to 
unionise because the perceived instrumentality of joining a union would be lowered 
(Gollan, 2000; Kaufman and Taras, 2000; Taras and Copping, 1998; Terry, 1999). 
Such arrangements exert strong inhibiting factors on the process of unionisation due 
to the fear of reprisal by management, or good management practices rendering 
unions as unattractive and unnecessary (Gollan, 2000; Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 
1986). In addition, these commentators also state that such structures are packed with 
‘hand-picked cronies’ or in the cases where employees can elect representatives 
(including union representatives) may not be fully independent of the company and 
will not have the backing of national union organisers to enforce action or outcomes.
Terry (2003) suggested that the question is not whether works councils will weaken 
unions, but rather whether unions will be prevented from developing a strong 
presence where there is a works council. In essence, this argument is based on the 
premise that ‘confident, assertive unionism can still make effective use of collective 
action to obtain management concessions’ (Terry, 2003:491).
Another important debate around collective representation is the notion of ‘fairness’ 
and the sense of injustice. Kelly (1998) has been a leading advocate of the approach 
that places emphasis on the perceived injustice of workers, which can lead to the 
mobilisation of collective organisation, representation and organised action. Kelly 
(1998) argues that in order to mobilise collective action, workers need to acquire a 
sense of injustice or grievance in their work environment. This process, he argues, 
requires leadership and a collective organisation and structure (Kelly, 1998).
Likewise, Cropanzano and Folger (1991) argue that procedural justice can be 
important in organisations because it can make employees more willing to accept 
unfavourable distributive outcomes (eg not getting performance-based pay). For 
example, procedural justice may boost the effectiveness of incentive schemes 
designed to encourage employees to use the discretion they have in their work to the 
organisation’s advantage. Employers want them to be positively motivated, not just 
doing what they have to for fear of reprisals.
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Dundon’s (2002: 243) research into seven non-union organisations also highlights 
that while there was support for the principle of union representation, employees’ 
pragmatic concern was the ‘efficacy of a union to correct a perceived injustice’. 
Dundon (2002: 243) argues:
In many o f these companies, workers were fearful o f managerial 
reprisals, and this led them to question the ability o f a union to 
challenge managerial attitudes effectively or provide any 
instrumental job improvements ... In part, this is because existing 
evidence suggests a dual strategy by the unions: they want to appear 
respectable to employers while at the same time trying to appeal to 
workers ... O f course much depends on the contours o f specific 
partnership arrangements. Recent evidence indicates that ‘weak’ 
rather than ‘strong’ partnerships are developing in some non-union 
organisations.
Hyman (1997) has argued that structures representing the interests of employees 
through collective bargaining (legally enforced or not) may give more legitimacy and 
efficacy to the decision-making process, ensuring greater organisational 
commitment. In addition, Hyman (1997) suggests that NER forms have the capacity 
to assist unionism in workplaces where they are given many responsibilities and 
especially when enforced through statutory rights.
Appelbaum and Batt (1994: 153) suggest there are two interrelated issues guiding 
union decisions to support non-union voice arrangements and whether the union 
should participate in or with such arrangements -  the welfare of members and the 
institutional integrity of the union. It is said that these two issues are closely linked 
because the institutional strength of the union determines how well it can represent 
the interests of members over the longer term. Importantly, the welfare of members 
is premised on the success of the firm in providing employment security and 
increased wages. Appelbaum and Batt (1994) argue that the decision by union
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members to participate in these arrangements will be largely based on two guarantees 
-  that employees will share in gains derived from such initiatives and the union’s 
security in the firm will be maintained, and its ability to organise new members is 
unrestricted.
In unorganised workplaces, an alternative argument has also been presented. This is 
based on the belief that NER provides a condition for union representation (Taras 
and Copping, 1998). As Taras and Copping (1998: 27) argue, ‘By enabling workers 
to experience collective representation, non-union plans act as the thin edge of the 
wedge toward [union] certification’. Taras and Copping (1998) cite Ichniowski and 
Zax’s (1990) research, which indicates that the presence of non-union associations 
strongly predicted the formation of bargaining units in American local government 
departments. In the UK, it has also been highlighted that the establishment of non­
union Whitley Councils in the 1920s in the public service further encouraged 
unionisation (White, 1933; Gollan, 2000) and the development of workplace 
unionism in the traditionally status and hierarchy driven civil service.
Drago and Wooden’s (1991) research also suggests that formal employee 
participation structures (direct or indirect) heighten employees’ desire and appetite 
for representation at workplace level. A parallel can be drawn to Sako’s (1998) 
research findings of the interaction between direct and indirect participation 
arrangements, with one the necessary condition of the other. Similar findings were 
raised by Batt, Colvin and Keefe (2002) in their examination of employee voice in 
the telecommunications industry.
Charlwood’s (2002) analysis of a representative sample of non-union employees in 
the UK also confirms the importance of job dissatisfaction and perceived union 
instrumentality as predictors of the willingness to join a trade union, with union 
instrumentality being the most significant factor32. Charlwood’s (2002) figures based 
on the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey Data would suggest that overall some 40 
per cent of non-union employees expressed a willingness to join a union if one were
32 The representative sample o f non-union employees was derived from the 1998 British Social 
Attitudes Survey.
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available. Political beliefs and left wing views were also important factors in the 
decision to join a trade union. Charlwood (2002) further states that, ‘These results 
suggest that if unions are to win the support of the non-union workforce, they will 
need to invest considerable effort and resources in persuading employees that a union 
will make a difference to their workforce’ (p. 488).
Kelly (1998) also suggests that political and ideological beliefs may be important 
influences in the willingness of employees to join a trade union. In particular, left- 
wing political views could encourage social solidarity between employees since 
political beliefs may influence an individual’s views on trade unions which mediate 
the costs and benefits of unionisation. As Charlwood (2002: 470) argues, ‘an 
individual with left-wing political views is likely to believe that the benefits of 
unionisation are higher and the costs lower, while an individual with right-wing 
political views is likely to believe the opposite (also see Kelly, 1998: 27-29). Thus 
employees with left-wing views are likely to believe in union instrumentality. Kelly 
(1998) also states that such employees may view their employment in terms of 
capitalist exploitation and be less satisfied with their job.
Recent research by Badigannavar and Kelly (2005) explored why certain organising 
campaigns were more successful than other campaigns as measured by membership 
growth and recruitment of activists. They found that unions that generated greater 
social cohesion and union identification amongst employees were considered more 
effective in voicing workers’ concerns and more successful in attributing blame for 
problems on management, which promoted a stronger sense of union instrumentality 
and perceived effectiveness and highlighted the benefits of union membership. They 
go on to state that while those were important intrinsic factors, other extrinsic issues 
mediated the intention to be a union member. In particular, the size of the firm in 
establishing a critical mass of activists and the influence of local labour market 
conditions may also be important, with workers who have more ‘exit’ options likely 
to be in a much stronger bargaining position than workers with fewer alternatives. 
Badigannavar and Kelly (2005: 532) argue these extrinsic factors may ‘not directly 
affect the intention to unionise, they may have an indirect effect through reducing the
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perceived effectiveness of the union’.
Related to this are the views, beliefs and attitudes towards unions and work from the 
normative attitudes of family, local community and social class (Blanden and 
Machin, 2002; Charlwood, 2002). The rationale is that employees in a local 
community dominated by traditional heavy industry with high unionisation are more 
willing to join a trade union due to their experience of trade unionism from family 
and friends. Such normative attitudes may influence perceptions of union 
instrumentality and political views. Previous union experience through union 
membership may also be a significant factor, since impressions left by their previous 
union experience may encourage (or discourage) union membership.
Importantly, Appelbaum and Batt (1994: 151-152) suggest that ‘as the central 
conflict between labor and management has shifted from wage bargaining to saving 
jobs, unions have recognized the need to represent members’ interests by taking a 
proactive rather than a reactive stance on corporate decisions that affect the ability of 
the company to remain profitable in an increasingly competitive environment’. 
Within this context it may seem problematic for trade unions with increasing focus 
away from traditional collective bargaining issues concerning pay and conditions, to 
a new focus on more strategic issues such as capital investment, product 
development and/or service delivery, technology and work organisation. It is argued 
that traditionally few unions have the necessary capabilities, knowledge or capacity 
to assume such ‘partnership’ responsibilities (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994: 153; Terry, 
2003).
Within this context Bacon and Storey (2000: 408) argue that the evidence now 
strongly points to ‘many trade unions withering on the vine’, and where traditional 
industrial relations procedures remain in place they increasingly came to resemble a 
‘hollow shell’ (Hyman, 1997).
Research by Rubery et al. (2004) into changing organisational forms and inter- 
organisational relations in the UK shed some light on these developments. They
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found that worker voice was often fragmented or disconnected. One example was at 
an airport where business contracts and the nature of employment contracts were 
complex and fragmented. This was partly due to government regulations breaking up 
the existing employment relationships across a number of private sector companies. 
They found that union solidarity was weakened as staff started to identify previous 
colleagues as potential competitors and cost-cutting created a multi-tiered workforce 
on different terms and conditions, with newly appointed staff on less attractive terms 
and benefits than longer-serving staff (Rubery et al., 2004). Consequently tensions 
and divisions developed undermining worker and union solidarity. They concluded 
that those staff employed on precarious contracts lacked clearly defined channels of 
representation to articulate their grievances and lacked any collective strength to 
make their voice heard.
3.5 Management strategies towards NER and union responses: A 
framework
Figure 3.3 below sets out a framework highlighting the major themes and influences 
on the interplay between NER and union voice arrangements. It seeks to address the 
research questions presented in Chapter One. In particular, the model shows that a 
number of processes are involved in the mobilisation of union representation and its 
interaction with employer strategies and interplay with NER voice arrangements. It 
starts from the premise that certain internal and external contextual variables create 
an expectation and achievement/satisfaction gap, which management attempts to fill 
by creating a voice arrangement. This may be achieved through a single 
representation channel buying in a union or by establishing a non-union voice 
mechanism.
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Figure 3.3 Management strategies towards NER and union responses: A 
framework
INTERNAL & EXTERNAL CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Internal
• Corporate centralisation & cost rationalisation
• Investm ent risk (share and financial instability) 
• Corporate culture & leadership style (autocratic)
• Critical production dependency 
• HR policies & stra teg ies
External
• B usiness cycle 
• Labour & product m arkets 
• Industrial Relations environm ent 
•Legal & legislative context
Expectation (want) -  Achievement & Satisfaction (have) Gap
Pre-Union Organising 
P h ase
M anagement s tra teg ies & objectives of representative participation
• Make (non-union), Hedge (dual channel) or buy (union)
• Com plem ent or substitute
Effectiveness
• Unrealised expectations, lack of voice and influence
I
|  W idening of expectation -  achievem ent & satisfaction gap  & perceived injustice |
Frustration, lack of trust & disenchantm ent in m anagem en t leading to instrumental collectivism
Peaceful pursuit of outcom es with em ployer R ead iness for action again st employer
Union re sp o n ses  -  colonisation/m arginalisation of NER
Union Organising 
P h ase
INHIBITING CONDITIONS
• Desire to give employer 
opportunities for redress
• Lack of connection to 
union
Reprisal against em ployer -  support for unionisation (ballot & statutory recognition)
Union recognition & partnership p h ase
(Adapted from Wheeler & McClendon, 1991:60)
Mutual gains -  win/win
Conflict of interests -  win/lose
Union recognition & partnership 
Buy (union)
Im plications for union, 
em ployer & NER arrangem ents
Interplay betw een union & NER arrangem ents
• Continuum or sep a ra te  dom ain
Emotional residue 
NER policies & practices 
NER structures & forms
Level of union socialisation
FACILITATING CONDITIONS
• R epresen tatives’ influence & leadership
• Com pany provocations
• High perceived mobilisation by em ployees
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However, management may decide to ‘hedge’ by recognising a union and 
establishing an additional voice arrangement creating two voice channels as a means 
to address lack of employee voice and mediate union demands (addressing research 
question one). Such strategies determine whether NER arrangements are established 
as a complement to or a substitute for union representation (addressing research 
question two). It is suggested that when such NER arrangements, are established 
they create certain employee expectations about outcomes from such arrangements.
If these expectations are not realised, a widening of the gap between expectation and 
achievement results in greater frustration, lack of trust and disenchantment in 
management leading to instrumental collectivism due to a lack of perceived 
effectiveness (addressing research question three). This could manifest itself either as 
the peaceful pursuit of desired outcomes through mutual gains by union recognition 
by the employer and/or employer-employee partnership. These arrangements lead to 
certain partnership and collective bargaining outcomes, which in turn influence 
employee responses and perceptions (addressing research question four). 
Alternatively, union responses may be expressed through a readiness for action 
against an employer based on a conflict of interests as an expression of a ‘win’ and 
‘lose’ strategy. This will be meditated by union responses, in particular union 
strategies to colonise or to marginalise NER voice arrangements (addressing research 
question five).
Under the union recognition/partnership path a number of factors may influence the 
type and level of interplay between union and NER arrangements including NER 
policies and practices, NER structures and forms and the level of union socialisation. 
Under the ‘win/lose’ conflict path, the reprisal against the employer through support 
of unionisation may be influenced by a number of conditions. One inhibiting 
condition may be the desire by certain sections of the workforce to give the employer 
opportunities for redress, the lack of desire to be members of a trade union or the 
lack of connection to the union movement among employees. This may be due to 
more individualist, cultural and societal values towards or lack of historical 
connection to unions. More facilitating conditions include the strength of the union 
representatives’ influence and leadership, company views and opinions towards
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unions, and high perceived mobilisation by employees. As a result, these conditions 
and influences, affect the interplay between union and NER and if such structures 
provide a continuum or separate domain for employees, and in so doing have 
implications for unions, the employer and NER arrangements with in the context of 
recent legislative development in Europe (addressing research question six).
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODS AND STRATEGY
4.1 Introduction
The research method and strategy employed in this thesis principally follows a 
qualitative case study approach. Yin describes the case study approach as an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life 
context, when there is a blurring between phenomenon and context, where multiple 
sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1994). Stoecher (1991: 97-98) defines a case 
study as ‘those research projects which attempt to explain holistically the dynamics 
of a certain historical period of a particular social unit’. It could be argued that the 
advantage of the case study approach is the ability to evaluate the process of change 
and its consequences to give an account of actions, events and people. However, 
there are certain limitations to the case study approach, since it focuses on events 
within a particular context and it can be difficult to generalise from the results. Scott 
(1994: 30) argues that the case study should be seen as something different from 
general social surveys:
Case studies are not about indicating how common a particular 
phenomenon is, but rather about helping to understand situations ... 
this means using the evidence o f behaviour in particular enterprises to 
shed light upon issues which are common to a wide range o f business 
organisations, (as cited in Dundon and Rollinson, 2004: 60)
A fundamental feature of the research design was to use a strategy that would allow 
the flexibility of rich, deep and complex factors to emerge from what are essentially 
dynamic processes (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004). The emphasis on rich and detailed 
information in the case study approach by utilising both qualitative and quantitative 
methods can be useful in explaining social processes and outcomes. While the
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interviews provide in-depth understanding of a particular given situation and focus 
groups can represent a collective response to questions that permit testimonies and 
narratives (Gephart, 2004: 458), the use of a questionnaire can ‘bridge the gaps’ of 
qualitative data and help facilitate the management of a mass of information and 
allow direct comparison between nodes of data or variables (Dundon and Rollinson, 
2004; Yin, 1993).
It can also be argued that a combination of methods provides the best means to 
understand the ‘delicate and intricate interactions and processes occurring within 
organisations’ (Hartley, 1994: 209) as a means to triangulate and thereby improve 
validity in analysing the results. The aim of this research was not only to determine 
‘what’ were the structures, processes, procedures and outcomes of NER voice 
arrangements but also to inform and explain ‘why’ and ‘how’ such arrangements 
were introduced and the likely implications of the introduction of such voice 
arrangements. While the interviews and observation provided explanations for why 
certain policies and procedures had to be adopted, the questionnaires provided 
factual information on employee perceptions and attitudes. In effect, this research 
endeavours to shift away from a variable-centred explanation to one based on 
narrative, thus attempting to capture social realities as a network of complex social 
interactions and locating small case study based surveys within more firm-based 
general social science thought.
As a means to ascertain a fuller picture of NER arrangements, this research attempts 
to measure the breadth and depth of such voice arrangements. As Cox, Zagelmeyer, 
and Marchington (2006) suggests relying on questions about absence or presence 
does not take into account how these schemes work in practice and questions about 
extensions tell us nothing about the extent to which schemes are embedded within a 
workplace or an organisation.
Breadth can be considered to be a measure of how many different schemes operate in 
a workplace or organisation or industry. Depth, however, measures how embedded 
an individual technique or channel of voice is within the workplace or firm, assessing
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factors such as regularity, significance, level of power, independence and autonomy, 
level of trust, resources and capability, and legitimacy.
While it could be argued that each of these factors assesses slightly different aspects 
of voice, they all measure depth and the degree of effectiveness and influence over 
decisions, and assess whether such voice arrangements are merely a cosmetic 
exercise and a device to incorporate, or a genuine attempt to share influence and give 
workers a say in the decision-making process.
Combining breadth and depth offers greater acknowledgement and capacity to 
evaluate voice and participation at the workplace level. As Cox, Zagelmeyer and 
Marchington (2006) suggest these indicators should be assessed through longitudinal 
case study work. Cox, Zagelmeyer and Marchington (2006) also argue that greater 
breadth and depth of voice arrangements are associated more significantly with 
positive employee outcomes, including commitment, satisfaction, loyalty, pride, 
fairness and shared values, than presence alone.
Importantly, qualitative research is often designed at the same time as the research is 
undertaken and is open to unanticipated events, which requires highly contextualised 
individual judgements. While it offers holistic depictions of realities that cannot be 
reduced to a few variables, clarity can be gained by contrasting qualitative research 
with quantitative research which focuses on measurement and analysis of causal 
relations between certain variables (Gephart, 2004: 455) and provides the bases for 
understanding social processes that underlie management strategy and actions.
According to Gephart (2004), qualitative research highlights the linkages between 
theories and methods. It addition, it explores the processes that occur naturally and 
studies phenomena in the environments in which they naturally occur, and uses 
social actors’ meanings to understand this phenomena (Gephart, 2004: 455).
Gephart goes on to suggest that qualitative research ‘provides a narrative of people’s 
view(s) of reality and it relies on words and talk to create tests. Qualitative work is
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highly descriptive and often recounts who said what to whom, as well as how, when 
and why. An emphasis on situation details unfolding over time allows qualitative 
research to describe processes. Qualitative researchers also seek to explain research 
observations by providing well-substantiated conceptual insights that reveal how 
broad concepts and theories operate in particular cases ... An important value of 
qualitative research is description and understanding of the actual human 
interactions, meanings and processes that constitute real-life organisational settings’ 
(Gephart, 2004: 455).
This research employs an interpretive perspective as a means to understand the 
‘actual production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings’, 
thus describing how different meanings ‘held by different people or groups produce 
and sustain a sense of fact, particularly in the face of competing definitions of 
reality’, and seeking to describe and understand individually held meanings and the 
implications that different meanings hold for social interaction (Gephart, 2004: 457). 
It also examines how particular meanings become shared, dominant, and/or contested 
in situations in which alternative meanings and understandings are present.
According to Harrison and Freeman (1999: 482), the quality of empirical research in 
the social sciences is measured in terms of validity, reliability, internal validity, and 
external validity. As a means to address these criteria, Yin (1994) has suggested a 
number of elements which could be addressed. To ensure construct validity 
(establishing correct measures for constructs under consideration) multiple sources of 
evidence could be used and key informants could review and comment on the 
findings and evidence. Reliability (the means by which a study can be repeated and 
yield the same or similar results) requires detailed research frameworks and protocol. 
Internal validity (relevant for explanatory cases) can be gained from pattern matching 
by explanation building or time series analysis. To address this requirement, the 
Eurotunnel case presented for example builds in this thesis on explanation building 
through a time series of longitudinal analysis. The issue of external validity or 
generalisability however, is more problematic for case studies.
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Yin (1994) states that simply contrasting a sample as representative to the large 
population is an incorrect evaluation of case studies, since survey research relies on 
‘statistical’ generalisation and case studies rely on ‘analytical’ generalisation, where 
a researcher is trying to generalise a ‘particular set of results to some broader theory’ 
(Yin, 1994:36). Another way to address this issue, according to Yin, is to use 
replication with multiple or a series of cases that reinforce each other. This has been 
addressed in this thesis by examining a series of cases as part of the research 
strategy.
In particular, the selection of the cases highlighted a number of distinguishing 
characteristics that enabled a better understanding of management motives and union 
responses towards NER, and the effectiveness of NER arrangements as a mechanism 
of employee voice.
The cases were selected on the basis that either their structures were well established 
(thus capable of showing their potential effectiveness), or were recognised as leading 
companies in their field or market (examples of best practice behaviour) and had 
recently adopted NER arrangements as part of their industrial relations strategy.
Some cases were also selected to highlight conditions for representative change 
under certain environmental conditions. In particular, the catalysts for change at 
South West Water, News International and Eurotunnel were both internal to the firm 
and as a result of external changes in environmental conditions outside the firm. In 
the case of South West Water, internal catalysts were a change of management style 
from a new leadership team and the change of ownership from government control to 
privatisation. In the case of News International, environmental changes such as 
availability of new technology allowed greater flexibility of labour and reduced the 
demand for highly unionised craft skills.
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4.2 Methodological framework
The central focus on the perceived effectiveness of NER systems has several 
methodological consequences. First, it allows an analysis of the different types of 
relationships, such as the relationship between the employee and the employer, the 
employee and employee representative, and the representative and the employer. 
Second, it can provide a framework for examining the operation of NER 
arrangements (ie how do they impact on employee trust in management and 
perceptions of influence etc.?) Third, what this all means for unionism is explored 
indirectly, by studying union responses to such arrangements. Fourth, it allows an 
examination of the effectiveness of representative voice arrangements through 
employee perceptions, attitudes towards and satisfaction with NER arrangements and 
how such arrangements are perceived in representing the interests of, and providing 
voice for employees .
It was considered inappropriate to explore effectiveness and outcomes using 
objective data (performance, employment levels, turnover etc) due to a number of 
factors. First, objective workplace data was difficult to obtain in a number of firms. 
While public data through annual reports was accessible, much of the data was too 
general and distant from the central focus of the research. Second, where data was 
available (eg. turnover) movements and trends identified in these data were difficult 
to attribute to actual representative and consultative processes and arrangements. 
Third, objective indicators of effectiveness (performance, profits, productivity etc) 
invariably depend on a number of inputs, thus isolating the contribution of 
representative and consultative processes to these outcomes would be difficult and 
problematic. Thus ‘perceptions’ of effectiveness and outcomes from respondents 
(employees, management, and worker representatives) who have knowledge and 
experience of the representative and consultative processes were considered to be a 
more appropriate measure.
33 It must be recognised that while perceptions o f effectiveness are potentially biased and should be 
treated with caution. However, such opinions could be considered important since the level o f  support 
for voice arrangements may impact o f the level o f success and longevity o f such arrangements.
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This raises two general methodological questions. First, ‘How is the research going 
to answer the questions presented?’, and second, ‘What process or approach will be 
adopted to develop the research? As such, the research strategy consists of five 
stages.
The first stage was the identification and exploration of NER voice arrangements. 
This involved a literature review, exploratory fieldwork, ‘pilot’ case studies and 
finally selection of the cases. The second stage involved the case study research by 
reviewing management strategies towards NER arrangements in nine organisations. 
The third stage identified five organisations to undertake a more thorough analysis 
using a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques over specific 
time periods as a means to identify the perceived effectiveness of NER in 
representing the interests of and providing voice for employees. These cases also 
provided data for examining union responses to such arrangements. The fourth stage 
applied a longitudinal investigation of Eurotunnel to explore whether NER 
arrangements were a complement to union representation or acted as a substitute for 
union-based voice arrangements. This stage also provided a means to assess the 
workplace outcomes of both NER and union-based voice arrangements. In the final 
stage, the findings were synthesised and conclusions drawn to highlight the potential 
implications for employers, unions and NER-based voice arrangements in the future.
4.2.1 First stage: literature review and case study selection
The first stage established the background to and development of NER arrangements 
through a review of relevant literature and findings. An examination was made of 
definitional questions (ie what is an NER structure?) and an assessment made of the 
approaches to certain forms of NER from an employee’s and employer’s perspective 
(including managerial strategies towards employee representation in general). As 
such, the first stage was divided into two parts.
Literature review
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Until recently, research into NER was limited in the UK and was mainly based on a 
small number of North American studies. While research on works councils in 
Europe was very well developed, little was known of NER in Anglo countries where 
no legal framework of NER had been established. In 2000, Bruce Kaufman and 
Daphne Taras edited a collection of papers around the issue of NER titled Nonunion 
Employee Representation -  History, Contemporary Practice and Policy (Kaufman 
and Taras, 2000) based on a conference in Banff, Canada in September, 1997. The 
volume contained a number of perspectives and views towards NER and outlined the 
theory and practice of NER arrangements, primarily in the US. The volume also 
contained three chapters focusing on NER arrangements in Germany, Japan, and the 
UK and Australia. While this provided an initial step towards filling a void, little was 
still known of NER in practice from a UK perspective.
Using Kaufman and Taras’ (2000: 17) words, the aim of this doctoral research was to 
‘materially advance the state of knowledge and debate’ by consolidating and 
integrating the available (and limited) literature on NER in the UK. The literature 
outlined a number of descriptive details of the policies, practices and structures of 
NER voice arrangements but provided little insight into how such arrangements were 
implemented, the management strategies involved, or their impact on performance or 
industrial relations outcomes for employers or employees.
Case study selection
The initial empirical research began by identifying a number of ‘pilot’ studies from 
the general press and trade journals based on the definition of NER generated in the 
first stage. Academic and practitioner contacts were also utilised to undertake an 
initial review of organisations with NER. Upon identification of the organisation, 
initial contact was made via telephone and email normally with a senior HR manager 
or director to ascertain the type of NER arrangement and its appropriateness for 
addressing the research questions generated in the first stage of the project.
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Another consideration was the probability of gaining access to firms with appropriate 
NER structures. This process identified nine organisations in total. These firms 
represented a cross section of service-based market sectors and manufacturing (see 
below for further details). Given the limited research previously undertaken in the 
area, this stage was considered important to enable a clear systematic understanding 
of what was required in the subsequent research stages (see Table 4.1 for details of 
case study organisations and characteristics).
Table 4.1 Characteristics of case studies34
Sainsbury’s
Retail (Grocery)
Sainsbury’s was founded in 1869 as one o f the first grocery stores in Drury Lane, London. At the time 
o f  the study, the group had 140,000 full-time and part-time employees in over 380 Sainsbury’s, 
Savacentre and Homebase stores nationwide. Sainsbury’s employed 115,000 people in around 363 
supermarkets and four depots (two-thirds were part-timers). In addition, there were 12,500 
administrative staff. Homebase employees accounted for 17,000 staff in 332 stores35. Savacentre had
10.000 staff in 12 hypermarkets. About 66 per cent o f the total workforce were part-time and are 
mainly women.
John Lewis Partnership
Retail (Department store)
The company was founded in 1864 when John Lewis established a draper’s shop in Oxford Street, 
London. In April 2002, John Lewis had 50,000 staff with 40,000 partners (permanent full-time and 
part-time staff) employed in 25 department stores, 130 Waitrose food shops, five manufacturing units, 
distribution centres and warehouses.
South West Water -  Pennon Group
Water utility (W ater & sewerage)
South West Water Limited (SWW) is the water and sewerage company for the South West region, 
which employed around 1,600 people at the time o f the study at the time o f the study. It is part o f  a 
larger group o f companies under the umbrella o f  the Pennon Group Pic. SWW holds the licence from 
the Government to provide water and sewerage services to the South West for 25 years from 1989 to 
2014.
Panasonic (Matsushita) UK
Sales (Electrical appliance)
Panasonic (UK) is the trading name o f the Matsushita Electric group based in Japan. At the time o f the 
study it had 11,000 employees in Europe and a workforce o f 260,000 worldwide. There were around
4.000 employees in the UK where its European head office is based.
34 All figures were as o f 2001 unless otherwise stated.
35 Sainsbury pic sold its Homebase stores in December 2000.
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of case studies (continued)
HP Bulmers Ltd
Food and drink (Alcoholic -  cider)
Bulmers was founded after Percival Bulmer began making cider at Credenhill in Herefordshire in 
1887. In the autumn o f that year he began operations in Hereford. In 1888, his brother Fred Bulmer 
joined him to establish HP Bulmer and Company. While it became a public company in 1970, at the 
time o f the study the Bulmer family still owned about 50 per cent o f the shares. Subsidiary companies 
include Symonds (Herefordshire), Inch’s (Devon) and businesses in Belgium, Australia and New  
Zealand. At the time o f  the study Bulmers had around 60 per cent market share in the UK and 
accounted for 80 per cent o f the UK’s cider exports. In 2001, it had around 800 employees at the 
Hereford plants and a worldwide workforce o f 1,250 employees36.
Grosvenor Casinos
Entertainment (Casinos and clubs)
Grosvenor Casinos is one o f the largest entertainment operations in the UK with interests covering 
casinos, bingo, bowling alleys and nightclubs. The company forms part o f the leisure division o f the 
Rank Organisation pic. Grosvenor opened its first casino in 1970 and has been developing its portfolio 
ever since. At the time o f the research, it operated over 33 clubs throughout England and Wales 
(providing over 300 gaming tables). In addition, two clubs in Belgium were bought in 1998. On 
average, there were 120 employees per club, although one London club employed some 500 people. 
Overall, Grosvenor Casinos employed approximately 3,500 staff (including part-time and casual 
employees) and was divided into four geographic regions. Some sites operated 14 hours a day seven 
days a week, 365 days a year.
News International
M edia and entertainment (Newspapers, television and motion pictures)
News International Newspapers (UK) is part o f the Australian-based News Corporation37. News 
Corporation is one o f the world’s largest media companies with total assets o f approximately U S$40  
billion. News Corporation has diversified global operations in the United States, Canada, Continental 
Europe, United Kingdom, Australia, Latin America and the Pacific Basin. These operations include: 
the production and distribution o f motion pictures and television programming; television, satellite 
and cable broadcasting; the publication o f newspapers, magazines, and books; the production and 
distribution o f promotional and advertising products and services; the development o f digital 
broadcasting; and the creation and distribution o f  popular on-line programming (The News 
Corporation Limited Overview, 1999). At the time o f the study News Corporation had a worldwide 
staff o f 50,000 employees. In 2001, News International Newspapers UK employed around 3,600 staff 
in London (Wapping), Manchester (Knowsley) and Glasgow (Kinning Park).
Eurotunnel (UK)
Transport
Eurotunnel has a 99-year lease to operate the Channel Tunnel link between Britain and France. It has a 
complex structure consisting o f two legal entities to meet requirements in the UK and France. The 
company is owned by private shareholdings in France and the UK. Around 26 per cent o f shareholders 
are banks, a similar proportion are institutional investors and 48 per cent are individual shareholders.
In 2001/2 Eurotunnel employed a total staff o f 2,300, with approxiately 1,300 based in Britain on UK  
contracts. The UK head office is in Folkestone (Longport) with a separate office nearby for some 
administration activities (ie call centre).
36 In September 2002 HP Bulmers’ share price collapsed and 280 employees were made redundant. In 
2003 HP Bulmers sold their Australian business to Calton United Brewers and in 2003 HP Bulmers 
was bought by the Scottish and Newcastle Brewery.
37 In 2004 News International shifted its corporate domicile from Australia to the US.
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of case studies (continued)
Ciba Specialty Chem icals (UK)
Chemicals
Ciba Specialty Chemicals (UK) is the UK division o f the Swiss-based Ciba Specialty Chemicals 
group. Previously, the UK division was an independent UK company under the name o f Allied 
Colloids. It was sold to the Ciba group in 1998. Worldwide, the group has around 25,000 employees. 
The Bradford site at the time o f  the study employed around 1,800 staff. It is a leading specialty 
chemicals and associated chemicals producer with a focus on chemicals for water treatment38.
Particular emphasis at this stage of the research was to identify the various 
approaches and strategies towards NER arrangements. After a review of firms as part 
of the first stage of the research, it was considered that these firms represented a 
diverse range of NER approaches, which could highlight particular management 
strategies in attempting to achieve organisational aims and objectives. Given that the 
aim of case selection was to achieve a diversity of approaches, firms with similar 
approaches and strategies to those cases already identified were rejected.
In addition, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented in section 3.1 were 
used to guide case analysis. In particular, the Willman et a l  (2003) buy (union), 
make (non-union) or hedge (dual channel) model (incorporating risk and switching 
costs) based on transaction cost economics was used to identify the rationale for 
employers to choose between different voice regimes and to provide a theoretical 
basis for employer strategies towards NER arrangements. As such, the cases
- IQ
represent dual (union and non-union) and single channel (non-union only ) 
approaches to employee representation.
As previously mentioned, the cases were also drawn from diverse industries and 
were selected on the basis of dissimilarity allowing for a comparative analysis of the 
variability and adaptability of employer strategies across industry sectors, 
occupational groups, difference in systems of corporate governance and geographical 
spread. Importantly, all organisations in this study were medium to large private 
sector firms since these firms would be covered by the European information and 
consultation provisions. This research also investigates management perceptions of
38 By 2005 Ciba Specialty Chemicals group employed around 19,000 people at 80 sites in 
28 countries. By this time the Bradford site reduced its workforce to 1055 employees.
39 Union only approaches were not included in the case selection since this was not the focus o f the 
thesis.
Paul J  Gollan 103
th e  L ondon S choo l of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o l i t ic a l  S c i e n o
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of non-union voice configurations and tests 
possible complementarities by using qualitative variations in voice arrangements. It 
was considered that management strategies and perceptions of the role of employee 
voice would influence management’s desire to obtain certain union and non-union 
channels of voice.
4.2.2 Second stage: fieldwork
The initial fieldwork in these nine organisations was undertaken between October 
1998 and June 2000. This phase enabled an assessment of management strategies and 
motivations towards NER up to and immediately following the introduction of the 
Employment Relations Act with its new provisions and procedures for statutory union 
recognition. This review of management strategies towards NER in the period 
preceding and following the introduction of the Employment Relations Act could also 
give an indication of the management strategies likely to be adopted for the 
forthcoming Information and Consultation Directive and the UK ICE Regulations.
In addition, assessing management strategies towards NER in these cases would 
provide a basis for exploring the internal influences on employers rationale for 
establishing NER arrangements and assessing the value of the Willman et al. (2003) 
framework based on the transaction cost economics model. In addition, it also 
allowed an opportunity to examine the importance of Appelbaum and Batt’s (1994) 
institutional framework of external factors conditioning and influencing NER 
strategies.
In all cases, the research was based on interviews with senior HR personnel 
(normally the HR Manager and/or HR Director) in order to explore management 
strategies and NER processes. Where appropriate the employee representative and 
senior trade union representatives were also interviewed. Fieldwork was carried out 
in these organisations by identifying key informants who could outline and review 
their NER arrangements in fine detail (see Appendix 1 for the list of key informants). 
In several organisations, access was also given for interviews with other worker
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representatives and employees.
In total, the research is based on approximately 45 interviews with managers, 
employee representatives and union officials. In many cases, access was also given 
to detailed employee survey data and other internal company documents, such as 
committee minutes, management memos and committee constitutions. A semi­
structured interview was used on each occasion with interviews lasting between one 
and three hours.
Key themes raised in the interview schedule included: drivers in establishing NER 
voice arrangements; involvement of trade unions; structures and processes of 
representative voice arrangements; issues raised at meetings; relationship between 
representatives and management; perceptions of the value of information and 
consultation processes; role of negotiation, bargaining and consultation; perceptions 
of effectiveness among management and employee representatives; and perceptions 
of influence and impact of NER arrangements.
In addition, in those organisations with a trade union presence material from relevant 
union sources was sought to assess union and employee representatives’ views on 
NER strategies. Interviews were also conducted with employee representatives and, 
where present, trade union representatives, as a means to assess the perceived 
outcomes of NER from the perspective of worker representatives. Themes raised in 
the employee representative interviews were: degree of personal involvement; 
information received from management; perceptions of the extent of voice and 
influence; level of training and of representative skills; relations between union and 
non-union representatives; conduct and procedures of council meetings; and 
representatives’ relations with management (see Appendix 2 for full interview 
schedule).
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4.2.3 Third stage: cases for further investigation
The third stage of the research identified five organisations (from the pool of nine 
organisations) worthy of further investigation -  HP Bulmers, Ciba Specialty 
Chemicals (UK), South West Water (SWW), News International and Eurotunnel 
(UK). In particular, these cases were selected on the basis that their NER structures 
were embedded within workplaces, which had a degree of active union presence. 
These cases also provided an opportunity to examine company wide representation 
arrangements across a diverse range of occupational roles within a single firm.
One of the aims of this stage of the research was to provide insights into union 
responses to such arrangements, thus shedding some light on the potential outcomes 
and implications for management, trade unions and employees. The research also 
explored union strategies and tactics of ‘colonisation’ and ‘marginalisation’ of NER 
voice arrangements. These cases also provided a basis for assessing Freeman and 
Lazear’s (1995) model of rent distribution in underpinning the rationale for 
maintaining NER voice arrangements.
In addition to the methods employed in the previous stages of the research, this stage 
widened the scope of investigation to include focus groups in three organisations 
(South West Water, News International and Eurotunnel). Access was given at News 
International to a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey on representation and other 
internal company records, and at Eurotunnel permission was given to conduct a 
Consultation, information and representation employee survey in 1999 before union 
recognition and again in 2002 after union recognition (see below for further details of 
the surveys). Access was granted to council minutes and internal correspondence 
between management, the union and the company council, senior management and 
employee representatives. In order to assess employee views at South West Water, a 
previous trade union representative at the company arranged focus groups with 
employees to ascertain employees’ views as well as interviews with senior 
management and employee representatives. The detailed research strategies are
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outlined below.
HP Bulmers Ltd
The HP Bulmers case study was based on two interviews -  one with the Employee 
Councillor and Deputy Chair of the Employee Council and another with the 
T&GWU Convenor -  in June and July 1999. The interviews provided an opportunity 
for indepth questioning of leading representatives from the union and the Employee 
Council.
This case was selected because of the presence of dual channels of representation, 
which could highlight the processes and interplay between union and non-union 
arrangements. Bulmers’ long history of paternalistic partnership practices based on a 
strong sense of social harmony, co-operation and equality was also a significant 
factor in the case selection, particularly given the company’s aim of diminishing 
‘class distinction’ . In addition, the long history of union representation and non­
union arrangements could provide further insights into the processes and procedures 
required for the co-existence of union and non-union voice arrangements.
Ciba Specialty Chemicals (UK)
This case study was based on interviews with the Company Council Leader and 
Union Site Representative, and the union (GMB) Regional Organiser in June 1999. 
The case provided an opportunity to review the strategy of the long-standing 
Company Council before and after union recognition. It also provided an opportunity 
to assess the union’s strategy in finally gaining union recognition in early 1999. It 
became evident from the interviews that the union had maintained a high presence 
before union recognition. Thus strategies by the GMB in gaining union recognition 
and the union’s responses to the existing Company Council were significant in 
establishing relations with management through a partnership agreement and 
developing relations with non-union employees and the Company Council.
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South West Water
South West Water (SWW) was identified as a suitable organisation for researching 
the rationale behind the changes in industrial relations policy and recognition of trade 
unions that had taken place over a nine-year period. Important observations and 
unique insights into the representation arrangements at SWW were recorded during 
this period. Access was also given to internal company and union documentation.
A series of interviews were carried out over a two-year period (before and after 
union recognition) with the Head of Personnel, Personnel and Services Manager, the 
full-time UNISON Officer and the UNISON Branch Secretary. The interviews each 
lasted between two and four hours. The interviews were recorded and the transcripts 
verified with the interviewees.
Importantly, this longitudinal study is not based on snapshots at the beginning and 
end of the process but examines important events during the process and the 
dynamics of management decisions and attitudes throughout the period of the study. 
The interviews attempted to establish what motivated SWW to re-establish relations 
with UNISON and to recognise them after the establishment of the non-union Staff 
Council (SC). By exploring this issue and examining reactions to a number of 
important events in the intervening time, it was hoped to assess the importance of 
partnership at SWW, the influence of senior management and the impact that the 
1999 Employment Relations Act had made on management strategies towards 
representation in the organisation.
As Cutcher-Gershenfeld et a l  (1995: 13) have argued, there are few detailed 
accounts of change processes at organisational level. They go on to suggest that ‘it is 
only by tracing the twists and turns in the change process that we can fully appreciate 
why the pathways to change are so complex’. This case study attempts to trace such 
‘pathways’ and provide an in-depth examination to understand the rationale behind a 
history of derecognition leading to a non-union SC, followed by a review of 
personnel policies, which resulted in partnership initiatives and a subsequent
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recognition agreement with UNISON.
News International Newspapers (UK)
The study of News International was based on fieldwork undertaken between March 
1999 and June 2000. This period allowed an examination of the issues involved in 
the transition from the previous consultative structure to the development of a new 
staff association. In particular, it enabled an assessment of management strategies 
towards and motivations regarding NER at News International. During this period, 
six interviews were carried out with the Director of Human Resources and other 
senior managers. As a means to assess employees’ views, access was made available 
to the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ employee attitude survey data. Other internal 
company and staff association documents were also examined. In addition, material 
from relevant union sources was also sought to assess union views on employee 
representation and management strategies.
The Employee Consultative Council (ECC) employee attitude survey was carried out 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers in November 1998 on behalf of the ECC. Questions 
were asked covering issues of work satisfaction, communication, management style, 
representation and the ECC. Of the 3,553 questionnaires40 sent to employees, some 
1,656 self-completion questionnaires were sent directly back to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. The overall response rate was 47 per cent with two largest 
sites, Wapping and Manchester, having the lowest response rates -  39 per cent and 
33 per cent respectively. The data from this survey was also analysed to further 
explore employees’ views towards employee consultation in general, and more 
specifically towards the ECC, unions and the future of representation at News 
International.
Eurotunnel
As previously mentioned, together with the SWW and News International case 
studies, the Eurotunnel study provided an opportunity to examine representation
40 All employees at News International at the time.
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arrangements in a number of operations. However the Eurotunnel study could also 
review these diverse operations within one single establishment (call centre, 
engineering, train drivers, administration etc).
In the Eurotunnel case study, qualitative and quantitative techniques were applied to 
improve internal validity. The method employed and the time period under 
investigation was more extensive than the other case studies due increased access to 
the site. Qualitative techniques included: structured and unstructured interviews with 
managers, union officials and company council representatives; fieldwork and site 
visits; participant observation and examination of company and company council 
archives and documents. The quantitative dimension complemented the qualitative 
research and enhanced and reinforced the overall research results and analysis.
While management was initially hesitant about distributing the surveys to its 
employees due to perceptions of survey overload, raising employee expectations, and 
work interruptions, the company eventually agreed to proceed with the surveys since 
it might provide valuable independent data on employee views and a more accurate 
account of employee attitudes, than surveys conducted by management.
4.2.4 Fourth stage: in-depth case study
The fourth stage identified one organisation for further analysis. This involved a 
longitudinal investigation of Eurotunnel to examine the interplay between non-union 
and union representation arrangements. This was done by comparing the views of 
employees and representation before and after union recognition and by comparing 
union members’ views with non-members’ views on union and NER voice 
arrangements.
This stage was largely based on a longitudinal study of the events and issues raised 
over a five year period at Eurotunnel (UK) from 1998 to 2003 by using a variety of 
sources. These sources included two company-based employee surveys (before and 
after union recognition), interviews, focus groups, attendance at meetings, a review
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of company and company council (CC) documentation (notably CC minutes since its 
establishment in 1992), and observation of CC meetings over this period.
The first survey was particularly problematic given the debate over trade union 
recognition among Eurotunnel management and on the CC. However, after 
consultation and negotiation with management and the CC, it was considered 
appropriate to survey a limited number of employees. By the 2002 survey, union 
recognition was established and no such restrictions were requested, allowing a full 
survey of all UK-contracted employees. The results could be compared (with 
additional union-based questions in the second survey) over the two time periods.
Employee surveys and focus groups were conducted as a means to analyse the 
feelings, views and perceptions of employees towards management, work, 
consultation and representation before and after union representation. In addition, 
based on the approach of Taras and Copping (1998) the study has employed a 
‘critical incident’ research method by encouraging specificity in interview responses. 
This was done by asking respondents to recall and describe an event which could be 
viewed as the pinnacle of the CC’s effectiveness and an event which could be 
described as the CC’s least effective.
This method is used to highlight such examples and events and to define otherwise 
‘nebulous’ terms such as ‘effectiveness’ and ‘power’ (Taras and Copping, 1998: 28). 
By analysing these critical incidents, the research could go beyond respondents’ ‘ex 
post’ views and sentiments, which may be influenced by other events, by identifying 
the basis for their perceptions. The study has also employed an issue analysis 
approach of the processes and outcomes derived from CC minutes.
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were applied in the case study. The 
quantitative approach added an important extra dimension to the research and could 
be seen as a distinguishing feature of the case study research framework.
Importantly, the purpose of the questionnaire was to augment this qualitative 
analysis, not to supplant this approach. Thus the analysis and results of the
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questionnaire are used in this research to triangulate the qualitative analysis 
enhancing and reinforcing the overall conclusions and findings.
It was envisaged that using such a research strategy would reduce any potential 
limitations in the survey methodology. This longitudinal study was not only derived 
from a comparison of snapshots taken at the start and end of the research, but 
significantly it follows through the dynamics and implications of management 
interventions and assesses the policies as they are ‘considered, engaged in and 
reappraised’ during this five-year period of transformation (Bacon and Storey, 2000: 
411).
Importantly, this approach assessed how attitudes and intentions had changed over 
this time period, rather than just providing a static snapshot of employee views. As 
Beaumont and Hunter (2003: 55) suggest, ‘the consultation process has been 
relatively little researched in the UK context’. Furthermore, the multi-variant nature 
of the research and the longitudinal perspective could give an insight into the 
dynamic of the processes and the trends that have developed, examine Eurotunnel 
strategies towards representation arrangements before and after union recognition 
and give an initial assessment of the outcomes of such arrangements. It was also 
anticipated that this approach to examining NER and union voice arrangements could 
highlight issues around ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘principal-agent’ problems.
As mentioned previously, in order to assess employees’ responses prior to union 
recognition an employee survey was undertaken between December 1999 and 
January 2000, expanding on some of the issues raised in earlier interviews. In 
addition, a second survey was conducted after union recognition during December 
2002. For the surveys, a draft questionnaire was piloted on all CC representatives, 
and detailed comments were received in relation to style, format, content, 
appropriateness of questions. The comments were addressed and incorporated into a 
final draft.
The first survey undertaken in 1999 consisted of a self-completion questionnaire of
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27 questions and was distributed to almost a third of the UK workforce (400 
employees) by CC representatives and deputies. Some 123 completed questions were 
returned, representing a 31 per cent response rate. The themes raised in the 
questionnaire included: work involvement; personal involvement in the consultation 
process; information received from management; the extent of voice and influence; 
relations between CC and union representatives; perceived CC effectiveness; and 
perceptions of management behaviour and responsiveness.
The second survey undertaken in 2002 replicated the first survey but included 
additional questions relating to trade union recognition and trade union presence. It 
consisted of a self-completion questionnaire of 31 questions. It was distributed to all 
UK employees (1,400 employees) and was attached to employees’ pay slips by the 
CC. Some 552 completed questionnaires were returned, representing a 40 per cent 
response rate of the total UK workforce. The objective of the second survey was to 
ascertain how Eurotunnel employees’ views and opinions towards management and 
representation had changed over this period and to examine the likely success of 
these new arrangements. In addition, at the end of the questionnaire employees were 
invited to make open comments about their work environment in relation to several 
issues, such as management, voice and representation. This yielded some 253 open 
comments, providing additional depth to employee responses.
Potentially, the survey could highlight distinct attitudes towards trade unions, and 
between management and the Eurotunnel workforce. In addition, an issue analysis of 
CC meetings was also made to ascertain the most important matters raised by CC 
representatives. The second survey and interview data highlight issues and views 
raised by non-union employees and union members towards the recognised union 
(T&GWU) and the CC after union recognition and the establishment of the 
partnership arrangements. However, the 1999/2000 survey was used as a reference 
point regarding certain union issues.
The intention of this was to assess the feedback on and satisfaction with the 
perceived effectiveness of CC arrangements at Eurotunnel in representing and
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communicating the interests of employees to management and the degree of 
satisfactory outcomes that had been achieved. This formed the basis of ascertaining 
the CC’s contribution to general organisational productivity and effectiveness and 
the climate of management/employee relations.
Levels of significance were tested from the findings of both surveys using Chi- 
square analysis. This was considered appropriate as it allows a statistical assessment 
of whether two variables are different in their distribution of values. Chi-square is a 
non-parametric statistic and thus can be used to assess data that is normally and not 
normally distributed.
In addition to the survey’s undertaken as part of this thesis, previous company 
surveys were also analysed for comparison. Three focus groups were also held in 
2002 to highlight and discuss themes raised in the completed questionnaires and in 
total, a series of twenty-five interviews were conducted with trade union and CC 
representatives over the five-year period. Each interview lasted appropriately 60 to 
90 minutes. In addition, eight interviews were conducted with the Eurotunnel Human 
Resources Director and the T&GWU Regional Industrial Organiser over a two-year 
period (during the process of union recognition).
The multiple methods used also allowed a way of cross-checking data collected in 
different ways. Figure 4.1 shows diagrammatically the structure on which the case 
study analysis is based and how it addresses the issues raised by the research 
questions.
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Figure 4.1 Non-union forms of employee representation as a system
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As Baird (2004: 427) has highlighted, relations with ‘managers can, in themselves, 
prove to be a delicate path and acceptance from such managers is critical to the 
success of the research and can be very dependent on the “goodwill” of the 
managers. This at times can create a certain tension with the researcher reliant on 
open access to the workplaces from the manager while at the same time maintaining 
independence and objectivity by balancing the views of the firm through managers 
with those of employees, unions and other workplace representatives’. In addition to 
these challenges, two other issues should be considered. While the initial point of 
contact was the first HR Director in 1998, which defined the context and parameters 
of the research, the researcher depended on the support and access given by the CC 
under the agreement with the HR Director. Finally as with many large organisations, 
internal politics between managers, unions and CC representatives created extra 
challenges regarding the openness of informants and access to resources.
This was exacerbated at Eurotunnel with allegiances often formed by both UK and 
French workers, or within the UK site between different divisions which have very 
diverse cultures and backgrounds. In addition, during the course of the research it
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was vital to establish a wide network of contacts as a means to embed the project 
within the organisation and to increase trust and transparency. This approach was 
also critical to establishing continuity during changes in personnel and management, 
specifically turnover among HR Directors (during the course of the research there 
were three HR Directors).
4.2.5 Fifth stage: synthesis of the findings
The fifth and final stage of the research involved a synthesis of the findings to 
emerge from the previous stages to address the key research questions and to provide 
an examination of the implications of these findings for employers, unions and NER- 
based voice arrangements in the future. The implications were then considered in 
light of the literature on voice and NER arrangements and theoretical inputs, and 
where appropriate, were integrated into the case study analysis. This formed the basis 
of the write-up stage of the research and subsequent conclusions.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TOWARDS NON-UNION 
REPRESENTATION ARRANGEMENTS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the management strategies towards NER arrangements in nine 
UK organisations in the lead-up to the introduction of the Employment Relations Act 
1999 (which involved the introduction of formal union recognition procedures41 and 
union-employer partnership initiatives), and the formal agreement on the European 
Directive establishing a general framework for information and consultation, which 
came into effect in March 200242. It was anticipated that these two developments 
would have an impact on the type, structures and the processes of NER arrangements 
in light of the new legislative provisions and would highlight the potential 
implications and possible influence of such legislative developments in a 
traditionally ‘voluntarist’ industrial relations environment.
In particular, this review examines ‘what’ was established, ‘why’ such structures 
were set up, and finally, ‘how’ such arrangements are structured. These organisations 
include: Sainsbury’s pic; John Lewis Partnership; HP Bulmers Ltd; Grosvenor 
Casinos; Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Panasonic (Matsushita) UK, Eurotunnel (UK), 
News International, and South West Water43. The nine cases were selected on the 
basis that either their structures were well established (capable of showing their 
potential influence on management strategy) or were recognised as leading
41 Under the Employment Relations Act 1999  there is a set procedure for union recognition when an 
employer refuses to recognise a union for negotiating over pay and conditions. Under these 
provisions, an independent trade union may make an application to the Central Arbitration Committee 
for recognition in firms which employ at least 21 workers. To be granted union recognition by the 
CAC the union must have at least ten per cent membership and be likely to attract majority support in 
a ballot or be able to prove that 50 per cent o f workers are members o f the union. Majority support is 
defined by a procedure which requires a majority o f those voting, and at least 40  per cent o f all 
workers in a workplace (or bargaining unit), to vote in favour o f union recognition.
42 Directive 2002/14/EC o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 11 March 2002 establishing 
a general framework for information and consulting employees in the European Community 
(European Parliament and Council, 2002) Official Journal o f  the European Communities. L080,
23/03: 29-34.
43 Full details o f these cases are in Appendix 3.
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companies in their field or market (examples of good practice behaviour) and had 
recently adopted NER arrangements as part of their industrial relations strategy.
In addition, these organisations demonstrate the diversity of non-union representative 
voice arrangements in the absence of mandated information and consultation 
structures. While some organisations in the sample have had a long history of well 
established NER arrangements (eg John Lewis, HP Bulmers, Ciba Specialty 
Chemicals, Eurotunnel and South West Water), other organisations had limited 
experience with such arrangements (Sainsbury’s pic, Grosvenor Casinos, Panasonic 
(Matsushita UK) and News International). It was also considered that well developed 
NER arrangements were more likely to be present in large private sector 
organisations since they would have the resources required to successfully establish 
and operate such arrangements, were less likely to be heavily unionised and more 
likely to be more exposed to current legislative reforms.
Management strategies and organisational outcomes
Quantitative research into consultation arrangements would lend support to the view 
that management strategies and the practice of voice arrangements may impact on 
organisational outcomes and perceived effectiveness. For example, Millward, Bryson 
and Forth’s (2000: 129) review of employee views in WERS98 found a strong link 
between how often consultation occurs and its perceived value -  with a lack of 
consultation contributing to perceptions of poor management among employees. 
Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000: 129) also found that:
Employees with some type o f non-union voice arrangement generally fe lt  
that managers were better at keeping them up-to-date with proposed 
changes at the establishment than did those employees in workplaces 
without any formal voice mechanism. This was true whether non-union 
arrangements were found in isolation or together with union channels o f  
voice.
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However, in terms of employees’ perceptions of ‘fair treatment’ only the combined 
presence of a recognised union and union representation on a consultative committee 
seemed to be a key factor (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000:137). Thus, Millward, 
Bryson and Forth (2000) conclude that while formal voice mechanisms help to 
promote communication in the workplace, with non-union or direct voice 
mechanisms more effective in enhancing the responsiveness of management to 
specific employee issues, they also appear less effective than unions at promoting 
fair treatment for employees in general.
Beaumont and Hunter’s (2005) review of a sample of NER arrangements suggest that 
influence was dependent on the nature and scope of issues that are subject to 
consultation such as integrative or productivity enhancing issues, as opposed to more 
distributive issues like wages and conditions. The values and expectations of the 
parties involved in the consultation process may also be an important influence in 
terms of how the parties interpret the consultation process. Finally, another major 
influence are the steps or procedures involved in the process of establishing voice. 
These might include the level of preparatory activity such as the agenda of items to be 
discussed, the degree of formality in dialogue, the gathering of information, the level 
of cooperation and discussion achieved, and the type of outcome (Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2005: 5-12).
This chapter addresses some of these issues in the nine organisations by examining 
the management strategies towards and objectives of NER arrangements.
5.2 Management strategies towards and objectives of NER 
arrangements
5.2.1 Sainsbury’s pic
A number of consultative committees have been established in the company since the 
late 1950s (all continue to exist). The most notable of these is the joint consultative 
committee (JCC), established in 1959 to enable the company to consult with
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employees or their representatives on a regular basis. The aims of the JCC were to 
provide information on policies and plans, exchange ideas and to seek the views of 
employees on decisions likely to affect their interests and future company policy. 
However, the JCC only covered 2,500 staff working within the Central Services 
departments at two locations in London (Blackfriars and Streatham). In total, the 
main committee consisted of 20 elected representatives and met on a quarterly basis. 
The main JCC also split into two local JCCs representing each location.
Three main factors drove the establishment of the staff councils at Sainsbury’s. The 
first occurred in late 1996 when in response to a company-wide employee attitude 
survey conducted in February that year, managers began to explore the possibility of 
establishing a company-wide representative structure. The first survey to cover all 
115,000 of Sainsbury’s staff, it achieved a high response rate of 80 per cent. The 
‘Talkback’ survey indicated that many employees were dissatisfied with the level 
and quality of communication and consultation at Sainsbury’s and suggested that 
they lacked ‘effective’ voice in the workplace. According to the Senior Manager for 
HR Policy, the survey indicated that existing channels of communication which 
included the JS Journal (an internal newsletter), videos and ad hoc team meetings, 
did not provide sufficient employee voice and representation (Interview, 15-10-98). 
The survey suggested there was little two-way consultation providing limited 
opportunity for employee feedback44.
In addition, the questionnaire provided an opportunity for employees to ask questions 
and state their views. These comments identified serious problems with the level of 
understanding and consultation at the workplace. About 25 per cent of the 24,000 
individual comments related to communication. Summaries of the individual 
statements are below:
44 For example, although some 68 per cent o f respondents agreed with the statement, ‘I know exactly 
what my department is trying to achieve’, the figures fell below 50 per cent on other questions relating 
to communication. For example: 43 per cent o f staff stated that communications where they worked 
were open, honest and direct; only 14 per cent o f respondents indicated that company directors 
listened to staff suggestions; 36 per cent felt encouraged to make suggestions to improve the way 
things are done; 34 per cent said that their manager valued employees who made suggestions to 
improve the way things are done; and 25 per cent stated that their manager acted on their ideas to 
improve the way things are done.
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Statement 1 - ‘I feel that communication on all levels is very bad. It has led to people 
feeling despondent. This in turn has affected the way employees treat customers’.
Statement 2 -  ‘There is a general lack of communication between management and 
staff, noticeboards are not enough, nor are mass group meetings (ie STAR -  
Supporting Teams Achieve Results). There needs to be more open one-to-one 
communication, an open door policy. By improving morale, Sainsbury’s can become 
a better place to work with more enthusiasm to do things properly...’.
Statement 3 -  ‘Senior management should be more approachable, maybe setting 
aside one day a month on a timetable basis to see staff and hear their 
suggestions/problems...’
Statement 4 -  ‘Managers should listen to their staff more often and learn to treat 
them with respect as we do them. Staff meetings should be regular -  a way of 
communicating and getting feedback to better the standards at Sainsbury’s for staff 
and customers’.
For example, according to the Senior Manager for HR Policy at Sainsbury’s an 
employee survey indicated that many employees were dissatisfied and that existing 
more direct channels of communication were perceived as not providing sufficient 
employee voice and representation. In particular, it was suggested that there was a 
lack of two-way consultation resulting in little opportunity for employee feedback, 
which had serious business implications in terms of poor frontline morale and 
commitment. She concluded, ‘These comments made it very clear that there was a 
huge gap in internal consultation and communication channels, which needed to be 
filled quickly -  the business and HR arguments were indisputable. In summary, it 
could be said that people had the feeling that we were not always listening to their 
ideas and that they did not really have a way of making their voices heard’.
She suggested that while these figures were not out of line with other company
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surveys they nevertheless had serious business implications of poor front line morale 
and commitment. A Senior HR Manager stated, ‘Some of the questions were very 
simple ones, like ‘Why can’t they leave the lights on when the staff on the evening 
shift go to their cars?’ This was obviously causing a huge amount of frustration 
among staff and is actually terribly easy to address ... but we had no way to know.’
At the same time as the Talkback survey, a review was underway of the existing JCC 
for the 2,500 head office staff. This review was the second major driver in the 
establishment of the staff council. The review found that the JCC meetings focused 
on minor matters and were too limited, concentrating on ‘tea, towels and toilets’ 
issues rather than on the more substantive issues which employees wanted to address. 
Most of these discussions were limited to parking arrangements and canteen 
facilities. The representatives on the JCC suggested that a separate forum be set up to 
deal with more substantive issues.
The third major driver was the introduction of the European Works Council 
Directive in September 1996 and the Directive’s influence on internal collective 
consultation within European companies. As the Senior Manager for HR Policy 
suggested, ‘Synergy did exist between the demands of the EWC Directive and the 
needs of our company’ (Interview, 15-10-98). In addition, while Sainsbury’s had one 
store outside the UK (Calais in France) they were not directly brought into the remit 
of the Directive because they had under 150 staff at the Calais site45. However it was 
considered possible in the future that stores could be established in other European 
countries, thus bringing the company into the Directive’s provisions.
During the setting up of the staff council, a wide range of employees were consulted 
over the possible type and processes of such a structure. Lessons drawn from a staff 
council in the Durham Sainsbury’s store were also reviewed. In addition, 
consultation with and benchmarking of other companies (including Marks and 
Spencer, HP Bulmers, NatWest and John Lewis Partnership -  see below for details) 
were undertaken to review other representative structures. Organisations such as the
45 The Directive requires the establishment o f  a European Works Council (EWC) if  a company has 
1,000 employees in the EU and more than 150 in each of two EU states.
Paul J  Gollan 122
th e  L ondon S ch o o l of E c o n o m ic *
a n d  P o th ic a l  S c ie n c
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
Industrial Society and Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) were also 
consulted to establish possible options. In April 1996, a proposal went to the 
executive board and to other management committees. The trade unions were 
informed and consulted in June and July following further changes. The in-house JS 
Journal outlined the proposal and invited comments and views from employees.
Finally, according to formal management policy, ‘The (Staff councils) are a 
communication tool for employees to communicate upwards to the Chairman, and 
also a process for the business to communicate information to all employees’ 
(Sainsbury’s, 1998: 14). In reference to the Group Council, the same information 
guide states, ‘A group CC enables representatives from all areas of the business to 
hear from the Chairman on key issues and changes that affect them. It will also 
provide an opportunity for ideas from employees to be communicated to Directors’ 
(Sainsbury’s, 1998: 14).
5.2.2 John Lewis Partnership
NER arrangements at John Lewis Partnership and HP Bulmers are the most well 
established and paternalistic out of the nine organisations. In 1950, Spedan Lewis 
established a written constitution for the business and transferred his rights of 
ownership to trustees46. As an internal document states, ‘Every member of staff who 
works for John Lewis is one of the owners, with a say in how the company is run and 
a share in the profits’ (John Lewis Partnership, 1998a). In addition, one of the core 
issuess was to recognise the importance of participation in community life. However, 
this sharing of power, which is part of the Partnership’s underlying ideology, in no 
way implies that Partners have the right to appoint or to elect their own managers 
(Flanders, Pomeranz and Woodward, 1968: 35). It was also considered that giving 
employees that right would have prejudiced the economic viability of the enterprise 
and thus the interests of all its members, or in the words of a former chairman ‘the
46 John Lewis Partnership is not the only employee-owned business in the UK. Similar trusts have 
been set up by Baxi-Boilers in Preston when Philip Baxendale passed over his shareholding. Tullis 
Russell, the Scottish paper milling company, also has similar features. Shares in Tullis Russell were 
bought from family owners in a complex purchase scheme designed to transfer ownership to 
employees (Donkin, 1998).
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results are unfortunate and often disastrous’ (Flanders, Pomeranz and Woodward, 
1968: 182-183). ‘It is felt that the requirements of industrial democracy are met 
through acceptance of the idea that managers should be completely accountable to all 
Partners’ (Flanders, Pomeranz and Woodward, 1968: 35).
Sir Bernard Miller (former Chairman of the John Lewis Partnership) has argued:
The Partnership believes that the fruits o f their common work, after all 
outgoings, including the cost o f borrowed capital which should be fixed  
and moderate, should belong to managed and management alike and that 
the interests that are common to both and should be pursued in 
partnership together are therefore fa r  greater than those which divide 
them. Dividing influences cannot, o f course, be eliminated entirely since 
the individual worker’s interest, which is frequently short term, will often 
conflict with the interest o f the whole which is generally long term. But 
they can be very greatly reduced by the fairer sharing o f gain, knowledge 
and power. The Partnership’s democracy aims to resolve such 
differences by keeping the general body o f the Partnership fully and 
properly informed on what is being done and why, by consultation and by 
sharing in decisions to the greatest extent that seems practicable.
(Flanders, Pomeranz and Woodward, 1968:16)
The Chief Registrar suggested that the Partnership’s network of consultative and 
communication mechanisms take the place of trade union representation. However, 
Partners may join a trade union if they wish. Rule 51 of the Partnership’s 
Constitution states: ‘Every member of the Partnership has complete freedom to 
belong to a trade union, though in the case of conflict between a trade union and the 
Partnership those concerned must remember the special obligations which they have 
to their Partners’. In the organisation’s textile printing plants, management consults 
with union representatives. However, they are not recognised in any other part of the 
company.
In 1995 the then Chairman, Stuart Hampson argued, ‘Our belief and our objective is
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that the efficient running of the Partnership should bring benefits to all those who 
have an interest in the company -  the employees, the suppliers, the customers and the 
community. We do not accept the inevitability of the adversarial approach’ (IPA, 
1995: 16).
5.2.3 HP Bulmers Limited
It appears that Bulmers was always a proponent of social harmony establishing a 
long history of paternalistic partnership practices. For example, in 1920 a Life 
Assurance and Pension Scheme was first introduced, a policy for providing housing 
for employees was also in operation, and in 1938 the Welfare Trust was established 
that provided family allowances, non-contributory sick pay and holiday pay to all 
employees. To reinforce this philosophy, on winning his election as Mayor of 
Hereford in 1925 Fred Bulmer argued, ‘We must eliminate class distinctions which 
are the root of our troubles. Close the social gap between employer and employed, as 
in America, which enables them to keep in touch more easily’. In 1931, Bulmers 
became one of the largest employers in Hereford with a workforce of 431. By 2000, 
Bulmers had around 800 employees at the Hereford plants and a worldwide 
workforce of 1,250 employees47.
According to Bulmer’s management, from the late 1960s there was a determined 
effort to diminish ‘class distinction’ in the firm. Initiatives included abolishing 
clocking on and off for all employees, directors undertaking a stint on the shop floor 
or on the lorries once a month, reports being written in plain English and the 
implementation of an Employees Annual General Meeting. In his book ‘Leadership 
is not a Bowler Hat’ Fred Bulmer stated that participation was about team building 
and noted that while there were extreme advocates of authoritarian management, 
they were unfortunately matched on the union side by an equally vociferous minority 
of left wing extremists, advocates of antagonism rather than cooperation. In addition, 
he argued that: ‘Participation was not just about power, but about achievement 
through co-operation'.
47 From 1995 to 2000 there was a reduction in the workforce of about 25 per cent.
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Until the 1960s, there had been no strong union push for unionisation at Bulmers. 
However, as part of its paternalistic attitude to its workforce the company established 
a works advisory committee in the late 1950s. This consisted of about 15 
representatives elected by departments, the personnel manager, a departmental 
manager and the works manager as chair. It met once a month and its scope was 
limited, covering only factory employees. In addition, since Bulmers at that time was 
a private company, it was not required to publish its accounts. Thus information was 
restricted and discussion over wage rates was excluded from its remit. According to 
the T&GWU Convenor, in theory the scope of discussions was unlimited but in 
practice ‘it tended to concentrate on internal factory administration covering such 
topics as the provision of a car park for employees’. Although the T&GWU 
Convenor suggested that these initiatives might seem minimal representation by 
modern standards, they were the first real steps towards employee/management 
negotiations.
In the mid 1960s, the distribution drivers formed a separate works committee and 
began concluding their own agreements separately from the rest of the factory. These 
agreements established between 1965 and the early 1970s were the first to be jointly 
agreed between management and employees at Bulmers.
The rationale for establishing the Employee Council (EC) is stated in the first 
paragraph of its constitution: ‘The company understands and welcomes the desire of 
employees to become more deeply involved in decisions which affect their future as 
it recognises and encourages the important part which employees play in ensuring 
the continuing success of Bulmers for the ultimate benefit of customers, employees 
and shareholders’ (Employee Council Constitution, 1977). The constitution also 
states: ‘the objective of the Employee Council is to provide a platform where 
discussions can take place on those matters which affect all employees and hence, 
their future and the success of the company; these matters would not include 
particular areas which are subject to negotiations with the recognised trade union’ 
(Employee Council Constitution, 1977).
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The company and the T&GWU agreed to form the Employee Council in 1977. At the 
first meeting on 10 October 1977, the Managing Director explained that at meetings 
all delegates were equal regardless of rank or seniority. At that time, the Employee 
Council consisted of ten managers and ten shop stewards with the original objective 
being to eventually elect its own Chairman48. The council was also to become the 
main participatory bridge between the Board and the employees. The Managing 
Director later added that he hoped that the Employee Council would eventually 
represent the views of workers at board level and that, in the event of the 
appointment of worker directors, they would be elected from the Employee Council. 
It was also agreed at the first meeting that the Employee Council should discuss 
capital investment policy, although the Chairman highlighted that the commitment of 
investment ‘must remain a management prerogative’ (Employee Council Minutes, 
1977). In addition, there would also be nominations to the Profit Sharing Committee 
and Pensions Advisory Committee from the Employee Council, which would 
eventually provide recommendations for the position of Trustees of the Company 
Pension Fund. (Employee Council Minutes, 1977)49.
5.2.4 Grosvenor Casinos
Before the introduction of the employee councils, Grosvenor Casinos introduced 
staff forums and general manager surgeries. Although these initiatives seemed to 
have had limited success in some divisions and units, management recognised that 
there was a need to replace them with a more effective and open form of staff 
representation. The Employee Council Coordinator suggested that there was a 
‘general feeling [that] employees were the poor partners in the business, while sister 
companies had works councils. A change in senior management three years
48 However, the Chair was either the company’s Managing Director or Chief Executive.
49 In addition to these objectives, the Council was also pivotal in a major restructuring exercise in the 
mid 1990s. In 1995 after the axing o f several hundred jobs, a joint Employee Council code o f practice 
statement on job losses was agreed. This 19-point plan stated the main responsibilities o f the company 
and the procedures required if there was a need for job losses in the future. It set out the proceedures 
for redundancy and early retirement programmes and the requirement for management to inform the 
Employee Council o f  the number and type o f job losses and the need for compulsory redundancy. It 
also stated that during periods o f enforced job losses a sub-committee would be established from the 
Employee Council, which would monitor the code o f practice and issue regular reports to the 
Employee Council (Employee Council Code o f  Practice on Job Losses, 1995).
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previously came to recognise this and something needed to be done to address these 
concerns. As such, an employee survey was conducted which acted as a catalyst for 
addressing these concerns. The survey highlighted employees’ perceptions of the 
business, which was very hierarchical with dictatorial management. Employees 
wanted a more career approach in the company’ (Interview, 13-05-99).
Consequently, a random sample of staff representing a cross section of departments 
and casinos were invited to attend a meeting in February 1998 to discuss ways of 
developing a workable concept of employee representation. According to 
management, the consensus among the representatives was that the existing 
employee forums had no clearly defined roles, lacked a structure and a purpose, and 
rarely achieved the actions promised, thus creating mistrust between staff and 
management.
The Employee Council Coordinator went further, ‘...Staff forums had no structure 
and were ad hoc; they required and depended on local management support for their 
effectiveness. Generally, they did not live up to expectations and people went away 
from meetings disappointed with the experience. [There was] Also a feeling among 
employees that they feared to raise issues due to comeback from management. In 
training this was identified and it was emphasised that this was not going to happen 
in the new structure’.
Bearing in mind the concerns and issues raised, the company undertook a review of 
the existing structure with the objective of creating a new structure. This process was 
finalised at a second meeting in April 1998 with the establishment of final terms of 
reference for the new employee councils in a ‘policy document’.
The introduction of the employee councils coincided with heavy trade union action 
against their establishment within the London region (picketing outside casinos and 
posters etc). The response from staff was that it looked like management were 
introducing the employee councils as a means to circumvent the unions (in particular 
the T&GWU). According to the Employee Council Coordinator, ‘It wasn’t, since we
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had our original meeting at the beginning of 1998 and by the time we started to roll 
out the council process the union at the London sites [had already] started their 
campaign. Before the campaign there was very little trade union activity and [few] 
members. Now [these have] greatly increased. However, while the T&GWU does 
have union members (mainly in the London region), management does not recognise 
them. Management wanted the councils to be an effective alternative to unions. 
Management wanted a body that knew about the business and that they could trust 
rather than a third body, which could have its own agenda. The T&GWU action had 
little effect outside London’ (Interview, 13-05-99). Overall, in 2000 T&GWU 
membership was between five to ten per cent of the workforce.
A briefing paper for the introduction of the Employee Councils states their aim and 
purpose: ‘To work in partnership to improve the working environment and morale of 
all staff in Grosvenor Casinos through Employee Councils by effective open 
communication and problem solving to enhance future prospects and employability’. 
In addition, it states: ‘The model has a clear structure and purpose, and identifiable 
roles. Accountability is built into the structure, along with an ethos of working on a 
team basis, with open two-way communication in order to solve issues (Briefing 
Paper -  Introduction of Employee Councils, 1998: 4).
5.2.5 Ciba Specialty Chemicals (UK)
The Ciba Specialty Chemicals Company Council (CC) was established in May 1973. 
In the absence of any recognised trade union, its role at that time was to act as the 
sole communications and representation channel for employees and managers. 
According to its early constitution, the company recognised that its success depended 
on ‘teamwork, the cooperation of people, both individually and collectively by 
departments, to achieve the collaboration necessary to translate ideas through to 
sales’.
The CC constitution states: ‘The CC acts as a forum for discussion of matters of 
common interest to the employees of the company. The council acts as a means of
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communicating ideas and opinions to the board, and allows the board to meet and 
consult with the employee representatives. The Council aims to increase the 
understanding of the company’s affairs by all employees. All sections of the 
company’s employees should be represented on the council’ (Company Council 
Constitution, 1998).
The CC mission statement states that ‘the role of the CC is to ensure all employees 
are treated fairly and that matters are dealt with appropriately. Our goals are to: 
promote effective two-way consultation between the workforce and management; 
support employees by providing a confidential service for those who request our 
assistance; improve working conditions in line with the chemical manufacturing 
sector; and promote a culture of harmonious teamwork throughout the Company that 
improves production and safeguards jobs’ (Company Council Mission Statement,
1998).
5.2.6 Panasonic (Matsushita) (UK)
The company has two main consultative forums which cover its UK employees. First 
is the Panasonic European Congress (PEC), which was set up in 1996 under a 
voluntary agreement under section 13 of the European Works Council (EWC) 
Directive. The second forum is the nationally-based Panasonic UK Consultative 
Committee (PUCC), which was established in 1996 to cover mainly the non­
unionised part of the company (sales and administration and in theory also 
managers)50. It was established after consultations with ACAS and the setting-up of 
an internal working party in 1995, which considered the best way to introduce the 
system and to formulate the rules and constitution. After extensive communication 
with all staff (about 800), employees were encouraged to nominate representatives 
for their own area.
The Personnel Manager indicated that while European legislation provided one of the 
main drivers for the establishment of the consultative forums, other drivers were the
50 According to management, there was only one employee who was a member o f a trade union in the 
administration and sales division (out o f a total o f 850 employees). The AEEU had a single union 
agreement with Panasonic (UK) covering the six UK manufacturing plants.
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adoption of an EWC at the UK European Headquarters and the strong push from 
other European companies in the group to improve communication in non-union 
areas of the company. She also indicated that there were: ‘some people thinking 
about joining a union because they saw their rights were not being represented, and 
this would discourage them from doing so’ (Interview, 10-05-99). It was also 
suggested that the philosophy of the Japanese parent company based on group 
decision-making was also an influential factor in the process to improve 
communications. Other more direct communications methods were also used such as 
bulletin boards, the intranet, workshops and team briefings if major changes are 
taking place51.
As stated in the PUCC Constitution, ‘The objective of the PUCC is to provide a 
means of communication and consultation between the management and the staff of 
Panasonic UK on all matters of mutual interest including: company performance and 
efficiency; physical conditions of work, health and safety; training and further 
education; plans for technological or organisational change; and other matters which 
management or employee representatives may wish to raise which cannot be covered 
elsewhere’ (PUCC Constitution, 1996). The constitution also states that 
‘consultation’ means the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between 
employee representatives and senior management.
The Personnel Manager stated, ‘The PUCC is used as a means of communication 
between management and staff and acts as a sounding board for new ideas. It is also 
used to monitor suggestions or management ideas’. At the time of the study, the 
PUCC had no formal or informal bargaining or negotiation power over wages. 
However, management indicated that the PUCC could possibly evolve into a formal 
negotiation forum in light of the Employment Relations Act 1999 and European 
Information and Consultation Directive.
51 The Personnel Manager emphasised strongly that the company would rather deal directly with 
employees rather than unions or the PUCC (Interview, 10-05-99).
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5.2.7 Eurotunnel pic (UK)
Eurotunnel Group has a 99-year lease to operate and manage the infrastructure of the 
Channel Tunnel link and operates accompanied truck shuttle and passenger (car and 
coach) services between Folkestone in the UK and Coquelles in France. The 
company started operations through the tunnel on 6 May 1994. It is a market leader 
for cross-Channel travel transporting nearly 50 per cent of passenger traffic. 
Eurotunnel Group also earns toll revenue from other train operators -  Eurostar for 
rail passengers, and English, Welsh and Scottish Railway (EWS) and the Societe 
Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF) for rail freight, which use the 
Tunnel -  and income for coaxial and digital cable links through the tunnel. It 
operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Some 2,336,000 cars and 72,000 coaches 
used the Channel Tunnel in 2002. Every day an average of 400 trains and shuttles 
travel through the Channel Tunnel, carrying some 40,000 people (Eurotunnel Group, 
www.eurotunnel .com, accessed 10-10-03)
The company has a complex structure consisting of two legal entities to meet 
requirements in the UK (Eurotunnel pic52) and France (Eurotunnel SA) and is quoted 
on the London, Paris and Brussels Stock Exchanges. It is owned by private 
shareholdings in France and the UK. Eurotunnel Group employs a total of 3,400 
staff, with approximately 1,400 based in Britain on UK contracts. In addition, certain 
terminal positions are also filled by subcontractors and immigration and customs 
officers. The UK head office is in Folkestone (Longport) with a separate office 
nearby for some administration activities and the call centre. According to 
management, the company’s human resource policy systematically takes into 
consideration its bi-national balance, whether regarding staff allocation or the fixing 
of salaries and benefits. The 1999 annual report stated:
National differences are taken into account when creating 
personnel management policies, especially as fa r  as labour laws 
are concerned, the main objective always being to ensure as fa r  
as possible equal status fo r  the personnel o f each country.
52 Eurotunnel pic (UK) will be referred to as Eurotunnel in the rest o f  this thesis.
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Salaries are competitively fixed in line with the current market 
conditions o f each country, with most o f the associated salary 
benefits (paid holiday, retirement pension, medical insurance) 
being either identical or directly comparable 
(Eurotunnel Group, 1999: 23)
The Eurotunnel CC was established in 1992 as the sole channel of employee 
representation. The CC consists of employees who are democratically elected every 
two years53. Importantly, it is the company’s communications forum and has three 
main aims: to give information and consult on matters of common concern to 
employees; to manage the social and welfare budget equal to one per cent of payroll 
(approximately £250,000-£350,000 per year)54; and to represent all employees at 
Eurotunnel. (Before June 2000, its role also included informal bargaining and 
negotiation over pay and conditions).
As part of an early policy decision to integrate and harmonise the UK workforce, the 
CC for UK-contracted employees was established in December 1992, and is broadly 
similar to the enterprise committee (or comite d’entreprise) under French legislation. 
However, the HR Director acknowledged that there was a gap between the theory 
and the practice of the harmonisation policy. He suggested, ‘In theory there would be 
a single bi-national company with most middle management having a mixture of 
British and French personnel, unless there was some legal reason, we would treat 
everybody the same. However, in practice first line management and wage staff are 
either French or British, and to an extent the way the business is run, the service is 
very different between these two groups’. He went on to say that these differences 
could not be really resolved since ‘you will not totally eliminate the difference’.
53 In addition, the Eurotunnel Group created a European Company Council (ECC) in November 1998, 
chaired by the Group Managing Director. It is made up o f 16 members, eight British and eight French. 
The ECC meets at least twice a year and is ‘informed or consulted on all matters o f general bi-national 
interest within the Company, without encroaching in any way on the autonomy o f the national 
Committees, which preserve all their prerogatives’. The representatives are drawn from the national 
committees.
54 This may include welfare support for needy families, money for trips away, nights out etc. It must 
be noted that the CC are trustees only. These benefits are based on a ‘Declaration o f Trust’ agreed and 
signed by the CC and Eurotunnel in 1993, and later revised in 1995 which created a ‘Trust Fund’.
This gives the CC representatives (as the trustees) authority to fund social and sporting events, 
allocate individual hardship and education grants, provide donations to registered charities and fund 
administration expenses for the Trust and/or the CC.
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5.2.8 News International Newspapers (UK)
News International Newspapers (UK)55 is part of News Corporation. News 
Corporation is one of the world’s largest media companies with total assets of 
approximately US$40 billion. It has diversified global operations in the United 
States, Canada, Continental Europe, United Kingdom, Australia, Latin America and 
the Pacific Basin. These operations include: the production and distribution of 
motion pictures and television programming; television, satellite and cable 
broadcasting; the publication of newspapers, magazines, and books; the production 
and distribution of promotional and advertising products and services; the 
development of digital broadcasting; and the creation and distribution of popular on­
line programming (The News Corporation Limited Overview, 1999).
In 2000, News International employed around 3,600 staff in London (Wapping), 
Manchester (Knowsley) and Glasgow (Kinning Park). There has been no recognised 
union at News International since 1988 after the long-running Wapping dispute 
which began in 1986. In that dispute, Rupert Murdoch (News Corporation Chairman) 
sacked around 5,800 print workers and derecognised trade unions when he moved 
production from Fleet Street in central London to Wapping in east London and to 
Kinning Park in Glasgow. This event was regarded as a watershed in British 
industrial relations.
Despite derecognition, union membership remained high in some parts of the 
company. News International management estimated that at the time there were 
approximately 500 union members out of 750 production workers at Wapping. 
Among the 1,000 journalists at Wapping, a significant majority belonged to the 
National Union of Journalists (NUJ) (previously to get a press card you needed to be 
a union member), the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU) and 
the Graphical Paper and Media Union members (GPMU)56, although management 
questioned how many active union members there were in the company. However,
55 N ew s International Newspapers (UK) will be referred to in the rest o f this thesis as News 
International.
56 In 2001, the AEEU merged with the Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) union to establish 
Amicus. The GPMU joined Amicus in 2004. It is Britain’s second largest union and covers 
manufacturing, technical and skilled workers in both the private and public sectors.
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management conceded that membership was slightly higher than national trends at 
the time.
In April 1999 the company held a ballot to win support for the establishment of the 
News International Staff Association (NISA)57 as a means to expand the role of its 
existing Employee Consultative Council (ECC), which was established in 1994 to 
provide sole representation for employees. The Director of Human Resources was 
open about his rationale for the ballot, ‘We don’t want external unions, that’s the 
driver, and with all the employment relations legislation coming through, we needed 
to do something’ (Interview, 04-08-99)58. The vote at the ballot was 1,618 to 588 (or 
73 per cent) in favour of setting up the NISA. Out of 3,616 staff, 60 per cent voted. 
Overall some 44 per cent of all employees voted yes to the establishment of the 
NISA and only 16 per cent of the total workforce voted no59. It was suggested by 
some employee representatives that many staff at News International saw this as the 
best form of representation they were likely to get from a ‘virulently anti-union 
company’ (Gall and McKay, 1999)
In an internal e-mail to all staff, the Director of Human Resources said, ‘If a union 
made a claim for recognition, they would argue that the Employee Consultative 
Council (ECC) is not totally independent. In all honesty, they would probably be 
right. If you do nothing you would almost certainly end up with a union. It is not an
57 The ballot started on 6 April 1999 with leaflets stapled to em ployees’ payslips setting out the 
process and stating the negative influence of ‘external third parties’. Voting began six days later. It 
was claimed by the NUJ that staff in some sections were gathered together by managers to go and 
vote. Employees also received a 15-minute audio tape of interviews with managers and selected 
workers expressing, in NUJ words, ‘enthusiasm’ for the scheme, together with a copy o f the NISA  
charter. On the audio tape the Director o f Human Resources stated, ‘When our staff read the specifics 
of what is being proposed they will appreciate that what senior management have agreed to is better 
than anything an external union can offer. Senior management is determined to make it work’
(.Journalist, May, 1999: 9). The NUJ protested by sending out ‘Vote no’ leaflets and when voting 
started thousands o f activists were outside the Wapping plant in London. The NUJ argued, ‘The News 
International Staff Association (NISA) was set up after a rigged ballot -  no time or facilities for 
anyone to campaign against it, while the company deluged staff with propaganda’ (Journalist, 
November, 2000: 14).
58 In a subsequent interview, the Director o f Human Resources defined the future success o f the Staff 
Association as follows, ‘...if external unions do not come across the gates, it’s a success...Long-term, 
it’s a success if  it’s around in two years’ time in its current form’ (Interview, 4-8-99).
59 The Director o f Human Resources suggested that most o f the respondents who voted ‘N o’ would 
probably be located in the production areas. In response to the 40 per cent who did not vote, the 
Director o f  Human Resources thought that these employees could fall into three main categories: a 
group that did not vote because they knew what the outcome would be; another group which was 
happy with the current arrangements; and those who were not interested at all (Interview, 4-8-99).
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option if you want your interests to be represented without the involvement of an 
external third party’ (,Journalist, May, 1999: 9).
Interestingly, when asked why the company feared trade unions, the Director of 
Human Resources replied: ‘A Staff Association is in-house, it’s an internal body, not 
an external body which may have prejudices. The problem is history -  it’s that 
strong. Unions have changed etc -  but so what. No partnership deals even with a no 
strike clause can be overturned under legislation with a ballot’ (Interview, 04-08-99). 
He also suggested, ‘It was considered that under the requirements of the union 
recognition legislation the establishment of so-called “sweetheart” or “in house 
unions” was not completely debarred (see discussion below). Therefore, News 
International set up a new staff association following the staff ballot. The NISA does 
not levy subscriptions, which are subsidised by the News International. All costs are 
also borne by the company’ (Interview, 12-05-99).
In August 2000, News International began procedures to set up a company- 
sponsored ‘independent union’. To satisfy the ‘independence’ requirements of the 
legislation, News International gave the NISA £250,000 in lieu of membership 
subscriptions for employing a full-time general secretary and provided the NISA 
with facilities including an office60. In addition, if independence were granted by the 
Certification Officer (CO), the Director of Human Resources had indicated that 
News International would provide a charitable donation of one to two million pounds 
as further support. However, there would be safeguards, ‘Of course, we would write 
conditions into the funding. In the event of an external union gaining favour here, the 
money would be stopped and then we would ask for the money back. The point is we 
have to fund it, and for independent status, employees have to pay subscriptions, 
even if it’s only a penny a year’ (Interview, 04-08-99). In an interesting 
development, the Father of the Chapel for the NUJ was elected unopposed as Chair 
of the NISA.
60 According to company figures, the NISA was projected to cost up to £100,000 a year to run for the 
three NISA sectors o f Wapping, Knowsley and Kinning Park. In addition, News International 
provided £20,000 for legal support for the financial year 1999-2000. This figure is revised annually by 
the Director o f Human Resources.
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In addition to the previous ‘consultation’ powers of the ECC, the Charter for NISA 
states: ‘To encompass collective bargaining over not only these matters [for the 
ECC] but also: hours of work; rates of pay; benefits; and other terms and conditions 
of employment; ....To enjoy rights equivalent to those conferred by law upon an 
independent trade union in respect of all rights to information and consultation; To 
agree procedures generally for making the representative body fully effective in 
respect of all the above matters and any other matter it is agreed with News 
International to include from time to time’ (Charter of News International Staff 
Associations and Staff Associations Executive Committee, 1999: 1).
5.2.9 South West Water
The privatised utilities in UK have perhaps been a sector where industrial relations 
changes have been most prevalent. The water industry in particular has been through 
rapid changes since 1989 with a change in government policies and wide variation in 
employer strategies within this sector61.
In economic terms, the 1980s saw controls on public spending which restricted 
investment in infrastructure and employees by water authorities. There was also a 
desire to enforce efficiencies prior to privatisation. Following privatisation, employee 
numbers generally increased in the water industry as a response to the capital 
expenditure that was necessary to comply with European Union legislation. However 
by 1994, as a response to tighter price regulation, many water companies started 
outsourcing work and making staff redundant. SWW was no exception, with the 
number of employees at SWW rising to around 2,250 by the early 1990s and 
reducing to around 1,400 in 2002. SWW is part of the Pennon Group Pic and in 2000 
contributed to 61 per cent of turnover and 83 per cent of group profit.
Falling union membership reflected the change from public to private ownership at 
SWW, with new staff recruited from the private sector where union membership was 
less common. In addition, management excluded higher-graded staff from
61 One o f the first and best known examples in the water industry is probably the partnership 
agreement at Welsh Water (later renamed to Dwr Cymru and now part o f Hyder pic) (Thomas and 
W allis 1998: 160-170).
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participating in union representation, reducing the propensity for higher-graded staff 
to retain membership.
Before privatisation in 1989, bargaining in the industry had been conducted at 
industry level through national committees, although some agreements were 
negotiated at the local level. After privatisation, bargaining was undertaken at the 
company level and SWW established separate negotiating committees for white- 
collar and blue-collar staff with representation from the respective trade union lay 
officers and the union full-time officers. Before 1993, SWW had recognised NALGO 
for white-collar employees and NUPE, AEU, T&GWU and GMB for blue-collar 
employees. In 1993, the major unions at SWW -  NALGO, NUPE and COHSE -  
merged to form UNISON, with some members transferring to the new National 
Rivers Authority (NRA) union branch.
At this time, most of the new management of SWW came from the private sector and 
a programme was implemented to change the culture of the organisation. Prior to 
1991, the grading structure had been negotiated at national level and comprised 10 
grades with incremental points based on length of service. During 1991, management 
wanted to introduce individual performance-related pay (PRP) and started 
negotiations with NALGO. Despite union protests, the introduction of the PRP 
system went ahead with all jobs evaluated using the Hay system prior to being 
allocated to a grade. Increments on job grades were replaced with performance 
payments but a ‘cost of living’ increase was negotiated with the union. Management 
refused to negotiate over the new pay bandings, which created a number of 
discrepancies at the lower end of the salary bands. At this time there was a union 
campaign for a change in the salary band structures. As a result, management re­
opened negotiations and extended the range of each band to reduce the number of 
employees affected by the discrepancies. During this period, union membership 
increased substantially.
In July 1993 when UNISON was formed, both NALGO and NUPE had been 
recognised by SWW and UNISON expected that recognition to continue.
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Significantly, that year the union submitted a pay claim but management advised that 
pay awards would be based solely on individual performance. In October 1993,
SWW announced through team briefings that it would not recognise UNISON for 
collective bargaining purposes and would not operate the check-off scheme. SWW 
argued this was non-recognition rather than what UNISON considered as 
derecognition.
As a result, SWW established a Staff Council (SC) for the purpose of consultation 
but not negotiation. Representatives were elected from management determined 
constituencies covering all grades of white-collar staff, with the exception of senior 
managers who had individual contracts. The Head of Personnel stated that, ‘The 
main driver for the establishment of the SC was the introduction of a company-based 
performance-related pay system in the 1990s. The former NALGO union (now part 
of UNISON) did not participate in the performance-related pay process, thus SWW 
needed to introduce a mechanism of representation that could deal with such local 
issues’.
The Head of Personnel went on to suggest that management’s aim was to create a 
new culture, as the previous union arrangement ‘was based on an attitude that what 
was good for the company was bad for the employees ... with this new way we have 
tried to emphasise things that unite us rather than separate us. History was a problem 
with water being the least popular privatisation, so tools were put in place to unite 
employees and management to create a new culture’ (Interview, 27-03-00).
The original structure of the SC consisted of four consultative committees (one for 
each of the operations divisions and one for head office) with a percentage of the 
members from those committees being elected to the SC. There were problems in 
some areas of attracting staff to become representatives with many representatives 
elected unopposed. In only ten out of the 32 constituencies was a ballot necessary. 
However, the SC only provided representation for white-collar staff. The manual 
UNISON and non-union employees had no form of representation, since the 
remaining craft and industry unions would not formally participate in the SC.
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In effect, SWW had replicated the consultative committee structure that existed 
before derecognition without any employee negotiation or consultation. As Brown et 
al. (2001: 189) have suggested:
From the employers’ point o f view, even where trade unions were 
vulnerable, collective representation continued to have a role because 
[of] continuous pressure to maintain high quality and to increase 
productivity. Many firm s found that the task o f motivating employees to 
cope with these pressures cannot be left to individualised incentive 
structures alone. Collective voice ...had a role to play [so] it was 
common fo r  employers to set up non-union consultative bodies ... as a 
basis fo r  the expression o f collective employee voice.
The aim of the SC as stated in its Constitution was to provide, ‘the primary focus for 
our consultation arrangements and [provides] the opportunity for all employees 
through their representatives to influence and be involved in decisions which are 
likely to affect their interests’. For its part, it was stated that the company would take 
account of the views expressed by the SC in reaching decisions which may affect the 
working arrangements of its employees and the employment relationship.
There are 14 elected members representing constituents from the various functions or 
from ‘natural’ communication groups within the company. There is only one elected 
representative per constituency. The chairperson is the Chief Executive or a 
nominated deputy, and the secretary is normally the Personnel and Services 
Manager. Other members of staff or managers who have a specialist contribution 
may also be invited. Representatives must be permanent employees of SWW and are 
elected for a three-year period. Meetings normally take place four times a year, 
although other special meetings may be called to discuss extraordinary matters 
affecting the company or employees by agreement with the Chairperson. The SC 
representatives are provided with email facilities and access to management. Minutes 
are normally emailed to staff, displayed on notice boards where appropriate and
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posted on the Intranet.
While the primary role of representatives is to represent their own constituency, other 
specific responsibilities (as stated in the SC constitution) may include: 
communicating issues discussed in meetings to constituents; bringing to the Council 
matters of importance and relevance within the scope of the subject matter; 
participating constructively in the business of the SC for the benefit of employees; 
and ‘enhancing the smooth and efficient running of the Company’. Employees in 
SWW elect representatives from all levels to the SC, which deals with matters of 
concern to all staff employees -  both trade union and non-trade union members. 
While representatives are free to be union members, they sit as non-union 
representatives on the SC.
5.3 Review of management strategies towards and objectives of 
NER arrangements
These nine organisations have provided a means to further examine management 
strategies towards NER arrangements and how such arrangements are structured in 
practice. The case studies also highlight a number of reasons for the establishment of 
NER arrangements. The rationale for establishing NER structures are central to a 
discussion of management strategies in implementing NER, given that managers 
initiate and are the architects of such schemes.
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Table 5.1 Reasons for establishing NER arrangements
Sains Jo h n
Lewis
Panas H P
B ulm ers
G ros
C asinos
C iba E uro News SW W
Negative
employee
attitudes
regarding
previous
consultation
X X X
European
Directives
X X X
History of
participative
culture
X X
Union avoidance 
strategy
X X X X
UK legislation 
(eg Fairness at 
Work)
X X
Fill
representation
gap (sole
representation
body)/only
representation
structure
X X X X X
Part of parent 
company HR 
strategy
X X X X
New leadership 
team
X
Development o f a 
new participative 
culture
X X X X
Other companies 
doing the same
X
Primary means o f 
information and 
communication
X X X X X X X X
Forum for new 
ideas
X X X
Opportunity to 
influence 
management 
decisions
X X
Development of 
shared values and 
a participative 
culture
X X
Achieved 
improved 
commitment and 
performance
X X
Exchange o f 
views
X
Monitor
management
decisions
X X
Problem solving X
Regulation of 
wages and 
working 
conditions
Management of 
social and 
welfare budget
X X X
Ensure fair 
treatment for 
employees
X
Improve working 
conditions
X
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In summary, there are six principal reasons why managers established NER 
arrangements, although these are not mutually exclusive and may be multiple reasons 
in any one organisation. First, they were set up as a pragmatic response to improve 
information flows and communication between employees and managers in 
organisations and aid the diffusion of information and consultation (eg Sainsbury’s, 
Ciba Specialty Chemicals and Eurotunnel).
Second, such arrangements were perceived to act as a ‘safety valve’ (allowing 
employees the opportunity to express their views and grievances) especially in the 
absence of an active union presence (eg Sainsbury’s, Grosvenor Casinos and News 
International). Some companies with a long history of formal consultation structures 
through a more paternalistic senior management organisational culture (eg John 
Lewis Partnership and HP Bulmer) see this as a primary reason for low levels of 
industrial conflict. These firms also indicated that other aims of such structures were 
to provide a means for exchanging views between management and employees, to 
act as a forum for problem solving, to regulate wages and working conditions, to 
ensure employees were treated fairly and to improve working conditions.
Third, an NER structure may help facilitate the process of organisational and 
workplace change by enabling management and employees to highlight issues of 
concern at an early stage thus reducing potential conflict at the implementation stage 
(eg Ciba Specialty Chemicals). Fourth, NER could potentially increase 
organisational performance in terms of productivity and quality by providing a forum 
for new ideas and employee input and developing a shared set of values and culture, 
thus increasing employees’ understanding of business behaviour and producing 
greater employee commitment (eg Sainsbury’s, Panasonic (Matsushita), Grosvenor 
Casinos, HP Bulmer, John Lewis Partnership, Eurotunnel and South West Water).
Fifth, NER structures were introduced as a response to recent legislative initiatives 
over information and consultation and the introduction of UK legislation on union 
recognition (the ‘Fairness at W ork’ initiatives as part of Employment Relations Act
1999) (eg Panasonic (Matsushita) and Sainsbury’s). Finally, NER arrangements may
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be used as an alternative body for negotiating purposes in situations where there is 
little active union presence. Among this group of cases, it would seem that a 
significant reason for implementing NER arrangements could be the desire by 
employers to avoid an active trade union presence or reduce third party influence in 
their workplaces -  five of the nine companies in the study suggested that this was the 
main reason for their establishment (eg Sainsbury’s , Panasonic (Matsushita), 
Grosvenor Casinos, News International and South West Water). It was also 
suggested by all the organisations in this group that establishing NER arrangements 
would fill a void or ‘representation gap’ in the absence of unions.
Paul J  Gollan 144
th e  L ondon S ch o o l of E c o n o m ic e
an d  P o l i t ic a l  S c i e n c
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
CHAPTER SIX
UNION RESPONSES AND APPROACHES TOWARDS NON­
UNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
6.1 Introduction
During the 1980s, 1990s and through to the present day there have been rapid changes in 
industrial relations in the UK. These changes have taken place against the background of 
changing political emphasis, economic pressures, declining union membership and 
density, an increase in the use of individualistic HRM practices and a rise in NER 
arrangements.
This chapter reviews union strategies and approaches towards NER, in particular 
exploring ‘colonisation’ and ‘marginalisation’ tactics towards NER arrangements. This 
is undertaken by reviewing representation arrangements before and after union 
recognition at Eurotunnel, HP Bulmers and Ciba Specialty Chemicals where the union 
works alongside a pre-existing non-union arrangement. The chapter also examines 
increased union influence as a response to a union avoidance strategy at News 
International in establishing the News International Staff Association (NISA), and at 
SWW in forming the SWW Staff Council (SWWSC) as a response to periods of 
unionisation.
6.2 HP Bulmers Limited
The union movement at Bulmers was created out of the necessity for delivery drivers in 
the 1960s to be union members. Bulmers drivers found it increasingly difficult to enter 
closed shop workplaces without a union membership card. By 1975, the T&GWU and
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the MSF gained recognition at Bulmers, as did in 1976 the Association of Clerical, 
Technical and Supervisory Staff (the T&GWU clerical trade group). The company’s 
partnership approach with the unions started with the establishment of a Joint Working 
Party (JWP) with representatives from management and the T&GWU. It was set up to 
examine and review the structure of shift pay, sick pay anomalies and the harmonisation 
of conditions of employment for all workers. In total, three senior managers and four 
senior shop stewards negotiated and debated the issues over the following three years. 
An agreement was eventually signed in 1994 entitled the ‘Joint Statement on Employee 
Relations Development’. In 1995, the MSF was de-recognised to help provide a more 
coherent representation approach thus leaving the T&GWU as the only recognised 
union.
The T&GWU represents employees through the JWP arrangement on the lower grades 6 
to 9 (around 340 employees). According to T&GWU Convenor, about 96 per cent of the 
shopfloor were union members (although office staff membership was very low at 
around 5 per cent)62. As well as the four ex-officio shop stewards on the Employee 
Council, many of the representatives were also T&GWU shop stewards63, and thus 
involved in the negotiating forum with union representatives only. However, most issues 
discussed in union negotiations have been previously discussed in the Employee 
Council.
The T&GWU Convenor suggested that he is comfortable with the Employee Council’s 
present role and argues that it should not be given negotiating powers. From a union 
point of view, the Council provides an opportunity for discussion and enhanced 
understanding of all sides of the business, as well as a forum for formulating important 
policies. In addition, he argued that shop stewards already had considerable input into 
the revision of the company’s vision, mission and strategic goals statement and that their 
participation was strongly supported by the Chief Executive.
62 The Employee Council is the only representative channel for the higher grades from 1 to 5.
63 TGWU Convenor stated there were eight shop stewards in 2000 on the Employee Council, representing 
all employees not just union members.
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6.3 Ciba Specialty Chemicals (UK)
Since 1999, the GMB64 has had sole union recognition, and a partnership agreement at 
the Bradford plant. Before recognition was granted, the GMB had approximately 500 
members. It was estimated that by 2000 there were 800 members at the site.
The partnership agreement signed in March 1999 sets out a number of objectives, some 
of which detail how the union should work together with the CC. For example: both 
parties ‘work together for the mutual benefit of the business and all those that it 
employs’; ‘the company recognises the right of the GMB to recruit, organise and give 
guidance and assistance to its members at the Bradford site and agrees to give 
reasonable facilities for that purpose; the ‘GMB agrees to work in tandem with the CC in 
improving two-way communications and understanding of common objectives’; the 
company recognises the GMB as the sole trade union for collective bargaining and the 
GMB promises to train all its site representatives with the company giving ‘reasonable 
time off with pay for the purpose’; the company encourages membership of the GMB 
and for ‘new employees the company will arrange for the CC leader to meet with them 
and advise of the benefits of GMB membership’; union contributions will be deducted 
from salaries for those employees requiring this to be done; and the company and the 
GMB have ‘a common objective in using the process of negotiation to achieve results 
beneficial to the company and the employee’ (Partnership Agreement -  Ciba Specialty 
Chemicals and GMB Trade Union, 1999). Notably, the agreement does not contain a ‘no 
strike’ clause. The GMB Regional Organiser argued, ‘I would never sign one because I 
see strike action as the ultimate [sanction] - 1 see it as a failure’ (Interview, 18-06-99).
The rationale for Ciba to finally accept and give union recognition was summarised by 
the GMB Regional Organiser,
64 Officially the GMB stands for 'GMB - Britain's General Union'. These initials were adopted as the 
official title in 1989. Historically the ‘G ’ derives from General, the ‘M ’ from Municipal and the ‘B ’ from 
Boilermakers but GMB is not an abbreviation for these titles as over 100 unions have merged with GMB 
making the initials its official name.
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At one time, management had a more paternalistic type approach to 
industrial relations. They thought they knew best. We were outside 
the gates fo r 11 years -  a long and slow struggle. People were paid 
fo r  the type o f job they did, they had stability o f employment and 
generally they were not badly treated -  they had share options, nice 
staff restaurant, social clubs etc. The problem was that some 
managers were not particularly well trained which meant that some 
industrial relations issues, which could have been handled easily 
were handled very badly. There were some horror stories. We still 
managed to gain 500 members over a ten-year period with no union 
recognition. The harder we knocked outside the gates, the more the 
company gave representatives inside training and power. There was 
no doubt the CC was used as a union avoidance mechanism. I either 
come in and work with the CC or hold onto the legislation and go 
through the process and demand recognition. 1 would rather work by 
consensus and a more modem approach to industrial relations 
(Interview, 18-06-99).
Unions must go through the CC for recognition purposes. However, the majority of the 
representatives on the CC are union representatives. The GMB Regional Organiser 
argued that while ‘the CC is a complication in the partnership process due to the non­
union representatives on the CC, over time with the hard sell, we will have all 
representatives on the CC as trade union members. In this current redundancy situation, 
the union experience has been helpful. I am sure consultation through us [GMB] took 
the heat out of the situation’ (Interview, 18-06-99). He went on to say: ‘The problem 
when you are an employee is that it is like a collar around your neck when it gets hot. 
They don’t employ me and that makes a hell of a difference. In training we told them 
what their rights were, where they could go and what they could do. They had never 
been told that before’ (Interview, 18-06-99).
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Most of the production-based representatives by 2000 were union members (with around 
20 representatives). In contrast, few office-based representatives were unionised. While 
previously this had not caused any conflicts on the CC, since union recognition it 
highlighted a higher standard of training provided by the GMB for its union 
representatives. Non-union office staff consequently requested a higher standard of 
training for non-union representatives to address this imbalance.
The CC Leader and Union Representative stated that union recognition allowed the CC 
access to more information and offered greater legal protection for employees in 
disciplinary procedures by giving representation to those employees who were dismissed 
due to disciplinary action (Interview, 18-06-99). For example, the redundancy 
programme required the CC to call on the assistance of the GMB. The CC Leader and 
Union Representative suggested that the ‘unions are there as an extension and tool for 
the CC to use and it’s my responsibility to get the union in for help and guidance. The 
company has a dual channel of representation’ (Interview, 18-06-99).
6.4 Eurotunnel pic (UK)
As a new site, recruitment of employees with the right skills mix was a major factor in 
Eurotunnel’s development and growth65. Thus Eurotunnel’s original philosophy and 
selection criteria of employees for operational roles in the early 1990s was an important 
factor in establishing the culture of the company.
In terms of recruitment of the general employee population at Eurotunnel, one agency 
(Mercuri Urval a bi-national organisation) was charged with assisting Eurotunnel Group 
on both sides of the channel. As a former Human Resource Manager suggested, ‘We 
were looking for a particular type of individual in all areas -  fresh, enthusiastic,
65 According to Labour Force Survey 2001 data, Kent (including Ashford) had a slightly higher 
unemployment rate o f 3.7 per cent compared to the South East average o f 3.3 per cent (National Statistics, 
2002).
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customer focused, flexible in thought and action. It should be said that this led us to 
recruit in large numbers away from outside the local ferry, railway and mining 
groups. Similarly we tried, for instance, to avoid the military when recruiting for 
security staff as we found that some had difficulty in converting to civilian life’.
He went on to state the difficulties of recruiting the right type of staff, ‘We did not see 
our product as anything but new. Our locomotives and rolling stock were totally new 
and required different skills to master than the main line stock. Subsequently despite 
high salaries being paid on the main line, only three or four employees have left us to go 
and work for them. The main line drivers did not want to come and work for us as we of 
course did not pay enough. We needed to employ technicians who had the skills, but as 
our technology was at that time at the leading edge and not in line with the current 
railway environment, we tended again to recruit from outside of that industry’.
He went on to say, ‘We did employ individuals from TML [Transmanche Link66] where 
their skills and approach matched those of the emerging company. For all roles we were 
very selective as at the time we were inundated with applicants for all roles. At the time 
of this mass recruitment (1993/4/5), unions were at a fairly low point and as we had 
recruited away from what could be considered as staunch union arenas, at the same time 
offering similar support to staff, very few seemed interested in union activity. I will say 
that the recruitment was not actively anti-union, but in looking for the particular type of 
individual this was the end result.’ (Former Human Resource Manager, email 
correspondence, 21-07-03)
In 1996, a major fire in the tunnel stopped the service for seven months as repairs and 
safety inspections were carried out. This caused severe financial strain on the operating 
company both in terms of costs to repair the tunnel and in terms of lost service and 
market share during this period.
66 The company was set up during the construction phases of the tunnel.
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In another development, Eurotunnel management approached the CC in October 1996 
requesting negotiations regarding 120 redundancies (including agency staff) at the 
company. This was a response to the completion of the construction phase of the project 
to a full operational transportation company and the loss of revenue resulting from lost 
service due to the fire. It was proposed that while some redundancies would be 
voluntary, it might be necessary to enforce redundancies. During this period, the CC 
called upon the Industrial Society67 (of which the CC is a member) for advice and 
delivery of a five-day training course on employment law with particular emphasis on 
redeployment and redundancy procedures. The CC also employed an independent 
consultant to help on various employee matters and issues that arose during the period of 
reorganisation.
It was suggested by the CC in its monthly newsletter that ‘an element outside of 
Eurotunnel ... are determined to undermine the efforts of the CC by distributing half 
truths and downright inaccurate information regarding the various meetings that have 
been held with Management’ (Eurotunnel UK CC, Newsletter -  November, 1996: 1). 
This message was in response to views expressed by the T&GWU through a T&GWU 
sponsored ‘Eurotunnel Bulletin Number 1 ’, which highlighted a number of issues 
regarding the ineffectiveness of the CC in relation to Eurotunnel’s lack of resources 
dedicated to security, the degree of information provide by management to the CC, 
consultation over organisational restructuring, and protecting staff on short-term 
contracts. In particular, the T&GWU Bulletin suggested that the ‘French side’ had more 
rights to information over these issues than the ‘British workers’. The then UK Director 
of Human Resources responded by stating in a letter to the T&GWU: ‘This [the CC] 
frankly is a better service to employees than an emotive programme of obstruction based 
on ill-informed understanding and calls for support from Parliamentary and community 
groups to intervene in issues which will be resolved only between the company and its 
employees’.
67 This organisation is now called The Work Foundation.
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As a result of subsequent negotiations between the CC and Eurotunnel management, an 
agreement The Social Contract -  Eurotunnel Operational Effectiveness and Job Security 
Protocol was signed in 1997 which guaranteed job security, additional consultation and 
information rights for the CC and outlined procedures to avoid future redundancies.
In 1999, Eurotunnel management faced a number of industrial relations challenges. In 
June of that year, French Eurotunnel employees supported by all five French unions 
blockaded the entrance to the Calais departure terminal when French train crews and 
other French contracted workers parked about 30 cars across the entry lanes over a 
dispute involving increases in pay and conditions. This halted Shuttle services for a 
number of days during one of the busiest periods of the year for passenger and car 
traffic. In yet another development, the abolition of duty-free goods in 2000 increased 
financial difficulties costing Eurotunnel about £100 million in yearly profits. This also 
resulted in increased fares as a means to compensate for the losses incurred through 
duty-free abolition.
Around the same time, the CC initiated an all employee share scheme (called the 
Eurotunnel Sharesave Scheme) and promoted its development with discussions and 
negotiations during 1998 through to its introduction in November 1999. It was 
considered by the CC at the time as a means of involving employees in the future 
success of the company and increasing the share of profit to employees.
With respect to representation, until June 2000 Eurotunnel (UK) only recognised the CC 
for consultation and negotiation purposes. This is in contrast to France where five unions 
are recognised for bargaining and negotiation purposes .
68 These include: French Democratic Confederation o f Labour (CFDT), General Confederation o f  
Professional and Managerial Staff (CGC), General Confederation of Labour (CGT), French Christian 
Workers’ Confederation (CFTC), and Force Ouvriere (FO)
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Regarding representative arrangements prior to June 2000, one representative and one 
deputy were elected to the CC from each of eight constituencies, which are 
geographically or functionally based, including: Technical Engineering, Shuttle 
Services, Tourist Division, Train Crew, Freight Division, Corporate (Administration), 
Technical Railway and the Call Centre. Each constituency had a representative and 
deputy on a joint ticket. Election was by secret ballot for a two-year period. All 
representatives had to be permanent employees with at least one year’s service, and on 
permanent rather than temporary contracts. They could, however, include full-time or 
part-time employees.
With the introduction of the Employment Relations Act 1999, a recognition and 
partnership agreement was signed by Eurotunnel management and the T&GWU in June 
2000, which conferred negotiation rights, confirmed the acceptance of the existing 
consultation framework and established a joint management trade union forum. As a 
result, the agreement created two representation structures. A modified CC with eight 
representatives meets six times a year and represents all employees at Eurotunnel. The 
joint management trade union forum represents union members at Eurotunnel covering 
all issues of concern, including sole negotiating rights over UK pay and conditions.
It was suggested by Eurotunnel management that the company was in favour of the 
partnership agreement as a means to assist the organisational change process. In 
addition, any conflict could be resolved through a formalised conflict resolution 
procedure. At the time of union recognition, the then HR Director hoped that within six 
to 12 months Eurotunnel might be able to move towards a single unified negotiation 
body with a merger of the CC and the T&GWU anticipated.
At the time that Eurotunnel management introduced union recognition and signed the 
partnership agreement between Eurotunnel and the T&GWU, the then Director of HR 
indicated that the impetus for change was the threat of industrial action in late 1999 by 
train drivers who were members of a rival trade union Aslef, which had created
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operational upheaval and a situation of crisis management. Aslef had been lobbying 
Eurotunnel for many years to gain recognition. From August 1997, Aslef worked in 
tandem with the T&GWU in order to bring about joint recognition, whereby Aslef 
would represent the Train Crew division with full negotiating rights, and the T&GWU 
would represent other grades (FireFighter, December 2000: 16).
Prior to recognition of the T&GWU, the CC and the Industrial Society conducted a 
survey of Eurotunnel employees as a means to gauge their views towards trade union 
recognition. The survey found that an overwhelming majority of employees were in 
favour of trade union recognition. The results also indicated that employees did not 
believe that the CC, as it was constituted, was an effective body in representing 
employees over pay and terms and conditions of employment, and just over a half (52 
per cent) wished to be represented by a trade union. Only eight per cent of respondents 
supported the existing arrangements, while 35 per cent stated they would like to have the 
CC with negotiating as well as consultative powers. Over a third of respondents 
supported the alternative of having trade union representatives on the CC. 50 per cent of 
the sample of 902 respondents (out of 1438 questionnaires distributed, representing 63 
per cent response rate) indicated that they would be willing to join a union should 
Eurotunnel management go down the route of recognition, and a further seven per cent 
indicated they were already union members (Eurotunnel CC Recognition Survey, 1999: 
1).
Importantly, a quarter (24 per cent) stated that they would not join a union even if it 
were recognised by the company, with an additional 18 per cent not sure if they would. 
However, the report concluded in theory at least, that the necessary majority for 
recognition under the Employment Relations Act was present (CC/Industrial Society, 
1999: 1). Analysis by division showed strongest support for trade union representation in 
the Train Crew division (76 per cent), Technical Engineering (55 per cent), Call Centre 
(52 per cent) and Technical Railway (51 per cent). There was lower support in Shuttle 
Services (29 per cent) and the corporate division (28 per cent).
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As a consequence, Aslef wrote to Eurotunnel management on 15 March 2000, bringing 
the results of the survey to their attention and seeking a further meeting to establish a 
framework within which the T&GWU and Aslef would ‘establish mutually acceptable 
recognition agreements’ (Thornton, 2000: 16).
Eurotunnel management responded that they would offer a single union recognition 
agreement with the T&GWU, and both parties (to the exclusion of Aslef) signed the 
agreement. In June 2000, the Annual Assembly of Aslef considered an emergency report 
on the situation at Eurotunnel and carried a resolution calling for a ballot for industrial 
action. On 20 August, Aslef members at Eurotunnel (about 220) balloted for industrial 
action by banning all non-contractual overtime. It was recognised that this would be 
insufficient to persuade management to return to the negotiating table and a second 
ballot was held which approved a series of discontinuous 24-hour strikes (Thornton, 
FireFighter, December 2000: 16).
The first of these strikes took place on 20 November 2000 and continued on a weekly 
basis until the end of December as a means to disrupt Eurotunnel’s operations over the 
busy Christmas period. Their French counterparts also agreed not to run any services 
that would normally be operated by British drivers. Aslef alleged that Eurotunnel had 
intimidated their members with a series of ‘threatening’ e-mails. At the time general 
secretary Mick Rix said, ‘Eurotunnel is bent on confrontation and intimidation of staff 
when it should be trying to negotiate’ (BBC News, 20 November, 2000). However, the 
effect of the strike was limited with management filling in some of the driver positions69. 
As a result the single union recognition agreement was with the T&GWU maintained.
69 It is interesting to not that in September 2003, Eurotunnel Group edged closer to a potential 
confrontation with French unions in response to the company’s insistence that it continue plans to run its 
own freight trains across France, affecting the monopoly position o f SNCF in conducting freight services 
across France. French railway staff threatened to block the tunnel with ad hoc unannounced strikes if 
Eurotunnel Group proceeded with its plan, which was part of a rescue strategy to increase the company’s 
finances and reduce debt. The Eurotunnel Group technical director was reported to have said,’ There is a 
minority among the unions who can bring the network to a standstill. They are instinctively against 
anything which would change the status quo and they are going to resist the widespread break-up of SNCF
Paul J Gollan 155
the  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
The industrial action was considered to be critical due to the company’s £6.5 billion debt 
and the perishable nature of service delivery as it was costing potentially millions of
70pounds a day in lost revenue . Another important influence on union recognition were 
the union recognition requirements under the provisions of the Employment Relations 
Act 1999. It was felt by management that the legislation could be a catalyst for a number 
of diverse and complex union-based arrangements within Eurotunnel.
The partnership agreement was finalised with little consultation with the workforce and 
in the face of opposition from the rail union Aslef. It was stated by the HR Director that 
a mainline rail union would not be appropriate since Eurotunnel was not a mainline rail 
company. He suggested, ‘Jokingly, we are a railway line with two stations. In fact we 
are partly a process engineering factory, that is what the tunnel is, and partly a ferry 
service on wheels. We are not comparable to any UK rail companies. On the technical 
side (terminals, tunnel and rolling stock) we are more like a train factory rather than a 
rail company’. From the union side, the importance of the partnership agreement and 
working with the CC was voiced by one T&GWU official who stated:
We are a pragmatic union and we would complement the CC. We would 
not want to bypass it or undermine it. We, as a union, could enhance the 
role o f the CC. The recognition agreement is a new significant 
development for Eurotunnel and the T&G. We see this agreement as a
to meet European regulations’ (Webster and Sabbagh, 2003). These problems were encapsulated by the 
response from Eurotunnel management which stated, ‘The cross-Channel rail industry currently suffers 
from underutilisation of expensive infrastructure, financial losses and conflicting contractual relationships’ 
(BBC, 2004).
70 Confirming this negative financial situation and the difficulties faced by the company, income from 
passengers fell by 11 per cent at the end of 2003 in the face of a 20 per cent drop in revenue. After ten 
years o f no profits, the company posted its biggest ever loss of £1.3 billion in early 2004. It was suggested 
by Eurotunnel Group management that this was aggravated by increased competition from low-cost 
airlines offering cheap tickets to mainland Europe and reduced activity due to government-imposed 
increases in the price of alcohol and tobacco in France. In April 2004, a group o f French shareholders lead 
by Nicolas Miguet engineered the removal of the previous management, including its Chief Executive 
Richard Shirrefs and Chairman Charles Mackay, from the main company board.
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model agreement, looking at it as a basis o f a very good example o f best 
practice.
6.5 News International Newspapers (UK)
In response to a reference in the Newspaper Society Report on the Employment 
Relations Bill which stated that, ‘A truly independent staff council could become a 
dangerous animal, and would exercise its influence company-wide’ (Newspaper Society 
Report on the Employment Relations Bill, July, 1999: 4), the Director of Human 
Resources replied that while he agreed that it could: ‘We would prefer to keep our dirty 
washing inside rather than going external’ even if the possibility exists that it could one 
day lead to an association with one of the large unions or even affiliation with the TUC.
When asked what concerns the company had over union representation, the Director of 
Human Resources argued, ‘The problem is that we have a long history and they 
[employees] do not want to return to yesteryear. They know how damaging [union 
action can be] and how much damage was caused by the unions. If we have to handle 
the unions as a result of the new legislation and this process not getting certification, 
then we will handle them. But as a preference we would rather give our own staff a body 
that can represent their interests and interface with management without having to go to 
an association or union and be overturned, which can be described as bloody Sunday 
many years ago. They (the unions) are desperate to get in and we are desperate not to let 
them in. We can think of other processes that meet the interests of our staff (Interview, 
04-08-99).
The Director of Human Resources also acknowledged that in the early days the NISA 
was seen by management as a union avoidance strategy, although he went on to say,
‘We are where we are now. It is not about union avoidance but [about] having a credible 
association that truly represents all of the employees within News International. This is 
about us getting the biggest bang for our buck. It is very competitive out there, a very
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closed sector with journalists moving around between the titles very freely. What we 
wanted to do is maintain the quality we have got and provide as much opportunity to all 
employees across News Corporation. This (NISA) is one vehicle for it’ (Interview, 04- 
08-99).
He went on to say that the current management-employee relationship was very good. 
He suggested it was that way because a lot of work had gone into improving the 
relationship in the last five years, from what was a very poor relationship. According to 
the Director of Human Resources, this improvement started with the establishment of 
the previous ECC, ‘It was an acknowledgment that we were very poor communicators 
and a lot of frustrations were out there we did not know about.
According to the ECC employee survey in 199871 some 67 per cent of respondents 
reported that there was not enough opportunity for employees to let News International 
know about things that affect them and their work. Over 69 per cent indicated that 
speaking up on issues where they disagreed with management could damage their career 
prospects. 48 per cent also disagreed with the statement that ‘senior management 
explained the reasons behind major decisions’, 66 per cent wanted to see more evidence 
of senior management taking an interest in employees’ part in the company, and 37 
disagreed with the statement ‘senior management lead our organisation by example’ 
compared to 25 per cent who agreed with the statement. Regarding the level of 
communication only, 33 per cent felt they were fully or fairly informed at company 
level. In addition, in nearly all important performance and strategy issues the 
respondents were far more likely to report there was ‘too little’ information compared to 
those who stated they had the ‘right amount’.
71 The ECC employee attitude survey was carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers in November 1998 on 
behalf o f the ECC. Questions were asked covering issues o f work satisfaction, communication, 
management style, representation and the ECC. Out o f the 3,553 questionnaires sent to employees, some 
1,656 self-completion questionnaires were sent directly back to PricewaterhouseCoopers. The overall 
response rate was 47 per cent and the two largest sites, Wapping and Manchester, had the lowest response 
rates -  39 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. Nearly half o f all respondents were from production areas.
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The ECC employee survey also reinforced the level of support for giving negotiation 
rights to the ECC. In relation to improving the ECC, 67 per cent of respondents favoured 
giving the ECC pay negotiating powers, 80 per cent were in favour of giving it powers 
to negotiate over working conditions, and 67 per cent felt it should have the right to 
negotiate directly with News International management. Over two thirds of respondents 
also suggested that fair representation could be achieved if the ECC could represent staff 
in grievance issues and on disciplinary procedures. In addition, 60 per cent stated that 
fair representation could be achieved if the ECC became a staff body independent of 
News International management. 70 per cent of respondents also suggested that overall 
representation could be improved if the ECC was properly consulted prior to meetings.
Interestingly, only 24 per cent stated that the ECC in its current form (at the time of the 
survey) was successful in its consultation with management. 32 per cent thought it did a 
‘good job’ of representing employees’ interests and only 22 per cent stated that the ECC 
‘does not need to change significantly to achieve fair representation’. Around three 
quarters of respondents wanted to hear more about how the ECC helped to improve 
work conditions in their area and in News International in general. While 65 per cent 
understood what the ECC did, only 38 per cent of respondents indicated the ECC 
representative in their area did a good job.
The Director of Human Resources stated that: ‘The ECC was set up as a vehicle to 
understand what those frustrations were and gave [us] an opportunity to do something 
about it’ (Interview, 04-08-99). He added that the ECC ‘got lots of wins’. These 
included the establishment of a pension scheme, health care and dental insurance. 
According to him, another measure of the success of the ECC was that over the last five 
years labour turnover had declined greatly, retention rates were running at around 100 
percent, and pay was well above the market rate72. To reinforce these views, the ECC
72 He gave the example o f a printer at News International earning on average around £33,000 compared 
with the industry average o f £24,000.
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survey stated that 66 per cent of respondents were very or fairly satisfied with their 
present job at News International.
In June 2000, News International reached an agreement with NISA over a package of 
changes to terms and conditions of employment, including a three-year pay deal. This 
consisted of a five per cent increase in the first year and a 3.75 per cent rise the year 
after (or if the inflation rate was above this figure, the increase would be tied to a 
formula of inflation plus one per cent up to a cap of five per cent). Similarly, in the final 
year there would be an increase of 3.75 per cent unless inflation went above 4 per cent.
If this occurred, salaries would increase by the inflation rate plus one per cent, with a 
cap of six per cent (IDS Report 811, June, 2000: 4).
The timing of the three-year deal coincided with the establishment of the NISA and the 
introduction of union recognition legislation. It has been said that given News 
International’s historical resistance towards unions, this agreement could be regarded as 
an attempt to prevent unions such as the GPMU and NUJ from regaining recognition 
rights. It was reported that a NISA representative allegedly said: ‘We are convinced that 
no outside party could have negotiated a better agreement. The company is confident 
that the proposed package is better than any other deal in the industry. The same was 
true of our Millennium payments deal, which was also the result of negotiations between 
NISA and the company’ (IDS Report 811, June, 2000: 4).
The NUJ magazine Journalist described these settlements as follows: ‘In its short 
history, the NISA has had startling successes, ‘winning’ the best Millennium payments 
in the business and also pay rises without even having to try. Cynics have recalled 
Rupert Murdoch’s past generosity, paying a £2,000 lump sum plus a ten per cent pay 
rise to those who broke the Wapping dispute in 1986. Such short-term costs are clearly 
preferable to having to deal with a union.’ (Journalist, August/September 2000: 9). This 
seemed to be confirmed by the Director of Human Resources, who said of the NISA’s 
effectiveness, ‘If it’s not influential it will fail. If it does not get results on behalf of its
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staff it will fa il... They (NISA) have to get some prizes out of this and some early gains 
so they can go back to staff to say what they have secured’ (Interview, 04-08-99).
The NISA executive member responded by saying that the NUJ’s action against NISA’s 
application for registration had ‘given us a bit of a gee-up’, and added: ‘but clearly it has 
always been our intention. We think we are doing a very good job and we don’t want the 
NUJ coming in and mucking it up for us’. (Journalist, August-September 2000: 9). The 
NUJ National Organiser Jeremy Dear indicated in his response to the move that, ‘It 
shows the NISA up for what it is -  a company union. With the company paying for the 
staff, the offices and all its functioning, how anybody can consider that to be 
independent is beyond me’.
The Director of Human Resources was more circumspect, ‘I did not think they will 
[Certification Officer granting NISA recognition as an independent trade union] but that 
is what they [NISA] want. The problem of the interpretation over some issues will also 
need to be resolved. Somebody said it was a ‘muck-up’. Even if it is not accepted, they 
will come back and say this is where it falls short and that will give us an opportunity to 
work on it’. In addition he said it was management’s desire to make the NISA a full 
trade union, ‘Once the hare comes out of the trap, there was only one journey we could 
make, and that is ultimately being an independent trade union’ (Interview, 04-08-99).
A joint submission to the Certification Officer for Trade Unions from the NUJ, GPMU 
and AEEU asked the Certification Officer not to grant a certificate of independence to 
the NISA, arguing that there was strong evidence that the NISA was wholly dependent 
on the company’s resources (Journalist, March 2001: 11). This was a clear attempt by 
these unions to reduce the possibility of a recognition claim (Gall and McKay, 1999:
11). Under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), the existence of an agreement with 
another ‘independent union’ is a reason for refusal of an application for recognition by 
another union.
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On 18 May 2001, the NISA was refused recognition as an independent trade union by 
the Certification Officer (CO) for Trade Unions. Under the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act 1992, the CO needed to establish whether the NISA was ‘not under the 
domination or control of an employer’ and ‘not liable to interference by an employer’. 
Areas of concern highlighted by the Certification Officer were the Millennium bonus 
deal worth up to £990 per employee and a three-year pay deal, front-loaded with a 5 per 
cent increase from 1 July 2000.
News International suggested that these outcomes were evidence of the strong and 
effective negotiating powers of the NISA. The CO argued in his judgment, ‘There is real 
difficulty in assessing their significance as the union could have been pushing at the 
open door of a compliant employer who wished them to appear to be effective 
negotiators’ (CO, 2001, s28). He went on to say, ‘Both deals took effect before NISA 
was formed and while the staff association was still much management’s creature’ (CO, 
2001, s28).
The verdict centred on four key reservations based on NISA’s history, its membership, 
its organisational structure, and the way it was financed (IDS Report 835, June, 2001:
7). The CO stated that while the NISA had made progress towards independence, it was 
based on various consultation structures controlled by News International and it ‘had 
some way to go’ (CO, 2001, s29) before it had independence from the firm. Importantly, 
the CO highlighted the lack of a membership register and the dependence on News 
International for communication with its members. The CO argued that potentially News 
International could refuse access to its members and stop it providing services.
The CO also suggested that there was some ambiguity over how much support the NISA 
had from members since theirs was a ‘no fee’ paid membership and all employees are 
automatically members. This was problematic when many employees were already 
members of other unrecognised unions.
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Interestingly, the ECC employee survey had indicated that 37 per cent of respondents 
stated they wanted to be represented by a third party (such as a union) while 35 per cent 
stated they did not. 41 per cent agreed that representation by an independent third party 
would improve management and staff working relationships, while only 28 per cent 
stated that it would improve the company’s business success.
Regarding financing, the CO argued that the NISA was entirely dependent on the 
financial support from the company, in particular the £250,000 trust fund. The CO 
stated, ‘While the union [NISA] is at least potentially dependent on management finance 
for its effective operation it is hard to see how it can be free from management influence, 
whether such influence is explicitly or implicitly expressed or merely in the minds of the 
union’s members’ (CO, 2001, s34).
It has been suggested that in seeking recognition for purposes of collective bargaining 
under the Employment Relations Act 1999 a trade union need not be a fully independent 
trade union as defined by the 1992 Act. Para 35 (4) of the Employment Relations Act 
1999, states that in practice and as a general rule, an application by an independent trade 
union may be defeated by a trade union which does not have a certificate of 
independence if it is recognised for the purposes of collective bargaining. In effect, this 
means that the presence of a staff association with ‘negotiating’ rights (as in the case of 
the NISA) can operate to defeat a claim by an independent trade union (Ewing, 2000).
6.6 South West Water
A challenge for UNISON in the mid 1990s, while it was campaigning to make the 
company reconsider the recognition issue, was to decide whether to participate in the SC 
or remain outside it. It was decided after lengthy discussions that the members could be 
best represented if UNISON activists and members put themselves forward for election 
to the SC. In all cases where a UNISON representative stood for election they were 
successful and were often elected unopposed. This reflected the confidence among both
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union and non-union elected members of the SC and lower level committees. Of the 14 
seats on the SC ‘eight were UNISON members of whom three were shop stewards’ 
(Griffin and others v South West Water Services Ltd. (1995)).
In relation to the presence of union members and representation on the SC, the Head of 
Personnel suggested:
From my perspective, I  didn’t care, the prize was getting people involved 
and participating in something that was really exciting. It would have been 
illogical to say that if  the reason for the derecognition or non-recognition 
was to try to get a better way o f doing things, how could you exclude 
anybody from that process. It just wouldn’t have made a lot o f sense. Unless 
you believe that we were anti-trade union or anti-UNISON and that wasn’t 
and isn ’t the case, it was an irrelevance (Interview, 27-03-00).
Interestingly, the Head of Personnel also suggested that an important driver in the 
derecognition process was the style of the previous Chief Executive’s (pre-1993) which 
was based on traditional notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The Head of Personnel described 
him as a person who made a fundamental difference to the way things were conducted 
and saw the setting up of the SC as a defence strategy and as necessary due to union 
opposition to changes in the company.
One of the early problems for the SC was that no training was provided for 
representatives and the Managing Director denied the representatives the opportunity 
hold pre-meetings to discuss the agenda. This caused problems for the SC in providing 
effective representation and in the ability to work as a team. Representatives were 
expected to represent constituents in disciplinary and grievance hearings, but many non­
union SC members felt they were ill-prepared for this role and were concerned about the 
potential for conflict of interest, particularly among the higher-graded representatives. 
UNISON representatives were also unwilling to represent non-members in such hearings
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and to take on a health and safety role, since there were no legal safeguards for 
individual representatives.
According to the Head of Personnel, the importance of the SC to SWW was not 
underestimated as evidenced in a takeover threat by two water companies in 1996:
There was a need to involve employees in what was going on and to help and 
assist against the potential takeover through involving employees in the 
issues and by asking them to write to MPs and writing letters in newspapers.
This was important to all because it would also mean job losses throughout 
the company. Clearly employees had an interest in what the outcome would 
be. This was a good example o f not only effective communication but also 
employee involvement. This would have been more difficult to achieve 
without the SC. Without this process it would place a greater burden on 
other processes you have got (Interview, 27-03-00).
The Personnel and Services Manager added, ‘The question is not that the business would 
stop without it but would the business work as effectively. It [SC] is a very important 
part of the toolkit’. He also highlighted another example of the importance of the SC to 
SWW when he suggested, ‘Perhaps a negative measure, over this period there was a 
reduction in manpower from 2,250 ten years ago to around 1,650 people today and in 
terms of unfair dismissal claims [during this time] around half a dozen. This is a very 
positive result due in part to the consultation process and management listening to 
employee concerns. Outcomes were arrived at in the way [that] the process was handled 
-  fair and businesslike’(Interview, 27-03-00)73.
Notwithstanding the positive views from management, the Personnel and Services 
Manager felt that the main concern was maintaining employees’ interest in the SC. He
73 The figures stated were as o f June 2000 (before union recognition). By 2002, the SWW workforce was 
around 1,400 employees.
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suggested that many employees had little interest in the issues raised at SC meetings and 
thus pressure was placed on representatives to give the views of all workers. Another 
problem was that workers are geographically dispersed over a large area. Many water 
plants operate 24 hours a day and many employees work away from their base for much 
of the time. In this environment, there can be difficulties in keeping people informed of 
the latest developments. He went on to say that while the SC was increasingly effective 
and successful, it had experience little success in the early years for a number of reasons. 
These included, the lack of effective leadership and support from higher management, 
and lack of trust among SC representatives based on their experience with previous 
consultative arrangements and management structures and the previous two-tier 
committee process. This had created a culture which encouraged issues to be handled 
higher up the management structures rather than to be resolved lower down the line, 
resulting in a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
During this period the former NALGO branch orchestrated a long-running campaign 
against the derecognition, which involved leafleting outside the main offices, publicity 
stunts, a petition to the European Parliament and letters to local MPs. They tried to 
maintain membership levels by asking members to pay subscriptions by direct debit but 
without a workplace presence found it difficult to retain and recruit members. Coupled 
with the continuing redundancies, this meant that by 1998 the membership had reduced 
by two-thirds to approximately 200.
An important development was the High Court action in determining who were the 
‘workers representatives’ at SWW with respect to the issue of collective redundancies. 
The expert witnesses were Lord McCarthy and Dr Neil Millward for UNISON and 
SWW respectively. The Hon Mr Justice Blackburne stated in the judgment, ‘I was left 
with the impression that the consultative machinery established by SWW was very much 
the exception in the field of modem day industrial relations and that, despite an 
increasing trend towards de-recognition of trade unions for collective bargaining 
purposes, many employers still continue to recognise trade unions for other purposes
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including dealing with collective redundancies’ (Griffin and others v South West Water 
Services Ltd. (1995).
Before privatisation there were well-established procedures for determining pay, 
conditions of service and resolving disputes with little history of industrial action. This 
was confirmed by the Head of Personnel at SWW when he stated, ‘. .. up until that point 
I think we had a reasonably open relationship with our trade unions ... sometimes quite 
confronting, nothing wrong with that, but reasonably open’. The UNISON and former 
NUPE full-time officer concurred: ‘Certainly the manuals had been negotiating and 
talking with the company and the relationships, by and large, had been reasonably good 
on a one-to-one level’.
However, the formation of UNISON in 1993 and the relative inexperience of the branch 
officers had caused disruption within the union. During this period the company took the 
opportunity to derecognise the union in October of that year. Talking about reasons for 
the derecognition the Head of Personnel said: ‘I think it was as a result of UNISON 
being formed [and] their introversion. Looking in from the outside, you don’t see it all 
and all you see is this organisation being totally wrapped up in itself and not concerned 
with us as an organisation or dealing with the issues we were having to deal with. Just 
the sheer irritation with UNISON, its inability to handle what we saw as a stakeholder in 
ourselves...’ (Interview, 27-03-00).
In a later interview, the Head of Personnel suggested that the previous traditional 
collective bargaining arrangements restricted and limited flexibility and as a result 
reduced productivity. He also stated that another important factor was the lack of active 
union presence in the company. It was suggested by the Personnel and Services Manager 
that trade union membership in the white-collar area at that time was as little as 15 to 20 
per cent, therefore the company was sensitive to the views of an increasingly significant 
number of staff for whom trade union membership was no longer relevant. He suggested 
that a more direct relationship between employees and their representatives was desired,
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and as a result, when the unions decided to amalgamate into UNISON the company 
decided to end recognition.
Interestingly, unions were not completely excluded at SWW. Within the company there 
were notable variations in the scope and range of arrangements, with derecognition 
confined to mainly collective issues, allowing UNISON representation on individual 
matters. The UNISON full-time officer suggested the union was:
‘always received well by the company when representing members in 
disciplinary hearings or grievances. I got the impression that personnel 
were grateful they had someone there who knew what they were doing. It 
makes it easier for them I think. I  never had any hostility from either 
individual managers or personnel people ’ (Interview, 02-04-00).
This proved to be important later on when SWW decided to contact UNISON about re­
establishing a full relationship. The Personnel and Services Manager stated:
[the union] had been more and more present in the organisation, albeit on 
individual matters but we have never said ... that people would not be able 
to have individual representation ... ’ (Interview, 27-03-00).
The Head of Personnel added:
‘...we never actually lost contact with UNISON ...firstly ... that there were 
UNISON representatives on the Staff Council and secondly we always 
supported the idea that people had access to UNISON on individual 
grievance or disciplinary matters, so there was always a link there, there 
was never a divorce in a clean kind o f way. We never got to decree 
absolute, decree nisi maybe ’ (Interview, 27-03-00).
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UNISON invested significant time and resources in fighting the derecognition, but 
continued to lose members. The Personnel and Services Manager described this as a 
‘vicious’ campaign against derecognition. However, there was a difference between the 
pattern of membership loss regarding manual and non-manual workers. It could be 
argued that manual workers had a higher attachment to union membership and many 
chose to join one of the other unions. For the non-manual workers, there was not the 
same attachment, with the company being able to establish a non-union SC for 
representation and ceasing to deduct union membership subscriptions from pay.
Fairbrother (1996: 24) sums up the situation in the privatised utilities succinctly when he 
says ‘With the restructuring that has taken place in these sectors over the last decade and 
the ending of national forms of bargaining and negotiating procedures, there has been an 
attempt to replace one set of consensual procedures at the national level with another at 
the local level. This was accompanied by an attempt to individualise and fragment 
previously collective work relations. The outcome has been a dramatic change in work 
and employment relations in these sectors, with startling implications for trade unions’.
SWW approached UNISON in February 2000 concerning rebuilding the relationship 
and a possible recognition agreement. As a result, a recognition agreement with 
UNISON was signed in the summer of 2001, after agreement over the continuation of 
existing non-union arrangements. Given that seven years previously they had 
derecognised UNISON, it was thought that a key element in the change of management 
strategy was the appointment of a new Managing Director. The new appointee’s career 
was based entirely in the water industry, having previously been the Engineering 
Director at SWW. His management style was more open than that of his predecessor and 
this undoubtedly went some way towards rebuilding the relationship with UNISON.
Gall and McKay (1999) suggest that the new recognition agreements reflect the revival 
of a more pragmatic ‘pluralism’ approach rather than ‘unitarism’ within employer 
circles. They suggest ‘that some employers appear to be turning away from non-union
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collectivised and individualised arrangements and towards using trade unions. These 
employers have recognised the costs and difficulties of organising employee relations 
through works councils and performance-related pay and the ease, cheapness and 
legitimacy of the joint regulation that union recognition can afford. Often the vehicle for 
this change has been a change in ownership or a change in management personnel’ (Gall 
and McKay 1999: 610).
Moreover, the Employment Relations Act 1999 also had an important role in the re­
recognition process. As the full-time UNISON Official stated, ‘The legislation, almost 
undoubtedly, or the threat of it ... [was] the catalyst, with the prospect of ballots and 
more confrontation’. The Head of Personnel agreed by stating,
It was the impending change in the legislation that had prompted them to 
start discussions with UNISON. The Act was floating around in the 
background and we were aware o f that. The Act might potentially sour the 
situation rather than improve it, which may sound odd ... it is better to have 
a relationship which is done on a positive basis, or there isn ’t a relationship 
because you have fought it off, and that is the potential that you can get into 
with the Act (Interview, 27-03-00).
It could be suggested that by adopting the voluntary approach, SWW were able to secure 
an agreement which gave them the advantage. The UNISON full-time Official stated,
. . .we  are still on a building process really. We know where we want to be 
but we are a long way from being there yet. I think it is about biting your 
tongue sometimes whereas with an employer where you have got 90 per 
cent membership you can be a bit more robust ... than you can be with 
these, but it is all part o f the longer game plan really. It would be silly to 
throw the baby out now, better to look to the future (Interview, 02-04-00).
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An important factor in the re-recognition was the leadership of the UNISON 
representatives at SWW. Management suggested that the personality of the full-time 
officer was extremely important, especially a person that the company can trust. As 
Brown (1999: 168-9) has argued, ‘.. recognition will to a considerable degree depend not 
just upon what employers choose to offer, but also upon what unions can earn for 
themselves, by means of nurturing a relationship of trust with management’.
Regarding partnership at SWW, the Head of Personnel suggested that, ‘I am not sure 
whether UNISON know what they want out of the partnership agreement i f  there is 
going to be a partnership agreement because I don’t think we have got a partnership 
agreement at the moment, we have got a recognition agreement that is specific, there is a 
history here and you can’t ignore that, so let’s just take it slowly and rebuild the 
relationship. It’s more evolutionary than revolutionary’ (Interview, 27-03-00).
The full-time UNISON Official concurred, ‘...you have got to recognise that you can’t 
change the world overnight, you’ve just got to do small bite-sized chunks and hopefully 
over a period of time you’ll come quite a long way but you don’t realise it in the small 
steps you are taking’ (Interview, 02-04-00).
Haynes and Allen (2001: 165) also highlighted this point in their research, quoting from 
a full time union official, ‘If you’ve had years and years of something that’s horrible, 
and something comes along that’s not quite so horrible, you support it. Partnership’s not 
so horrible because we use it as a code word for recognition. It is an acknowledgement 
of the legitimacy of the other party’.
Significantly, while the DTI gave £50,000 as part of partnership fund to SWW, a 
UNISON Official stated, that partnership is ‘just another tool to try and get the company 
to move towards recognition and to get ourselves accepted within the company as a 
legitimate organisation that had a role to play’.
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6.7 Discussion and review
From this research, two types of strategies can be identified that were applied by unions 
at HP Bulmers, Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Eurotunnel, News International and SWW. 
Unions at HP Bulmers, Ciba Specialty Chemicals, News International and SWW used a 
strategy of ‘colonisation’ towards NER voice arrangements as opposed to the 
‘marginalisation’ of NER arrangements adopted by the T&GWU at Eurotunnel.
Significantly at Eurotunnel, although their expectations were high, employees were not 
totally convinced that unions alone would resolve their concerns74. Only when 
management was perceived as unresponsive did the union become more of a catalyst for 
collective action. However, in many ways it could be argued that the partnership 
agreement between Eurotunnel and the T&GWU protected the status quo rather than 
extracted increased gains for employees, resulting in dissatisfaction, disenchantment and 
frustration. This was reinforced by management recognising the T&GWU without 
consulting employees. This was in the context of the recognition of the T&GWU and a 
strategy of marginalising the CC from negotiations and bargaining with management, 
against the wishes of many employees. This resulted in many employees unconvinced of 
the merits of trade union representation alone and a significant group of employees not 
becoming members of the T&GWU.
At HP Bulmers, the T&GWU had a long standing presence in the organisation as part of 
a ‘coherent representation’ approach which recognised the union for collective 
bargaining while the Employee Council (which included union representatives) would 
discuss all other matters not subject to formal negotiation or bargaining. Ciba Specialty
74 At Eurotunnel, the first survey provided strong support for trade unions in all sections o f Eurotunnel 
with the majority o f respondents suggesting that a trade union would improve their position over pay and 
benefits, work conditions, health and safety and employee grievances. However, the second survey 
revealed the lack o f progress the union had made on these issues with many employees suggesting that the 
trade union had not met their expectations.
Paul J Gollan 172
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
Chemicals established a similar approach to dual channel representation when the GMB 
was granted sole union recognition in 1999. The Company Council actively encouraged 
union membership resulting in a dramatic increase in union membership after one year. 
In particular, the GMB agreed ‘to work in tandem with the Company Council in 
improving two-way communications and understanding of common objectives’. In turn, 
the GMB was granted sole representation for collective bargaining purposes.
While no union has been recognised at News International since 1988, an important 
tactic adopted by the unions was a colonisation strategy of NISA. For example, the 
Father of the Chapel for the NUJ was elected unopposed to the NISA. He argued, ‘Why 
am I joining a body which actually uses the words ‘staff association’? Because I have 
been asked to by colleagues who agree with me it is important for the chapel to maintain 
a way of being allowed to talk to management and take up staff issues’ (.Journalist, 
June/July, 1999:11).
Thus, the creation of NISA raises a number of questions for representatives who are 
trade union members. In particular, three main issues can be highlighted -  role conflict, 
reconciliation of differing interests, and the role of playing to different audiences. For 
the proponents of trade unions, such employer-sponsored structures are fatally flawed as 
an instrument of true workplace democracy because they are usually created and 
controlled by management and they have little or no independent power to protect 
workers’ rights (Kaufman and Kleiner, 1993). It could also be argued that union 
representatives on such structures could confer legitimacy on management action by the 
visible processes of consultation with accredited representatives (Terry, 1999). In 
addition, even if such representatives can influence the agenda -  but not the outcomes -  
there is a risk that representation on such structures could be seen as pseudo­
participation, thereby reducing the perceived influence and power of employee voice 
(Kaufman and Kleiner, 1993; Hyman, 2001). As Kelly (1996) suggests, workers require 
effective voice based on the right of workers to exercise collective power through 
independent organisations that they regard as legitimate.
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For unions, while having no guarantee of continuing recognition, maintaining high 
membership density creates an environment of strong union organisation and 
representation at workplace level. This was especially so at News International where 
there was a long history of anti-unionism and little prospect of union recognition by 
management. The experience at SWW has also shown that where unions have been 
excluded from the workplace, maintaining a presence through the representation of 
individual employee interests and through colonisation of NER structures has been 
shown to pay dividends in the long run. However, a recognition agreement is not enough 
on its own to secure new members and unions need to be effective and relevant to the 
workforce.
Overall the findings of this study suggest that a ‘marginalisation’ approach by a union to 
NER arrangements (as adopted by the T&GWU at Eurotunnel) could present challenges 
and have serious limitations. The implications of not recognising these limitations could 
lead to reduced union influence on workplace issues and potentially less desirable 
outcomes. The ‘colonisation’ approach as adopted by unions at HP Bulmer, Ciba 
Specialty Chemicals, News International and South West Water would seem to yield 
benefits by securing increased union presence in the decision-making process.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NON-UNION AND UNION 
REPRESENTATION ARRANGEMENTS -  
AN EMPLOYEE RESPONSE
7.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the interplay between non-union and union representative 
arrangements at Eurotunnel (UK) and assesses their effectiveness in representing the 
needs of employees over a five-year period. In particular, this chapter seeks to explore 
whether NER arrangements are a complement to union representation or whether NER 
arrangements act as a substitute for union-based arrangements. Furthermore, perceptions 
of workplace outcomes of both NER and union-based voice arrangements will be 
assessed. The findings show that the effectiveness of non-union structures as bodies 
representing the interests of employees in filling the representation gap is questionable. 
However, union recognition through an employer-union partnership agreement has also 
raised important issues regarding the effectiveness, impact and legitimacy of unions at 
Eurotunnel. The main implication of this research is that the existence of a mechanism -  
union or non-union -  for consultation between management and employees at the 
workplace may not be a sufficient condition for representation of employee interests. 
Effective employee voice over workplace issues may be essential for achieving and 
maintaining employee satisfaction.
The issues raised in this chapter have several consequences for the research outcomes. It 
is envisaged that this will provide a framework for examining the operation of NER 
forms, how they impact on employee trust in management, perceptions of their 
influence, and employees’ sense of grievance. In addition, what all means for unionism
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is explored by studying the collective nature of NER and its impact on employees’ views 
before and after union recognition at Eurotunnel. The research also examines the views 
of union and non-union respondents towards union and non-union channels of 
representation after trade union recognition and the signing of the partnership 
agreement. The effectiveness of union and non-union voice arrangements in delivering 
benefits for employees by using research based on employees’ perceptions of 
management, and of union and CC representatives are examined. Importantly, voice is 
deemed ‘effective’ for employees when it is associated with more positive employee 
perceptions of influence and being able to be heard.
7.2 Research findings from the longitudinal comparison of 
respondents’ views.
The evidence presented here assesses the views of employees at Eurotunnel based on 
two surveys -  one undertaken between December 1999 and January 2000, and the 
second survey conducted in December 2002 after union recognition (see Chapter Four 
for further details).
7.2.1 Perceptions of representative effectiveness
On the question of who would best represent staff on dealing with management over 
major workplace issues, the strongest support for a trade union was on pay increases. 
This was reflected in both surveys. However, the proportion of respondents who felt the 
union could best represent them in getting pay rises dropped significantly from over 70 
per cent in the first survey to under 50 per cent in the second survey. This downward 
trend over the period was also apparent in relation to other workplace issues. For 
example, employees who thought that the union would be best at making a complaint 
about an issue at work fell from 55 per cent to 35 per cent, representing employees in 
disciplinary procedures declined from over 62 per cent to 42 per cent and representing 
individuals about changes to their immediate workplace decreased from 46 per cent to
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29 per cent. Interestingly, support for the CC on these issues stayed relatively consistent 
between the two surveys.
A respondent argued:
The union reps seem only interested in their own little empires and inspire 
no confidence whatsoever. The CC reps seem to have at best a minor 
consultation role but at least make themselves available. We do need ways 
o f influencing all aspects o f how we operate. The vast majority o f people 
care about the company, our customers and the future. We seem to have 
inappropriate people in management who don’t realise the staff are an 
important part o f the jigsaw that can make Eurotunnel a success.
Table 7.1 Who would best represent employees in dealing with managers at 
Eurotunnel? (percentage)75
CompamV Council Union Individual
1999
Survey
2 0 0 2
Survey
1999
Survey
2 0 0 2
Survey
1999
Survey
2 0 0 2
Survey
Getting increases in 
pay
(y = 28.56; p= 0.000)
22 25 71 48 1 27
Making a complaint 
( f  =  23.47; p= 0.000)
31 28 55 35 14 37
If a manager wanted to 
discipline me
(X = 20.02; p= 0.000)
29 31 62 42 9 27
Changes to my 
immediate workplace 
(X = 20.43; p= 0.000)
29 23 46 29 25 48
(Source: 1999 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =I23; 2002 
Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55I)
The proportion of respondents who stated that they themselves were best placed to deal 
individually with the issues mentioned above increased significantly between the two 
surveys (% = 28.56; p -  0.000). For example, 27 per cent stated they individually were 
best placed to obtain pay increases, 37 per cent of respondents said they were best
75 Figures in the following tables may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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placed to make a complaint (up from 14 per cent in the first survey), 27 per cent felt they 
were best placed to deal with disciplinary action from managers (up from 9 per cent in 
the first survey), and 48 per cent stated they were best placed to individually deal with 
changes to their immediate workplace (up from 25 per cent in the first survey).
Importantly, it would seem that the lowered perceptions among employees of the 
union’s effectiveness resulted in increased perceptions of individuals being able to deal 
more effectively with management. The following comments illustrate the views of 
employees (who are evidently not supportive of unions):
One respondent suggested:
I  have a distrust for unions in general given that they cannot represent an 
individual’s concerns. A poor experience in the past with them probably 
influences my judgement. The CC however, comes across as a more 
independent, unbiased option with a friendlier perception. After all, they 
also manage the Eurotunnel recreational kitty which a union cannot. The 
CC are already one step towards being company employees, whereas 
union members tend to have a label o f “trouble maker”, irrespective o f  
their (CC or trade union) “clout” so to speak. I  would prefer to deal with 
my employer directly, they did so when employing me.
Another responded stated:
The trade union is only here on a “power trip ”. They contribute nothing -  in 
fact have made matters worse. The CC were perfectly adequate at 
representing employee issues without being confrontational -  union H&S 
reps are totally unnecessary as we have very good elected H&S reps which 
are voted on by the entire workforce not just union members.
Paul J Gollan 178
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o l i t ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
In the first survey the majority of respondents suggested that if trade unions were 
recognised at Eurotunnel, the CC should retain a role. As one respondent argued:
In an ideal world, the CC should have a role -  other than offering treats like 
cheap panto tickets and holiday deals. In reality the CC representatives are 
all paid employees -  their power and inclination is limited. It was hoped the 
union coming in would change all that, not the case I ’m afraid. The T&G 
seem to be more compliant than the CC. I  feel this must be poor leadership 
on their part, as certainly their employee representatives would like to make 
it work. Eurotunnel has fallen far behind in the pay stakes, and the touch 
feely “this is a nice place to work so don’t mind the money” stakes. 
Eurotunnel is heavy on top -  many well fed chiefs run committed but sorely 
tired and poorly paid Indians!
However, some 80 per cent of respondents in the first survey wanted management to 
recognise a trade union. Notwithstanding this, evidence suggests that around one in ten 
union and around a third of non-union respondents would favour the CC to represent 
their interests in relation to pay rises, making a complaint, discipline and changes to the 
workplace at Eurotunnel.
Table 7.2 below indicates that most employees after union recognition envisaged a role 
for the CC. On all major issues, few employees thought that the CC should play no role 
at all. In fact on all these issues, respondents regarded the CC as an important agent for 
consultation with management and as a source of information.
Interestingly, the second survey indicated that unionists were divided over the role of the 
CC regarding pay and benefit issues after union recognition, with 32 per cent indicating 
the CC should have a consultation role, 29 per cent suggesting an information role, and 
27 per cent stating no role at all. Non-union respondents were more decisive with 59 per
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cent opting for the CC to have a consultation role and 16 per cent an information role. 
Only seven per cent of non-union respondents suggested no role for the CC.
In relation to issues concerning the introduction of new technology, trade union 
members were again fairly evenly split with 31 per cent stating that the CC should have 
a consultation role. This compared to 39 per cent of non-union respondents indicating 
that the CC should have a consultation role, 28 per cent supporting an information role 
and 10 per cent stating no role. Again there was division among trade union respondents 
over changes to working practices as to whether the CC should have a consultation role 
(38 per cent), an information role (30 per cent) and no role (22 per cent). However, there 
was overwhelming support among non-union respondents for the CC to have a 
consultation role, with 58 per cent stating this. The views in relation to staffing issues 
and employee grievances were similar to these findings.
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Table 7.2 Role for the company council given trade union recognition 
(percentage)
Given trade union recognition at Eurotunnel, what role should the CC 
have? (percentage)
No role Information
role
Consultation
role
Don’t know
Pay and 
benefits 
(X = 65.66;
p=  0.000)
Unionised
employees
27 29 32 12
Non-union
employees
7 16 59 19
Introduction 
o f new 
technology
(X2 = 23.69;
p= 0.000)
Unionised
employees
26 27 31 17
Non-union
employees
10 28 39 23
Changes to
working
practices
(X = 38.69; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
22 30 38 10
Non-union
employees
8 19 58 16
Staffing
issues,
including
recruitment
and
redundancies
(X2 = 35.71 ,p=  
0.000)
Unionised
employees
23 27 39 11
Non-union
employees
9 17 58 16
Employee
grievances
(X = 42.52; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
26 20 42 11
Non-union
employees
7 15 62 16
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55I)
Company Council
Only six per cent of respondents indicated that they were frequently in contact with their 
CC representatives. This was down from 20 per cent in the previous survey. 45 per cent 
of respondents said they were occasionally in contact with their representatives, again 
down from 57 per cent in the previous survey. More worrying was the 20 per cent who 
did not even know who their worker representatives were. This was an increase from the 
previous survey when only three per cent said they did not know their representative. 
One respondent commented, ‘CC representatives simply do as they are told by the
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company -  no power, no backbone. The union is far more effective but would be better 
if Eurotunnel followed the rules of the agreement it signed and dealt with the issues 
raised (Pay and Conditions)’.
Regarding the importance of the CC communicating on workplace issues, respondents to
the second survey generally rated communication from the CC as less important than
respondents in the first survey. The most statistically significant issues regarding
2
communication from the CC in both surveys were pay and benefits (% = 11.42; p=
2 2 0.010) and employee grievances (% = 12.39; p= 0.015), staffing issues (% = 7.71; p=
0.052)76 and changes to working practices (% = 14.39; p= 0.002), with around half to 
two-thirds of respondents suggesting they were ‘important’ or ‘very important’. 
Significantly, there was a fall in respondents indicating that it was ‘important’ or ‘very 
important’ for the CC to be communicating on pay and benefit issues in the second 
survey, which highlights the influence of trade union recognition and presence.
76 This could be considered as marginally significant. 
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Table 7.3 Importance of the company council (percentage)
Issue How important is the CC in communicating on the issues below?
Very
important
Important Not so 
important
Not important 
at all
Pay and 
benefits 
( f =  11.42;/?= 
0.010)
1999 Survey 30 37 21 12
2002 Survey 22 30 24 24
Introduction
of new
technology
(X =5.99, p=  
0.112)
1999 Survey 6 30 39 25
2002 Survey 7 20 41 32
Changes to
working
practices
(X  = 14.39; p=  
0.002)
1999 Survey 29 25 32 15
2002 Survey 17 33 26 25
Staffing
issues,
including
recruitment
and
redundancies
( X 2 = 7.71 ; p =  
0.052)
1999 Survey 30 24 27 20
2002 Survey 20 30 25 26
Employee
grievances
(X = 12.39; p=  
0.015)
1999 Survey 37 29 23 12
2002 Survey 23 38 22 17
Career
ladder77
1999 Survey - - - -
2002 Survey 12 24 34 31
(Source: 1999 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=123; 2002 
Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=55J)
One respondent from a focus group held before union recognition argued:
The CC does a reasonable job considering the difficulties they have with 
conditions and unapproachable management. The social side is well 
organised. However, the lack o f communication and changes in 
procedures o f work which are very contradictory are a great problem. 
Management seem unaware that we all have a life outside Eurotunnel, 
what a pity! ’
77 Career question was not included in the 1999 survey.
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Before union recognition a CC representative also explained:
7 see the CC as a guardian body to ensure the communication is passed 
on correctly. It could be a lot more effective but the company would have 
to give it a lot more power than now. We [CC] are not a negotiating 
body but a consultation body. Although we could organise in a similar 
form to a union, the problem is the legal framework in that the CC is a 
‘trust’ under regulations. We are a consultation and welfare and social 
body for employees only.
Highly significant differences were found between non-union and union respondents in 
the second survey regarding the importance of the CC communicating on workplace 
issues. The majority (59 per cent) of non-union respondents indicated that it was
‘important’ or ‘very important’ that the CC communicated on pay and benefit issues
2
compared to 38 per cent of union members (x = 21.85; p= 0.000). These figures would 
seem to suggest that the CC has a degree of support among non-union respondents 
regarding its involvement in pay and benefits even though they are excluded from such 
discussions due to the partnership agreement between Eurotunnel and the T&GWU. A 
small amount of support for the CC was evident in relation to communications on the 
introduction of new technology.
Much greater support for the CC was evident in communicating issues relating to 
changes in working practices with some 56 per cent of non-union respondents indicating
that it was important or very important for the CC to communicate such issues. This was
2
in contrast to only 38 per cent of union members (x = 17.80; p= 0.000). Similarly, 55 
per cent of non-union respondents indicated that it was important or very important for
the CC to communicate over staffing issues, such as recruitment and redundancies,
2
compared to 36 per cent of union respondents (% = 22.69; p= 0.000). Interestingly, what 
could be considered as a traditional union activity, there was a high level of support for
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the CC to communicate on employee grievance issues with 67 per cent of non-union 
respondents suggesting this was important or very important. However, significantly
there was lower support from union respondents with 48 per cent indicating it was
2
important or very important for the CC to communicate on such issues (% = 23.80; p= 
0.000). Over twice as many non-union respondents compared to union members
indicated that it was important or very important for the CC to communicate on career
2
ladder and promotion issues (44 per cent compared to 19 per cent) (x = 36.70; p -  
0.000).
Table 7.4 The importance of company council communication (percentage)
Issue How important is the CC in communicating on the issues below? (percentage)
Very
important
Important Not so 
important
Not important 
at all
Pay and 
benefits 
(X2 = 21.85 ;P= 
0.052)
Unionised
employees
17 21 30 32
Non-union
employees
24 35 20 21
Introduction
o f new
technology
(X -  8.10; p= 
0.044)
Unionised
employees
6 16 37 40
Non-union
employees
7 22 43 28
Changes to
working
practices
(X = 17 80; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
15 23 29 33
Non-union
employees
18 38 24 20
Staffing
issues,
including
recruitment
and
redundancies
(X ~ 22.69; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
13 23 26 38
Non-union
employees
22 33 24 20
Employee
grievances
(X = 23.80; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
20 28 27 25
Non-union
employees
24 43 20 13
Career ladder
and promotion
(X = 36.70; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
8 11 37 43
Non-union
employees
14 30 32 25
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55I)
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After union recognition one respondent insisted:
I  would like to see the CC have a stronger voice especially in pay and 
conditions. The CC does very good work on social events and benefits 
but since the introduction o f the T&G has no power over negotiation on 
pay, Eurotunnel have put a lot o f time and effort into the “union deal” (I 
have the senior union representative and freight representative in my 
group and they spend a lot o f time at meetings). The numbers o f staff in 
the union is very small therefore the CC should represent the staff on pay 
and benefits.
Two-thirds of all respondents stated in the first survey that the CC was not effective in 
representing general employee interests or the interests of employees in the section or 
area where they worked. The view of one respondent from the first survey (before union 
recognition) was that the ‘CC does well regarding social activities but is unable, through 
no fault of their own, to influence management decisions’.
Another respondent stated before union recognition:
The CC has failed to deliver independent and worker orientated 
programmes and policies. This organisation must have information and 
not a consultation role due to an obvious lack o f objectivity and 
independence. We must structure the CC free from management 
influence and career orientated representatives. The CC has lost its 
credibility, influence and focus and must be replaced by new structures 
(trade unions, independent focus groups etc)
The views of respondents in the second survey towards the CC broadly reflect those 
from the first survey. Many respondents (around 50 per cent) in the second survey
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suggested that the CC should retain a consultation role in relation to pay and benefits, 
changes to working practices, staffing issues and employee grievances. Few respondents 
believed that the CC should have no role. One respondent suggested, ‘The idea of the 
CC is a good one. They want the same benefits as anyone else, but they don’t have the 
power to achieve a great deal. They need to evolve with the company and be given more 
power on certain issues. Management need to accept them and inform them more than 
they do now. Work with them not against them’.
Table 7.5 What role should the company council have at Eurotunnel? 
(percentage)
No role Information role Consultation role Don’t know
1999
Survey
2002
Survey
1999
Survey
2002
Survey
1999
Survey
2002
Survey
1999
Survey
2002
Survey
Pay and benefits
(r  = 7.70: p= 0.053)
18 13 22 21 54 50 6 17
Introduction to new
technology
(y = 9.44; p= 0.024)
12 15 33 28 36 36 9 21
Changes to working 
practices
(y2 = 5.76; p= 0.124)
15 12 25 22 55 51 5 14
Staffing issues, 
including 
recruitment and 
redundancies
(y2 = 8.49; p= 0.037)
18 13 27 20 50 52 5 15
Employee grievances 
(y2 = 9.60; p= 0.022)
21 13 21 17 53 56 5 15
(Source: 1999 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=J23; 2002  
Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N = 55I)
Statistically significant differences were found between non-union and union 
respondents regarding the effectiveness of the CC. Some 42 per cent of non-union
respondents from the second survey thought the CC was effective or very effective in
2
representing employees’ interests compared to 24 per cent of union respondents {% = 
42.55; p= 0.000).
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Trade Unions
At the time of the first survey, 12 per cent of respondents were union members. Only six 
per cent of respondents indicated that there was any active union presence and nine per 
cent had contact with other union members or representatives. However, over 75 per 
cent of the respondents indicated that management should recognise a trade union.
Support for trade union recognition was also reflected in the Eurotunnel Company 
Council Recognition Survey, which found that 52 per cent of the respondents were in 
favour of trade union representation. In terms of employees’ willingness to join a trade 
union, half of the respondents in the recognition survey stated they would. However, at 
the time one of the CC representatives was cautious of the impact of trade union 
recognition. He argued:
I  do not think management should recognise trade unions because I think it 
would be quite harmful fo r  the company due to the different unions with 
different agendas and interests. The fear is that you will get a lot o f outside 
conflicts with unions because unions also represent people outside 
Eurotunnel. Internalising industrial relations here is more effective 
because such outside influence would divide views and we would be 
divided. The best option would be to give the CC more power rather than 
bringing in outside conflicts. We see what happens over in France where 
they have a number o f unions and how this affects things like bonuses. Also 
greater union influence would reduce CC influence. We also need to 
represent those that do not belong to a union. I would rather have a 
combined CC with the same power as a union. There must be cooperation 
and a partnership between employees and management.
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Findings from the first survey (prior to trade union recognition) suggested that many 
employees believed that trade unions would improve their position on certain issues.
Significantly, in relation to pay and benefits some 72 per cent of respondents from the
2
first survey thought that trade unions would improve their position (x = 22.23; p= 
0 .000).
2
There were similar findings regarding work conditions (% = 24.71; p= 0.000) and
2
employee grievances (% = 24.71; p= 0.000), with 73 per cent of employees suggesting 
that trade unions would improve their position.
Table 7.6 Believe trade unions would improve your position (percentage)
Issue Do you believe trade unions would improve your position over the 
following issues? (1999 survey)
Yes No
Pay and benefits
(X  = 22.23; p=  0.000)
72 28
Work conditions 
(X  = 24.7 l ;p =  0.000)
73 27
Health and safety 
(X = 3.39; p=  0.066)
59 41
Training
(X2 = 1.66; p=  0.197)
44 56
Employee grievances 
(X = 24.71 p=  0.000)
73 27
Job security
(X2 = 0.034; p=  853)
51 49
(Source: J999 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=J23)
The findings from the second survey (after union recognition) indicated that the 
T&GWU had some success in recruiting members and increasing its presence. Some 35 
per cent of employees in the second survey said they were a trade union member 
compared to only 12 per cent in the first survey . Union presence had increased greatly 
with 55 per cent of respondents suggesting there was an active union presence in their 
workplace compared to only six per cent of respondents from the first survey. However,
78 In July 2002, the T&GWU Regional Industrial Organiser indicated that union membership was around 
400 members, representing around 35 per cent o f the Eurotunnel (UK) workforce. Management estimated 
this figure to be lower at between 20 to 25 per cent. According to the chief T&GWU representative at 
Eurotunnel, at the time o f the second survey it was expected that over 60 per cent o f employees would 
become trade union members.
Paul J  Gollan 189
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
end  P o lit ic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
in contrast to employees’ perceptions from the first survey, the second survey revealed 
the lack of progress the union had made on some important issues. Many employees 
suggested that the trade union had not met their expectations. When asked how effective 
the trade union had been in representing general employee interests, only 29 per cent 
suggested that they were effective or very effective. Some 27 per cent felt they were not 
effective at all with remaining respondents suggesting that the trade union was only 
moderately effective.
Significantly, when asked if the trade union had improved their position on pay and 
benefits, only 12 per cent of respondents agreed. This view was also apparent in relation 
to other issues, such as work conditions (11 per cent), health and safety (14 per cent), 
training (five per cent), individual grievances (16 per cent) and job security (10 per 
cent)79.
Table 7.7 Improvement from trade union recognition (percentage)
Issue Since trade union recognition, do you believe the trade unions have 
improved your position over the following issues? (2002 survey)
Yes No
Pay and benefits
(y2 = 1088.22; p= 0.000)
12 88
Work conditions 
(X = 298.94; p=  0.000)
11 89
Health and safety 
(X = 256.33; p=  0.000)
14 86
Training
(X  = 862.64; p=  0.000)
5 95
Employee grievances 
(X = 227.61; p=  0.000)
16 84
Job security
(X  = 313.93; p -  0.000)
10 90
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N -5 5 I )
There were highly significant differences between union and non-union respondents 
regarding union representatives. While union respondents were overwhelming in their 
endorsement of unions with 61 per cent stating that representatives were ‘helpful’ or 
‘very helpful’ in keeping them up-to-date with issues at Eurotunnel, only 18 per cent of
79 All o f these responses were highly significant at p=0.000.
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2
non-union respondents indicated this (% = 115.15; p= 0.000). Most significantly, 82 per 
cent of non-union respondents saw union representatives as ‘not so helpful’ or ‘not 
helpful at all’. This would seem to present serious challenges for increased trade union 
presence and support at Eurotunnel.
Another challenge for the trade union and partnership at Eurotunnel is the lack of 
information on union issues received by union members. Over half of union members in 
the survey indicated that they received no or only a little information on union issues 
with only 13 per cent stating they received a great deal of information. Despite 
management support for the union, of concern is the 85 per cent of non-union 
respondents indicating they received no or only a little information on union issues. 
Potentially, this lack of information could pose serious questions regarding the 
effectiveness of communication by the T&GWU and the success of the union-employer 
partnership at Eurotunnel.
However, it would seem that trade unions respondents have been serviced by union 
representatives with 72 per cent indicating an active union presence in their area 
(frequent or occasional contact with union representatives). Non-union respondents were
significantly much less likely to be in an area or section with an active union presence
2
(25 per cent) (frequent or occasional contact with union representatives) (% = 117.34; p -  
0.000). While nearly three quarters of union members in the survey were likely to be in 
frequent or occasional contact with other trade union representatives, some 76 per cent 
of non-union respondents were never in contact with or did not even know a trade union 
representative.
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Table 7.8 Contact with union representatives (percentage)
Issue How much contact do you have with your trade union 
representatives?
Unionised employee Non-union employee
I am frequently in contact 24 4
I am occasionally in contact 48 21
I am never in contact 17 33
I do not know my worker 
representation
12 43
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55])(% = 117.34; p=  
0 .000)
Regarding the importance of trade unions, significantly 82 per cent of trade unionists in 
the survey saw trade unions as important or very important in communicating over pay
and benefits issues. Less than half (46 per cent) of non-union respondents indicated this
2
(x = 89.56; p= 0.000). Again, only 21 per cent of non-union respondents indicated that
unions were important or very important in communicating over new technology issues,
2
compared to 39 per cent of union members in the survey (x = 34.81; p= 0.000). Nearly 
twice as many trade unionists (75 per cent) compared to non-union respondents (40 per
cent) indicated that the trade union was important or very important in communicating
2
issues concerning changes to working practices (x = 88.50; p= 0.000). Nearly three 
quarters of unionists thought that trade unions were important or very important in
communicating over staffing issues compared to 43 per cent of non-union respondents
2
(X = 57.50; p= 0.000). There were also significant differences between respondents 
regarding communications over employee grievances with eight in ten union
respondents compared to just half of non-union respondents stating that the trade union
2
was important or very important (x = 78.63; p= 0.000). The majority of all respondents 
did not see the trade union communicating on career ladder or promotions as important
or very important, although there was significantly greater support for a union role by
2
unionists (38 per cent) compared to non-union respondents (26 per cent) (x = 16.85; p= 
0.000).
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Table 7.9 The importance of trade union communication (percentage)
Issue How important is the trade union in communicating on the issues below? 
(percentage)
Very
important
Important Not so 
important
Not important 
at all
Pay and
benefits
(X = 89.56; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
51 31 12 7
Non-union
employees
15 31 30 25
Introduction
o f  new
technology
(X = 34.81; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
13 26 45 16
Non-union
employees
5 16 40 39
Changes to
working
practices
(X -  88.50; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
39 36 16 8
Non-union
employees
8 32 32 28
Staffing
issues,
including
recruitment
and
redundancies
(X =51.50\ p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
38 35 16 10
Non-union
employees
13 30 28 29
Employee 
grievances 
(% =  78.63; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
53 29 12 7
Non-union
employees
17 34 24 25
Career ladder
and promotion
(X  = 16.85;p= 
0.001)
Unionised
employees
16 22 41 21
Non-union
employees
7 19 39 36
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55I)
It could be argued that perceptions of its effectiveness would be important for the 
T&GWU’s future success in recruiting new members and exerting influence over 
management decision-making. There were highly significant differences between union 
and non-union respondents regarding trade union effectiveness. Importantly for the 
T&GWU, around half of union members (49 per cent) regarded the trade union as 
effective or very effective. This compared to nearly 80 per cent of non-union
respondents (78 per cent) who saw the trade union as ineffective at representing general
2
employee interests at Eurotunnel (% = 65.01; p= 0.000).
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The perceived ineffectiveness of the union was summed up by one respondent from the 
second survey:
The trade unions are ineffective because they are inexperienced, unused to 
[the] legal side o f work practices and gullible. The Human Resources 
Director can run rings around them. The management will always protect 
themselves and despite procedures put in place i.e. suggestion scheme, etc 
they appear to protect their own comers and pay lip service to the 
employees.
There were significant differences between union and non-union respondents on a 
number of workplace issues. Since union recognition, only 22 per cent of union
members in the survey and just six per cent of non-union respondents indicated that the
2
T&GWU had improved pay and benefits (% = 21 Ay, p = 0.000). Similar findings were
evident regarding: the improvement of work conditions (23 per cent of unionists and six
2
per cent of non-union respondents; x = 31.23; p= 0.000); improvement of health and
2
safety (28 per cent of unionists and seven per cent of non-union respondents; (x =
37.66; p= 0.000); individual grievances (34 per cent of unionists compared to seven per
2
cent of non-union respondents; (x = 56.43; p= 0.000); and improvements in job security
2
(22 per cent of unionists compared to four per cent of non-union respondents; (x = 
38.15; p= 0.000). Significantly, very few respondents (union and non-union) thought 
that trade unions had improved the provision of training at Eurotunnel.
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Table 7.10 Perceived trade union effectiveness (percentage)
Issue Since trade union recognition, do you 
believe the trade union has improved 
your position? (percentage)
Yes No
Pay and benefits 
(X = 27.43; /?= 0.000)
Unionised employees 22 78
Non-union employees 6 93
Working conditions
31.23;/?= 0.000)
Unionised employees 23 77
Non-union employees 6 94
Health & safety 
(X  = 37.66; p -  0.000)
Unionised employees 28 72
Non-union employees 7 93
Training
(X2 = 10.10; p=  0.006)
Unionised employees 8 92
Non-union employees 3 97
Individual grievances 
(X2 = 56.43; p =  0.000)
Unionised employees 34 66
Non-union employees 7 93
Job security
(X2 = 38.15;/?= 0.000)
Unionised employees 22 78
Non-union employees 4 96
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55I)
These findings would suggest that many non-union respondents in the second survey 
(after union recognition) were disenchanted with the impact of the T&GWU. As one 
respondent suggested, ‘I think the trade union have been unable to improve the staffs 
work conditions. Representatives have been given good jobs in order to be placed on the 
management’s side and therefore have not been able to raise the staffs problems or 
issues’. Another respondent stated, ‘I haven’t seen any benefit of trade unions in my 
workplace [call centre]. The CC do try, but I haven’t noticed any benefit from any 
actions by them’. While another argued, ‘The union haggled a worse pay deal for 2002 
than the previous year when there was no union presence! Nuff said!’.
Perhaps this disenchantment was best summed up by one supervisor who stated:
Neither the CC or T&GWU have proved particularly effective in 
representing employees’ interests. In fact, my union representative 
communicates more information on his fantasy football league than union 
related matters. Staff in my department are constantly unable to get leave.
This desperately needs addressing, especially as some staff are able to
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secure the time-off by working on secondment to other departments. 
Management need to educate employees as to the role o f management 
within Eurotunnel. The cynical view that many staff have about 
management can only stem from ignorance.
Type o f representation
Regarding what type of arrangement would be best to represent staff on major 
workplace issues, the overwhelming majority of respondents in the first survey indicated 
a trade union. The strongest support for a trade union was on pay increases. However, 
the second survey, conducted after union recognition, revealed some interesting 
differences between the views of union members and non-union employees.
As expected, after 18 months of union recognition and the signing of the T&GWU and 
Eurotunnel partnership agreement, 82 per cent of union members indicated that the 
union would be best in dealing with managers about increases in pay. However, there 
were significant differences compared with non-union respondents who were equally
divided between the union (31 per cent), the CC (34 per cent) or acting individually (35
2per cent) regarding dealing with pay issues {% = 123.33; p= 0.000). Overall, there was 
less support from all employees for union representation over making a complaint to
managers, with 66 per cent of union members opting for union representation. However,
2
only 20 per cent of non-union respondents held this view = 109.21; p -  0.000). The 
remaining union members were divided between the CC and acting individually.
Significantly, 80 per cent of union respondents indicated that the union should represent
them over discipline issues, although only 24 per cent of non-union respondents
2
suggested this (% = 154.26; p -  0.000). In addition, some 41 per cent of non-union 
respondents stated that the CC should represent them over discipline issues while 36 per 
cent would rather act individually. There was less support for union representation 
regarding changes to the workplace (59 per cent of union respondents). There were
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highly significant differences compared to non-union respondents with only 15 per cent 
preferring union representation on these issues. In addition, over 29 per cent of union 
and 58 per cent of non-union respondents would prefer to represent themselves 
regarding changes to their immediate workplace = 110.66; p= 0.000). In addition, 27 
per cent of non-union respondents would like the CC to represent their interests on such 
workplace issues.
Table 7.11 The type of employee representation (percentage)
Issue Ideally, who do you think would best represent you in dealing with managers here 
at Eurotunnel about the following issues? (percentage)
Company council Union Individually
Increases in pay 
(X -  123.33;/?= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
6 82 12
Non-union
employees
34 31 35
Making a
complaint
(X = 109.21; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
14 6 6 20
Non-union
employees
35 20 45
If a manager 
wanted to 
discipline me 
(% = 154.26;p=  
0.000)
Unionised
employees
10 80 10
Non-union
employees
41 24 36
Changes to my
immediate
workplace
(X = 110.66; p= 
0.000)
Unionised
employees
13 59 29
Non-union
employees
27 15 58
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=55J)
The frustration felt over these issues was highlighted by one respondent:
The CC has become too weak to defend employees’ standards and 
conditions. Although I am in favour o f a trade union, the T&G has not stood 
up strongly enough for me to become a member, and the ethos at Eurotunnel 
is to consult with its employees and after that do what they want to do 
regardless o f what discussions have gone on with the union or CC.
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7.2.2 Perceptions of management
In the first survey, between 70 and 80 per cent of respondents did not think that 
managers were good at keeping employees up-to-date about proposed workplace 
changes, providing a chance to comment on such changes, responding to suggestions 
from employees, and dealing with work problems. The second survey revealed no 
improvement with a similar percentage of respondents also expressing these views.
There was also virtually no change in the second survey in response to the question ‘In 
general, how would you describe relations between managers and employees at 
Eurotunnel?’
Four per cent of respondents indicated ‘very good’ (compared to just three per cent of 
respondents from the first survey), 30 per cent stated ‘good’ (compared to 29 per cent 
from the first survey), and 68 per cent stated either ‘not so good’ or ‘not good at all’ in 
the first survey (compared to 67 per cent in the second survey). Some 55 per cent of 
respondents in the first survey and 60 per cent of respondents in the second survey stated 
that managers were ‘not so good’ or ‘not good at all’ at treating employees fairly.
However, the second survey revealed significant differences of opinion between union 
and non-union respondents. Some 35 per cent of non-union respondents stated that
managers were ‘very good’ or ‘good’ at treating employees fairly compared to 23 per
2
cent of union respondents (% = 15.07; p= 0.000).
These findings reflected the views of a number of respondents in the second survey. 
Employees’ frustration with management was voiced by one call centre respondent:
The fact that I  have taken the time to complete this questionnaire should 
prove that I am willing to help this company, but due to management and
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generally anyone in a higher role being so deaf to suggestions or comments 
made by employees, I  rather wonder why I  bothered. Nothing recorded in 
this survey is likely to make a blind bit o f difference. The nepotism in the 
company is such that an outsider hasn ’t got a chance and any relevant input 
from employees is usually disregarded due to usually not enough money.
Another respondent suggested:
Disciplinary procedures are meted out all too readily at Eurotunnel, ... with 
the result that employees have little respect fo r middle management. Those in 
positions o f higher management frequently abuse their privileges, so that 
morale is generally lacking in the workplace.
Information from management
A slightly higher proportion of non-union respondents thought they were well very 
informed or fairly well informed about workplace issues at Eurotunnel compared to
unionised respondents (63 per cent of non-union respondents compared to 54 per cent of
2
unionised respondents), although this was not statistically significant (% = 6.28; p= 
0.099).
Union respondents were less satisfied with the amount of information from 
management. 40 per cent of union respondents indicated they were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very
satisfied’ with the amount of information from management compared with 53 per cent
2
of non-union employees (x = 12.70; p= 0.005). Again, non-union respondents were 
slightly more likely to indicate they were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the type of
information (48 per cent) compared to union members (40 per cent), although this was
2
only statistically marginally significant (x = 7.46; p= 0.058). While the majority of all 
respondents were largely dissatisfied with the timing of information from management, 
there were some very significant differences between non-union and union respondents.
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37 per cent of non-union respondents said they were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with
2
the timing of information compared to only 21 per cent of unionised respondents (% = 
19.86; p= 0.000).
Table 7.12 Satisfaction with information from management (percentage)
How satisfied are you with the information management gives you?
Very
satisfied
Satisfied Not so 
satisfied
Not satisfied 
at all
Amount of
information
(X ~ 12.70;/?= 
0.005)
Union
respondents
1 39 41 18
Non-union
respondents
4 49 38 9
Type of
information
(X2 = 7.46;/*= 
0.058)
Union
Respondents
1 39 43 16
Non-union
respondents
2 46 43 9
Timing of
information
(X2 = 19.86; p= 
0.000)
Union
Respondents
1 20 53 27
Non-union
respondents
2 35 48 15
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=55J)
Trust in management
Importantly for management at Eurotunnel, significant differences over the issue of 
‘trust’ were apparent between union respondents and non-union respondents. Nearly
three times as many non-union respondents said they believed ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of
2
the information received from management (26 per cent compared to 9 per cent) (x = 
26.44; p= 0.000).. Conversely, union members in the survey were significantly more 
likely to indicate they did not believe any at all or only a little of the information from 
management (46 per cent) compared to 30 per cent of non-union respondents. It could be 
argued that this would confirm previous findings that union members are generally more 
distrusting of management than non-members.
This attitude was reflected in an interview with one of the CC representatives, who 
argued, workers ‘take it [information] with a pinch of salt. They [Managers] bend the 
truth a little, but we also do the same. The problem is that managers normally have more
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information than the CC. The amount of information is not adequate nor the timing of 
the information. I think it has to do with the structure of the company’.
Another respondent suggested:
I  personally feel Eurotunnel management treat the staff poorly. Wage 
negotiations are a joke. I t’s a case o f take it or leave it. Having spoken to 
quite a few  members o f staff, there is a distinct lack o f trust o f the 
management. The morale o f the workforce is rock bottom. I f  other 
employment became available in the area (drivers) a lot o f people would 
leave. We have been sold down the river on the wages we were promised 
when we first started.
Influence on management decision-making
An overwhelming majority of respondents in the second survey felt they had no or only 
little opportunity to influence management in its decision-making processes, with union 
members significantly more likely than non-union respondents to indicate this (84 per
cent compared to 76 per cent). These figures were similar as those in the previous survey
2
(X = 10.29; p= 0.000). According to one respondent from the second survey,
‘Eurotunnel managers might listen to employees, but disregard their opinions and 
suggestions, unless it makes management shine. Management are arrogant and 
condescending’.
While the vast majority of all respondents indicated that they had little opportunity to 
influence management on pay and benefits, there were significant differences between 
non-union and union respondents on other issues. Around nine out of ten employees 
indicated that they had no opportunity to influence management decisions on the 
introduction of new technology. Interestingly, nearly twice as many non-union 
respondents compared to unionised respondents in the survey said they were given an
Paul J Gollan 201
the  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
opportunity to influence management on this issue (20 per cent compared to 11 per cent;
2
X = 7.31; p= 0.007). A significantly higher proportion of non-union respondents 
compared to union respondents indicated they were able to influence management on
2
issues concerning changes to working practices (35 per cent compared to 20 per cent; % 
= 12.97; p= 0.000), although the majority of all employees said they had no opportunity 
to influence such decisions.
More than nine-in-ten employees overall indicated that they had no influence on staffing 
issues, such as recruitment and redundancies, with little difference between unionised 
employees and non-union employees. Again, the majority of all respondents indicated 
that they could not influence management on decisions relating to employee grievances, 
although non-union respondents were slightly more positive with 17 per cent suggesting
they could compared to 13 per cent of union members (although this was not statistically
2
significant; % = 1.91; p= 0.386). Additionally, there was little difference between 
unionised and non-union employees regarding their ability to influence management 
over pay and benefits. This could be important, given that these issues could be seen as 
part of the traditional role of trade unions and may point to unrealised employee 
expectations of the T&GWU on core and substantive issues at Eurotunnel.
Table 7.13 Opportunity to influence management decision-making (percentage)
Issue Personally, do you feel you have an 
opportunity to influence management 
decision-making on? (percentage)
Yes No
Pay and benefits
(X2 = 2.01; /?= 0.156)
Unionised employees 3 97
Non-union employees 6 94
Introduction o f new technology 
(X2 = 7.31;/?= 0.007)
Unionised employees 11 89
Non-union employees 20 80
Changes to working practices 
(X = 12.97; p= 0.000)
Unionised employees 20 80
Non-union employees 35 65
Staffing issues (including 
recruitment & redundancies) 
(y2 = 5.74; p= 0.017)
Unionised employees 3 97
Non-union employees 8 92
Employee grievances
(X =  1.91; /7=  0.386)
Unionised employees 13 87
Non-union employees 17 83
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N =55I)
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Relations between managers and employees
Importantly, the union effect is evident here with union respondents more likely to have 
negative attitudes towards managers. In the second survey, there were significant 
differences between union and non-union respondents. Only 23 per cent of unionists
compared to 38 per cent of non-union respondents viewed relations between managers
2
and employees at Eurotunnel as good or very good (x = 15.07; p= 0.002).
There were significant differences between union and non-union respondents in regard
2
to: managers keeping people up-to-date (x = 8.07; p= 0.045); giving people a chance to
2
comment on workplace and organisational changes (x = 11.79; p= 0.008); responding to
2 2 suggestions (% = 16.90; p= 0.001); dealing with personal problems (% = 18.55; p -
0.000); and treating employees fairly, with non-union respondents significantly more
likely to see managers as good or very good (see Table 7.14). There were also
significant differences regarding perceptions of treating employees fairly. Some 69 per
cent of unionists and 56 per cent of non-union respondents indicated that management
2
were not good at treating employees fairly (x =11.60; p -  0.009).
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Table 7.14 How good are the managers at Eurotunnel? (percentage)
Issue How good are the managers at Eurotunnel at the following: 
(percentage)
Very good Good Not so good Not good at all
Keeping
everybody
up-to-date
about
proposed
workplace &
organisational
changes
(X  = 8.07; p=  
0.045)
Unionised
employees
2 23 55 20
Non-union
employees
5 30 47 18
Providing
everyone with
a chance to
comment on
proposed
workplace &
organisational
changes
(X2 = 11.79 \p=  
0.008)
Unionised
employees
1 15 47 37
Non-union
employees
5 23 44 29
Responding 
to suggestions 
from
employees
(X = 16.90; p= 
0.001)
Unionised
employees
1 13 47 39
Non-union
employees
4 22 49 26
Dealing with 
work
problems you 
or others may 
have
(X2= 18.55;^= 
0.001)
Unionised
employees
2 18 47 32
Non-union
employees
5 31 46 19
Treating
employees
fairly
(X2 = 11 -60; p=
0.009)
Unionised
employees
3 28 34 35
Non-union
employees
7 37 31 25
(Source: 2002 Eurotunnel Consultation, Information and Representation Survey, N=55J)
7.3 Discussion
The research at Eurotunnel provides an opportunity to explore the impact of consultative 
structures on certain processes and to assess employees’ attitudes towards the CC, as
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well as their views on the role a trade union might play, both prior to union recognition 
and in the period following the new arrangements. In particular, this chapter has 
examined the effectiveness of the CC and the T&GWU for Eurotunnel employees in 
terms of management relations, employee participation and the quality of consultation. 
Importantly, the research also addresses the question of whether NER, in the form of the 
CC at Eurotunnel, is a ‘substitute’ for unions, thus suppressing union activity, or is in 
some way a ‘complement’ to unions. It also endeavours to highlight potential limitations 
to such arrangements and to assess the future of employer and union partnership 
arrangements.
Even with the existence of both NER and union arrangements, a significant proportion 
of employees said they were not satisfied with the amount, type and timing of the 
information they received from management. Employees were also less likely to believe 
the information they were given by management, with trade unionists significantly more 
likely to express such views.
In addition, the vast majority of all respondents indicated they had little influence over 
management decisions. Although union respondents were more likely to report that they 
had no or little opportunity to influence management decision-making on any workplace 
issues, the vast majority of all respondents expressed dissatisfaction. The evidence 
would also suggest that despite dissatisfaction with the level of information and 
consultation from management, both the CC and the T&GWU failed to make a 
significant difference to this perception and fill the gap between expectation and 
achievement.
Importantly, on the issue of ‘trusting’ management (ie believing the information they 
were given by management), the findings would seem to indicate that many employees 
did not believe management regarding the information they were given. This may have 
profound implications for management’s ability in implementing further initiatives as 
part of an organisational change agenda.
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Regarding the effectiveness of NER arrangements and union representation, the views of 
survey respondents and employees in interviews would suggest that the CC (before 
recognition) had been essentially ineffective as a vehicle for voice, due to the very 
limited role it played in the decision-making processes. From the author’s observations, 
it would seem that the CC’s prime focus was based on a management agenda to provide 
information on performance or ‘business’ issues (improving quality, productivity, 
customer service and/or sales), to communicate the benefits of change and to persuade 
employees of the need for such change rather than to address employees’ concerns and 
meet their expectations.
This is particularly important given that until union recognition the CC was the sole 
body representing employee interests at Eurotunnel. It could also be argued that, given it 
is supposed to represent employees’ interests, then those interests should be taken into 
account in the management decision-making process. Thus, the CC is not necessarily a 
body to challenge management prerogative or management decisions per se but a means 
to have some input into and influence on outcomes from a process that does not involve 
collective bargaining. Thus, the main issue seems to be a lack of consultation resulting 
in too little CC and employee involvement and influence in the decision-making process.
While it could be argued that the purpose of NER arrangements essentially is not to 
bargain collectively on behalf of employees, at the very least this would suggest that the 
CC at Eurotunnel was ineffective as a vehicle for two-way voice for employee concerns, 
which subsequently led to increased frustration and created an environment for greater 
trade union activity. Significantly, it would seem that an acknowledgement of different 
interests and an ability to have some involvement in the decision-making process was 
important to Eurotunnel employees.
Interestingly, the majority of all employees at Eurotunnel suggested that the CC should 
retain a consultation role even with union recognition. This view gained more support in
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the second survey. However, while over two-thirds of union respondents stated that the 
CC was not effective at representing general employee interests, non-union respondents 
were less likely to hold this view.
In the first survey, there was strong support for a trade union in all sections of 
Eurotunnel with the majority of respondents suggesting that a trade union would 
improve their position over pay and benefits, work conditions, health and safety and 
employee grievances. However, the second survey revealed the lack of progress the 
union had made on these issues with many employees suggesting that the trade union 
had not met their expectations and had failed to address these issues. While employees’ 
expectations of the impact of trade unions may have been somewhat unrealistic, their 
disappointment could nevertheless potentially undermine the impact and legitimacy of 
unions at Eurotunnel and highlights the possible dangers for trade unions in general.
Interestingly, the research findings from the second employee survey after union 
recognition also seem to indicate that while the majority of employees were in favour of 
union recognition at Eurotunnel, they were not yet convinced that union representation 
by the T&GWU alone would achieve greater benefits for employees. Moreover, some 
employees at Eurotunnel remained convinced that the CC should continue to represent 
the workforce, with its role ranging from an information channel on some issues to a 
genuine negotiation body with greater power than existing arrangements on others.
These results would seem to confirm previous research by Millward, Bryson and Forth 
(2000) based on WERS98 that, from an employee viewpoint, the complementary 
presence of a trade union and NER arrangements potentially offers more positive 
outcomes than a single channel form of representation.
Overall, this research highlighted considerable frustration among employees revealing 
two underlying causes of discontent. First, was management’s preoccupation with cost- 
cutting due to share market demands, high continuing debt, pressure on market share and 
the highly centralised nature of the decision-making process, which was incompatible
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with the norms and expectations of the CC developed through the growth phase of 
Eurotunnel’s operations. This resulted in a loss of faith in the CC and a loss of trust in 
management.
The second source of discontent was the incompatibility of an autocratic management 
culture and style within Eurotunnel and the perceived lack of effective voice on the part 
of the CC. These findings would suggest that such perceptions further undermined 
employees’ trust in management. Interestingly, even with higher than expected pay 
rises, unilateral management announcements such as union recognition and the 
partnership agreement with the T&GWU were not considered to be positive gains by 
many employees. Judging from the survey responses and interviews, many employees 
and representatives felt it showed a further erosion of employee voice and influence and 
was often greeted with cynicism.
Significantly, although their expectations were high, employees were not totally 
convinced that unions alone would solve these issues. Only when management was 
perceived as unresponsive did the union become more of a catalyst for collective action. 
Before union recognition, union representation was seen more as a means to protect 
existing wages and conditions in a period of cost-cutting and spending controls. 
However, in many ways it could be argued that the partnership agreement between 
Eurotunnel and the T&GWU protected the status quo rather than extracted improved 
wages and conditions, resulting in dissatisfaction, disenchantment and frustration. This 
was in the context of the recognition of the T&GWU against the wishes of many 
employees, with many unconvinced of the merits of trade union representation alone. 
This resulted in a significant group of employees not becoming members of the 
T&GWU.
Of more concern for the T&GWU at Eurotunnel is the lack of support for the trade 
union regarding its ability to achieve traditional trade union objectives of increases in 
pay, fairness and protection in disciplinary action, making a complaint against
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management, and changes in employees’ immediate workplace -  in fact, many 
respondents felt they were as individuals best able to deal with such issues. This is 
important, given that these issues would be regarded by many as traditional and core 
trade union activities. The risk for the T&GWU is that employees’ perception of a lack 
of effective union voice could potentially impact negatively on the influence that unions 
could have on management decisions and undermine their legitimacy at the workplace. 
These issues could be seen as the challenge for the employer and union partnership at 
Eurotunnel, and more generally for employer and union partnership in the future.
The experience of Eurotunnel would also suggest that some employees are reluctant to 
abandon NER arrangements altogether, providing management with more diverse and 
complex representation arrangements. This could be seen as a failure of management 
and the T&GWU to convince employees of the merits of a single channel of trade union 
representation. For management, this dual representation arrangement could raise 
concerns regarding employees’ acceptance of management decisions and undermine the 
effectiveness of organisational change initiatives due to the increased complexity of 
dealing with a number of representation arrangements. For the T&GWU, failure to 
persuade the majority of employees at Eurotunnel of the merits of unionisation has 
potentially undermined the legitimacy and authority of the union in representing all 
employees at Eurotunnel.
Overall, these results would suggest that employees were satisfied with neither the NER 
nor union voice arrangements. Furthermore, neither arrangement appeared to address 
employees’ expectations in providing effective employee voice. There may be a number 
of reasons for -  and potential implications from -  this important finding. One possible 
explanation could be that the external environment (Eurotunnel’s financial situation, 
cost-cutting, competition etc) has restricted management’s ability to address the 
concerns of employees no matter how capable, motivated or willing management are in 
developing good employee relations. This could be seen as a basic pluralist industrial 
relations critique of human relations that voice lacks effectiveness if the external
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environment is negative. The second explanation is that management lacked the 
capability and experience to address and deal with the complexity of employees’ 
concerns through either the NER or union arrangements. Third, employees had high 
expectations which could not be met under the prevailing financial conditions by either 
the CC or the trade union due to their limited influence over the organisational decision­
making process. And finally, employees’ perception of a lack of independent voice in 
the CC as well as in the T&GWU due to the union-management partnership 
arrangements, and a failure by both to act on employees’ concerns, has further 
undermined the legitimacy, authority and trust in both arrangements.
The Eurotunnel findings are particularly significant given the provisions of the European 
Directive on Information and Consultation (European Parliament and Council, 2002). In 
the context of the UK ICE Regulations based on the European Directive, the potential 
exists for Eurotunnel employees to use the CC arrangement to challenge both 
management’s decision-making authority and the union’s legitimacy in representing 
employees’ interests. While the ICE Regulations encourage a more formalised approach, 
expanding on existing information and consultation rights within enterprises, the 
experiences at Eurotunnel may signal difficulties for unions and employers in satisfying 
the requirements of the legislation.
In particular, it could be argued that while the existing CC satisfies the legal 
requirements and spirit of the ICE Regulations in terms of structure and function, 
T&GWU recognition alone would be unlikely to meet these requirements given that any 
structure must represent all employees at an enterprise on those issues contained in the 
ICE Regulations, rather than representing one section of the workforce. Thus the CC at 
Eurotunnel may provide an alternative employee voice mechanism to union 
representation and potentially challenge union authority, since it is more likely to be in a 
position to satisfy these particular requirements of the ICE Regulations.
Paul J Gollan 210
the  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
An important conclusion from the research is that the Eurotunnel arrangements have 
failed in two major respects. In terms of communication both the union and the CC have 
failed to meet employee expectations, and in terms of providing an effective voice and 
involvement mechanism they have also failed to address issues of concern to employees. 
Perhaps an important conclusion to be drawn from the case study is that constraints such 
as low profits and the trauma of cost-cutting in difficult market conditions can poison 
employer-employee relations. As a result, employees may become more dissatisfied 
with existing representation arrangements and may look for alternatives that will provide 
the strongest possible defence, further undermining consensus-based partnership 
arrangements.
To reinforce this point, it could be argued that one possible reason that employees rate 
the information and consultation functions of both the union and CC so poorly is that the 
information the company is providing is almost uniformly unwelcome (the necessity for 
cost-cutting and restructuring etc). It could be argued that in ‘good times’ when 
economic and market conditions are positive with information provided on large profits 
and consequently prospects of high wage increases, perceptions of information and 
effective voice would rise. This argument is underpinned from research by Taras (2000) 
into Imperial Oil and Kaufman (2003) into Delta Airlines, which posits that NER is 
largely a unitarist and integrative approach and functions less successfully during more 
difficult times when financial outlays are restricted and reduced. Importantly, the 
Kaufman and Taras studies also suggest that NER arrangements only work well when 
distributive issues are taken off the agenda. However, at Eurotunnel it was found that, 
even with union recognition and distributive issues over pay limited to employer and 
union collective bargaining, many non-union employees felt disenfranchised from the 
process.
Paul J  Gollan 211
the  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
CHAPTER EIGHT
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: 
RE-SHAPING WORKPLACE REPRESENTATION
8.1 Introduction
This thesis has examined the development of NER approaches along with management 
strategies towards representation, and the processes at play in situations where firms 
attempt to restructure workplace industrial relations. It has also explored the outcomes 
when managers in organisations working with NER voice arrangements seek to change 
their approach to more traditional collective bargaining through trade union 
representation, and the union responses to such approaches.
As stated in Chapter One, more specifically this research has attempted to address a 
number of research questions:
• First, what are the management strategies towards and objectives of NER 
arrangements?
• Second, are NER arrangements a complement to union representation or do they 
act as a substitute for union-based voice arrangements?
• Third, how effective are NER and union arrangements perceived to be at 
representing the interests of and providing voice for employees?
• Fourth, what are the perceived workplace outcomes of both NER and union- 
based voice arrangements?
• Fifth, what are the union responses and approaches towards NER arrangements?
• Sixth, what are the potential implications for employers, unions and NER-based 
voice arrangements in the future?
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These issues have provided several research outcomes. In particular, these questions 
provided a framework for examining the operation of NER forms in terms of their 
independence, autonomy, resources and capability, and the impact of these on employee 
trust in management, perceptions of their influence and power, and employees’ sense of 
representative legitimacy. These questions have also allowed an analysis of the different 
employment relationships, such as those between employees and management, those 
between employees and their representatives, and those between the representatives and 
senior management.
Importantly, this research has appraised the perceived effectiveness of non-union and 
union representation arrangements and has assessed the satisfaction of employee needs 
by NER voice arrangements and trade unions. The questions also highlight another 
issue: whether NER voice arrangements lead to more positive employee attitudes 
towards management, and more harmonious industrial relations for union and non­
members in terms of organisational commitment, union and NER commitment, job 
satisfaction and the perceived industrial relations climate. These questions also raise the 
issue of the ‘want’ and ‘have’ gap between expectation and satisfaction based on three 
dimensions -  distributive issues, employee advocacy issues and mutual interest issues.
Empirically, the effectiveness of union and non-union voice arrangements in delivering 
benefits for employees has also been examined by using research based on employees’ 
perceptions of management, union and NER representatives. Importantly, voice in this 
research is deemed ‘effective’ for employees when it is associated with more positive 
employee perceptions.
This final chapter highlights the major issues surrounding NER arrangements and the 
implications for public policy. In particular, it explores the impact of consultative 
structures on certain processes and assesses employer strategies and union responses
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towards NER voice arrangements in organisations and the outcomes of such 
arrangements.
8.2 Management strategies towards and objectives of NER
Central to management strategies in the implementation of NER is the rationale for 
establishing such structures, given that managers initiate and are the architects for such 
arrangements. In this study, the case studies highlight six principal reasons why 
employers established NER arrangements. First, they were a means to improve 
information flows and communication between employees and managers in 
organisations. Second, such arrangements were regarded as a ‘safety valve’ especially in 
the absence of an active union presence. Some companies with a long history of formal 
consultation structures (eg John Lewis Partnership and HP Bulmer) see this as a primary 
reason for low levels of industrial conflict. Third, an NER structure may help to 
facilitate the process of organisational and workplace change by enabling management 
and employees to highlight issues of concern at an early stage, thus reducing potential 
conflict at the implementation stage. Fourth, NER could potentially increase 
organisational performance in terms of productivity and quality by providing a forum for 
new ideas and employee input, thus increasing employees’ understanding of business 
behaviour and producing greater levels of satisfaction and commitment. Fifth, an 
important reason has been management’s response to legislative initiatives over trade 
union recognition and information and consultation arrangements. Finally, NER 
arrangements may be used as an alternative for negotiations in situations where there is
little active union or collective bargaining or as an attempt to undermine the union’s
• * 80 position .
From the cases in this study, it could be argued that the objectives stated by these 
organisations for establishing NER structures reinforce Willman, Bryson and Gomez’s 
(2003) thesis, which provides a rationale for an employer’s demand for non-union voice
80 See Table 5.1 for further details.
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in terms of transaction cost economics and the beneficial effects on firm performance. In 
this approach, the decision to make (own voice by establishing NER) or buy (contract 
voice by recognising a union) is based on the type of employees, the amount of 
consultation and bargaining, the level of permanency of the need for voice, and its value 
and effectiveness in providing organisational outcomes.
Importantly, both internal and external conditions influence the decision-making 
process. Changes can be driven by internal influences such as a change in organisational 
culture and the desire to forge a more direct relationship with employees. However, 
external forces, in particular legal developments, and potential outside union 
intervention have also emerged as significant factors in focusing employers’ attention on 
increased employee consultation and involvement.
Internal influences
One of the most important internal influences on the establishment of NER 
arrangements in the cases studied in this thesis was the development of an organisational 
culture. Two organisations (John Lewis and HP Bulmer) have long-established NER 
structures that were created around and aimed at maintaining a strong paternalistic 
approach and consultative culture. Another three organisations (Eurotunnel, Ciba 
Specialty Chemicals and South West Water) had established their existing arrangements 
within the last ten years as a means to develop a new organisational culture. From the 
experiences of John Lewis and HP Bulmer, it could be argued that longer-established 
arrangements are more embedded in the organisational culture, which encourages the 
development of shared values and a participative culture along management lines. This 
can also be facilitated by NER arrangements having responsibility for managing social 
and welfare budgets.
Bacon and Storey (2000: 423) have argued in their review of employer strategies 
towards union and employer partnership, ‘those organisations acting as if they would
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prefer unions to “wither on the vine” discovered that the insecurity felt by employees 
was a potential future problem’. As a means to address this, some organisations in this 
study established a non-union representation structure to fill the void or ‘representation 
gap’ in the absence of unions, and to assist in management initiatives such as 
encouraging organisational change initiatives, and to develop a forum for new ideas and 
improving organisational commitment.
External influences
In this study the legal environment emerges as one of the most significant external 
drivers. Importantly, the staged development of the original Information and 
Consultation Directive leading eventually to the ICE Regulations, and the introduction 
of UK legislation on union recognition (eg the ‘Fairness at Work’ initiatives as part of 
the Employment Relations Act) were catalysts for change in a number of organisations in 
the study.
Interestingly, while HP Bulmers had a long history of paternalistic partnership practices 
dating back to the 1950s, the ‘Fairness at Work’ initiatives under the Employment 
Relations Act legislation provided a further rationale to develop the Employee Council 
as part of the company’s participative culture.
At Panasonic (Matsushita), the Personnel Manager indicated that European legislation 
was one of the main drivers for establishing the PUCC along with other drivers such as 
the adoption of an EWC at the UK European Headquarters and the strong push from 
other European companies in the group to improve communication in non-union areas of 
the company. In addition, it was also suggested that the Japanese parent company 
philosophy based on group decision-making was another influential factor in the process 
to improve communications.
Paul J Gollan 216
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
a n d  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
Importantly, a major factor driving the establishment of the Staff Council at Sainsbury’s 
at the time was the introduction of the European Works Council Directive in September 
1996 and the Directive’s influence on internal collective consultation within European 
companies. As the Manager of HR Policy commented: ‘Synergy did exist between the 
demands of the EWC Directive and the needs of our company’.
The external threat of union intervention was also considered an important influence on 
management strategies towards NER arrangements. For the majority of companies in 
this study, the primary reason for establishing NER arrangements was that it should be 
the sole means of company-based representation without the mediating forces of a ‘third 
party’ to avoid increased trade union presence and to achieve a more direct relationship 
with employees. Taras and Copping (1998) argue that in the absence of a serious union 
threat, management’s preoccupation with NER diminishes. However, when confronted 
by a union threat management awakens to pay greater attention to workplace issues that 
address the needs of employees.
For example, the Director of Human Resources at News International, argued that while 
it could be seen as a union avoidance strategy, ‘We would prefer to keep our dirty 
washing inside rather than going external’. At Panasonic (Matsushita), in addition to the 
legislative developments, the Personnel Manager indicated that there were: ‘some people 
thinking about joining a union because they saw their rights were not being represented, 
and this [PUCC] would discourage them from doing so’.
As noted in Chapter Three, these cases would seem to reflect transaction cost economics 
theory, which states that firms with higher levels of product market or service delivery 
risk are likely to act in a risk-averse manner, based on ‘potential’ threat rather than 
actual cost. Notably for employers, the legislative environment and union strategies 
towards voice arrangements will influence risk-averse activity by firms.
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This would lend support to Flood and Toner’s (1997) research, which suggested that 
non-union arrangements may reduce an adversarial climate associated with unions, and 
enable management to gain greater cooperation from employees in making unpopular 
changes and economies without the threat of industrial action, demarcation or other 
forms of retribution.
8.3 NER arrangements as a complement to or a substitute for union 
based voice arrangements
A central theme in this study has been whether NER forms may approximate ‘voice’ as 
identified by traditional union structures. An essential part of the debate centres on 
whether NER forms make trade unions unnecessary by acting as a ‘substitute’ or ‘union 
avoidance’ through a single channel of representation, or whether NER forms have a 
different but complementary role to that of unions at the workplace.
In adopting a ‘substitute’ or ‘union avoidance’ strategy employers may take two options. 
First, they may exclude a union by establishing a single channel NER structure to take 
the union’s place in the absence of union presence, thus preventing union activity. 
Second, they may establish NER arrangements to act as a dual channel of representation 
as a means to transform the employment relationship from a traditional adversarial 
approach based on conflictual interest to one of an alignment of interests, undermining 
the very reason for a union thus suppressing union activity.
While employers’ motivations may be driven by the desire to reduce outside trade union 
involvement, the findings in this study suggest that a ‘substitute’ or union avoidance 
strategy as used at Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Eurotunnel, News International 
Newspapers and SWW could have serious limitations and may have the capacity to 
assist unionism.
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This phenomenon was evident at Eurotunnel where the maintenance of NER 
arrangements was very much dependent on the threat of greater unionisation due to the 
presence of Aslef in the train crew section of the workforce. Interviews conducted post­
union recognition would seem to support this argument, with Eurotunnel management 
paying far greater attention to management-employee relations in an attempt to facilitate 
a more positive employment relations climate (for example, the introduction of the new 
team initiative at Eurotunnel). However, Eurotunnel’s union substitution approach failed 
to stop the forces for greater unionisation with the eventual recognition of the T&GWU.
As previously suggested, although expectations were high at Eurotunnel prior to union 
recognition, many non-union employees were not totally convinced that unions alone 
would be desirable. Importantly, these findings indicate that simple single channel 
arrangements either through union recognition or through an NER structure may not be 
possible or, in the view of some, even desirable. Instead implementing a hybrid 
employee representation structure or ‘complement’ structure could allow union 
recognition and potentially enable union members to become employee representatives 
on the NER body. In this study, HP Bulmers and Ciba Specialty Chemicals have 
adopted this approach whereby dual voice channels were established as a means to 
separate collective bargaining issues from more workplace integrative bargaining issues.
On the other hand, based on the experience of Eurotunnel one could argue that the 
failure of management and the T&GWU to convince employees of the merits of a single 
channel of trade union representation not only increased the complexity of dealing with 
a number of representation arrangements, but also that these dual arrangements 
undermined the effectiveness of management decision-making processes and union 
authority.
Firms with little or no union experience may establish NER arrangements as an 
alternative to union-based arrangements. Thus, it is not a question of NER weakening 
unions but whether they prevent unions from developing a strong workplace presence.
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This was the case at Sainsbury’s, John Lewis, Panasonic (Matsushita) and Grosvenor 
Casinos where single channel representation arrangements were established to deal with 
all issues. This non-union (or unitary) model is based on the premise that NER 
arrangements are established to not only prevent the development of an independent 
trade union but to act as a ‘safety valve’ for employee opinion in the absence of union 
activity. The objective of such a model is to be educative by informing employee 
representatives of management activities and to persuade representatives to support 
management decisions and thinking. Importantly, information on both ‘hard’ (business- 
oriented) issues and the ‘soft’ (welfare and social) issues are given to representatives to 
discuss. This is the only representative channel through which employees can voice their 
concerns.
NER structures can either be viewed primarily as communication devices and 
mechanisms for employee involvement or, as discussed previously, as a substitute for 
unions in the collective bargaining process. Drawing on the case study evidence, the 
findings would suggest that NER structures have been essentially ineffective as 
substitutes for union representation, due to the very limited role they play in the 
bargaining and decision-making processes. However, this is not to say they were not 
useful in providing greater access to information and a high level of consultation that
o  1
would not otherwise exist if such structures had not been established .
Overall the evidence presented in these studies questions the legitimacy of NER 
arrangements as true alternatives to unions in effectively representing the interests of 
employees and filling the lack of representation. Moreover, without legislative support 
underpinning such structures combined with a healthy union presence, the effectiveness 
of NER structures to provide voice can be seriously questioned.
81 This point was raised by Haynes (2005) in his review o f NER arrangements in the New Zealand hotel 
industry.
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However, as discussed above while a significant proportion of employees were in favour 
of union recognition at Eurotunnel, News International, and SWW, employees were not 
convinced that union representation alone would achieve greater benefits for employees, 
nor that sole union representation is desirable. Overall the findings would suggest that 
the implications of not recognising the limitations of single channel NER arrangements 
could result in greater union influence on workplace issues and greater employee 
dissatisfaction at the workplace.
These results would reconfirm research by Kim (2004) that NER and unions represent 
different employee interests and that NER aligns employees with management goals. 
Kim’s findings support the ‘separate domain’ perspective with unions and NER voice 
mechanisms satisfying different types of employee needs thus performing different 
functions. In the complementarity/substitution debate, these findings would seem to 
support the complementary perspective with these channels not directly substitutable, 
situated in separated domains and NER arrangements insufficient as a substitute for 
unions due to a lack of influence on primary distributive and employee advocacy issues.
8.4 Perceived effectiveness and outcomes of representative 
arrangements
As mentioned in Chapter Three, this thesis draws a distinction between the concepts of 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘outcomes’. Perceived effectiveness relates to the processes in 
satisfying and furthering employees’ interests, while outcomes are the actual impact of 
representative arrangements.
Perceived effectiveness
While NER structures can be used as mechanisms for more effective means of 
communication and consultation, the evidence from this thesis suggests that their
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effectiveness as bodies representing the interests of employees in filling the 
‘representation gap’ (Freeman and Rogers, 1993; Towers, 1997) is questionable.
The findings from the case studies also suggest that there was widespread dissatisfaction 
with management, especially regarding its unwillingness to involve employees in 
decision-making and the lack of consideration given to employees and concerns, 
highlighting the perceived lack of effective voice in the decision-making processes. 
However, it must be acknowledged that establishing a causal relationship between NER 
arrangements and employment relations can be problematic and open to many influences 
that may impact on such a relationship. Notwithstanding these limitations, it could be 
argued that it is useful to assess the perceptions of the effectiveness of NER 
arrangements, since the viability and continued operation of such arrangements is 
dependent on such assessments.
The Eurotunnel case provided an opportunity to assess the interplay between NER and 
union voice arrangements and perceptions of effectiveness of NER arrangements. The 
case allowed an examination of the impact of consultative structures on certain 
processes as well as an assessment of employees’ attitudes towards the CC and their 
views on the role a trade union might play, both prior to union recognition and in the 
period following the new arrangements. In particular, this research has examined the 
effectiveness of the CC and the trade union in providing a more effective means of 
representation and consultation at Eurotunnel in terms of management relations, 
employee participation and the quality of communication and consultation.
Regarding the effectiveness of NER arrangements, the views of survey respondents and 
employees in interviews would suggest that the previous CC (before recognition) had 
been essentially ineffective as a vehicle for voice, due to the very limited role it played 
in the decision-making processes.
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While it could be argued that the purpose of NER arrangements is not necessarily to 
bargain collectively on behalf of employees, it nevertheless highlights potential risks for 
employers in not recognising these employees’ interests that are different to those of 
management. At the very least, this would suggest that the CC at Eurotunnel was 
ineffective as a vehicle for two-way voice for employee concerns, which subsequently 
lead to increased frustration and created an environment for greater trade union activity. 
Significantly, it would seem that an acknowledgement of different interests and an 
ability to have some involvement in the decision-making process was important to 
Eurotunnel employees.
The other case studies also highlighted important issues regarding the perceived 
effectiveness of NER arrangements from the perspective of management and employee 
representatives. At Sainsbury’s, the Senior Manager for HR Policy indicated that the 
introduction of consultative staff councils had been a positive move. She stated that the 
councils were achieving their objectives of filling a communication gap and reflecting 
the views of employees. In addition, she maintained that the local councils which 
focused on grassroots issues such as store performance and new technology ‘...give us a 
better view about what’s going on and issues are getting put right at a local level’ 
(Interview, 17-11-98).
The Personnel Manager at Panasonic was circumspect regarding the effectiveness of 
their NER arrangements. She thought that since the PUCC had been established, 
feedback from the staff had generally been good. She also believed that the PUCC was 
seen by most employees as a way for them to have a voice and as a means of access to 
senior management. However, she did acknowledge that while the PUCC was ‘fairly 
influential’, ‘it could not be said that it was as effective as a trade union’.
The Union Convenor and Council Representative at HP Bulmer indicated that its 
Council was ‘reasonably effective’ although it could be ‘more effective’. Management 
and representatives both suggested that one of the benefits of the Council process was
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that the Councillors have a direct voice and the ‘ear’ of senior management, including 
members of the Board. They also thought that the Council represented all employees in 
the business (union and non-union), ‘carried less baggage’ than more traditional 
representation and negotiation structures, was less confrontational and acted as a 
‘stabilising influence’ between employees and management creating an interface and 
foundation for the discussion and ownership of key issues.
According to the Employee Council Coordinator at Grosvenor Casinos, an internal 
employee survey indicated that while there was a high degree of awareness of the 
Council’s existence and role, only around half of the respondents indicated that the 
Employee Council was having a positive effect. He also suggested that the relationship 
between management and employees generally had also improved due to greater 
communication through the employee council process. However, it was recognised that 
this relationship still needed improvement. In terms of information flows, he thought 
that the amount of information had greatly improved and that employee influence was 
slowly improving but still very dependent on local line managers, many of whom lacked 
skills in managing change. He also said that while he would describe representatives as 
‘fairly’ influential over management decisions, there were still some issues blocked by 
management at meetings, such as proposals for new shift patterns for London-based staff 
and the request for financial information and performance figures.
From a management perspective, the Head of Personnel for the Pennon Group (part of 
South West Water) thought that its Council was very effective and important for the 
implementation and process of achieving certain outcomes, ‘Compared with the later 
stages with Nalgo (now part of Unison), it is now twice as effective in terms of the kinds 
of issues raised and the approach on both sides, and in terms of the outcomes of those 
discussions. The Staff Council is more open. With Nalgo some information would be 
given to the press for their own purposes’.
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Overall, given the devolution of decision-making in many organisations and the greater 
focus on employee commitment and effective organisational change, these findings are 
of particular interest. They suggest that if employers wish to encourage an alignment of 
interests between employee behaviour and organisational goals, they need to place 
greater emphasis on giving employees a real voice and input into decision-making 
processes.
It would also be misleading to suggest that non-union workplaces are ‘non-represented’, 
and that unionisation is employees’ first exposure to collective representation given the 
variety of non-union forms. However, whether such forms promote employee voice and 
have the legitimacy in the workplace is another question.
Overall the cases highlight a number of issues relating to the effectiveness of NER 
arrangements. First, internal contextual institutional variables within the company (cost- 
cutting and centralisation) can be a pivotal condition. Second, idiosyncrasies of the 
potential bargaining unit (management style mismatch combined with dictatorial 
management culture) can undermine perceptions of NER effectiveness. Third, attributes 
generated by NER structures (legitimacy of elected non-union representatives, level of 
skills due to training, the level of expectations regarding NER arrangements) can impact 
on the perceived effectiveness of NER arrangements and representatives in the decision­
making process.
Outcomes
As mentioned previously, although one of the major reasons for employers to establish 
NER arrangements is a desire to have a more direct relationship with employees without 
the mediating forces of a ‘third party’ through union representation, in a number of cases 
this proved to be unsuccessful. At Eurotunnel, South West Water and to a degree at 
News International, management’s original substitution approach failed to prevent the 
forces for unionisation.
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At Eurotunnel, the CC’s lack of ‘clout’ and impact on vital issues was of concern. The 
employee survey revealed that the CC lacked muscle, that management lacked 
understanding and did not listen to employees, and CC representatives had no or little 
training to negotiate with management.
An important issue to emerge from the Eurotunnel research is that both representative 
voice arrangements at Eurotunnel have failed in two respects. In terms of 
communication, both the union and CC have failed to meet employee expectations, and 
in terms of providing an effective voice and involvement mechanism they have also 
failed to address issues of concern to employees. Perhaps an important conclusion to be 
drawn from the case study is that constraints such as profit pressures and the trauma of 
cost-cutting in difficult market conditions can poison employer-employee relations. As a 
result, employees may become more dissatisfied with existing representation 
arrangements and may look for alternatives that will provide the strongest possible 
defence, further undermining consensus-based partnership arrangements.
To reinforce this point, one possible reason why employees rated the information and 
consultation function of the CC so poorly is that the information the company was 
providing was almost uniformly unwelcome (the necessity for cost-cutting and 
restructuring etc). It could be argued that in ‘good times’, when economic and market 
conditions are positive and information is provided on large profits and subsequent 
prospects of wage increases, perceptions of information and effective voice would rise.
This would support other research by Taras (2000) into Imperial Oil and Kaufman’s 
(2003) research into Delta Airlines, concluding that NER arrangements are largely a 
unitarist and integrative approach and function less successfully during more difficult 
times when financial outlays are restricted and reduced. Importantly, the Kaufman and 
Taras studies also suggest that NER arrangements only work well when distributive 
issues are taken off the agenda, or as Taras and Copping (1998: 41) argue, NER voice
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arrangements are most powerful and effective when there is the 'threat' of unionisation, 
and in the absence of a serious union threat management’s preoccupation with the health 
of such voice arrangements diminish.
At Eurotunnel there was strong support for a greater union presence before union 
recognition with the majority of respondents suggesting that a trade union would 
improve their position over pay and benefits, work conditions, health and safety and 
employee grievances. However, the second survey revealed the lack of progress the 
union had made on these issues with many employees suggesting that the trade union 
had not met their expectations and had failed to address these issues. While employees’ 
expectations of the impact of trade unions may have been high, their disappointment 
could nevertheless potentially undermine the impact and legitimacy of unions at 
Eurotunnel and highlights the possible dangers for trade unions in general.
Interestingly, the research findings from the second employee survey after union 
recognition also seem to indicate that while the majority of employees were in favour of 
union recognition at Eurotunnel, they were not yet convinced that union representation 
by the T&GWU alone would achieve greater benefits for employees. Moreover, some 
employees at Eurotunnel remained convinced that the CC should continue to represent 
the workforce, with its role ranging from an information channel on some issues to a 
genuine negotiation body with greater power than existing arrangements on others.
These results would seem to confirm previous research by Millward, Bryson and Forth 
(2000) based on WERS98 that from an employee viewpoint the complementary 
presence of a trade union and NER arrangements potentially offer more positive 
outcomes than a single channel form of representation.
The research would suggest that it is not the formal existence of NER structures that is 
associated with greater effectiveness and positive performance outcomes. Rather, the 
nature of the relationship, management style and culture, and trust developed in NER 
structures, and the degree to which influence over managerial decisions is ceded through
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such forums, are the most important factors. In particular, the evidence presented in this 
research indicates that employer objectives, aims and approaches towards NER differ in 
many important aspects and that these approaches may have a significant impact on 
employees’ perceptions. This would seem to support Freeman and Lazear’s (1995) 
model on rent distribution, in which the maintenance of NER arrangements is dependent 
on positive outcomes from such arrangements in terms of greater efficiency driven by 
better quality decision-making, or by reducing third party intervention into the decision­
making process which could potentially reduce employer profits due to the redistribution 
of such profits to income.
The research is this thesis also highlights a range of outcomes regarding the potential 
limitations of NER structures raised by both management and employee representatives. 
The two main concerns identified were the lack of interest from employees and the 
availability of information. Other concerns mentioned were: council meetings being too 
bureaucratic and rigid; difficulties in keeping people informed of the latest 
developments; lack of leadership and senior management support; lack of clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities; insufficient training of representatives and provision 
of resources; a perception by employees of a ‘talking shop’ without appropriate 
management actions on issues raised; management setting the items on the agenda; lack 
of muscle on vital issues or as suggested ‘voice without power’; lack of line 
management support; turnover rate of staff in the firm; and the time taken to resolve 
issues raised by employee representatives.
At South West Water, the Personnel and Services Manager felt that the main concern 
was maintaining employees’ interest in the Staff Council. He suggested that many 
employees had little interest in the issues raised at Council meetings and thus pressure 
was placed on representatives to give the views of all workers. Another problem was the 
24-hour operations and the fact that many employees work away from their base for 
much of the time. In such an environment, there can be difficulties in keeping people 
informed of the latest developments. He went on to say that while the Staff Council was
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increasingly successful, it had had little success in the early years for a number of 
reasons including, the lack of leadership and support from higher management, and lack 
of trust among Council representatives based on their experience with previous 
consultative committees and management structures and the previous two-tier committee 
process. This had created a culture which encouraged issues to be handled higher up the 
management structures rather than to be resolved lower down the line, resulting in a lack 
of cleariy defined roles and responsibilities.
A negative outcome from the cases was the limited capacity and resources of 
representatives to participate in the consultation process. For example, the lack of time 
for representatives to conduct council duties was an inhibiting factor at Grosvenor 
Casinos. The Employee Council Co-ordinator thought that the shift arrangements were a 
major concern because they restricted the time available for council business, with few 
people willing to use their limited free time for this. In addition, staff shortages and shift 
arrangements meant that council representatives had little time to prepare for meetings .
At HP Bulmer, a number of concerns were highlighted by the Deputy Chair of the 
Employee Council. First was the perception among Council representatives that 
management sets the agenda (in reality Personnel sets the agenda then asks the Deputy 
Chair for comments). Second, under the profit-sharing scheme large bonuses were paid 
to senior executives, calling the credibility of the Council into question. Third, the 
minutes which were traditionally written by Personnel were too dense. Fourth, there was 
too little training for Council representatives. Fifth, some representatives were reluctant 
to raise issues of concern at Council meetings so that employees’ concerns were not 
addressed. Sixth, the role of the council was not adequately defined, in terms of union 
responsibilities. Finally, many decisions were still perceived to be top-down with
82 As such, only three hours a month per representative were assigned to Council business including 
meetings. According to the Employee Council Co-ordinator, ideally representatives should have at least 
three to four hours to prepare for a meeting (as emphasised in the training programme). In addition, certain 
specific issues may require site representatives to identify problems and come up with solutions, needing 
four to five hours per month to prepare. Moreover, regional and national representatives require far in 
excess o f that.
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management making the decisions and informing the Council for comment only 
afterwards.
In addition, the research highlighted that having established NER structures -  with or 
without a union presence -  to improve employee management relations and produce 
more effective decision-making procedures, managing the complexities of NER 
arrangements proved to be more difficult. The cases in this study would seem to reflect 
other literature that would suggest that NER arrangements work well when the times are 
good, but fail to weather economic storms or downturns when times are bad (Taras and 
Copping, 1998; Terry, 1999).
The results of this study would also suggest that while a dual channel or, in terms of 
transaction cost economics, a ‘hedging’ approach to representation is the highest cost 
option, the model suggests this approach is also associated with the lowest risk, since 
management can direct information and consultation flows either through union or NER 
voice channels depending on the perceived outcomes involved. As can be seen in the 
Eurotunnel, SWW, HP Bulmers and Ciba Specialty Chemicals cases, management often 
‘experimented’ for a period with both existing and newly created channels of 
representation as a means to assess outcomes during the ‘transition’ phase in 
representation arrangements. The experimentation of NER arrangements in these 
organisations highlighted that such a choice is influenced by the level of the perceived 
opportunism from trade union behaviour, thus posing a risk in terms of the redistribution 
of rents (or profits) or the risk associated with inhibiting the flow of production through 
industrial action.
8.5 Union responses and approaches towards NER arrangements
An important theme explored in this research has been union responses and approaches 
towards NER arrangements. Five cases were reviewed as a means to explore union 
responses towards NER. At Eurotunnel (UK) representation arrangements before and
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after union recognition were assessed. Instances of the union working alongside pre­
existing non-union arrangements at HP Bulmers and Ciba Specialty Chemicals were 
reviewed, and increased union influence on the News International NISA and the SWW 
Staff Council was also examined. The research provided an opportunity to review union 
strategies and approaches towards NER and, in particular whether they employed tactics 
of ‘colonisation’ in terms of union members and representatives being activity involved 
in such arrangements, or a ‘marginalisation’ approach where union members and 
representatives actively avoided any involvement in NER arrangements. The research 
would suggest that these strategies are particularly important in organisations that have 
established NER arrangements for the purposes of union avoidance. Equally important 
are employees’ attitudes towards unions and their potential impact in providing the 
conditions for unionisation.
Taras and Copping’s (1998: 36) study of Imperial Oil in Canada suggests that in 
developing a unionisation process model for application in non-union workplaces, it is 
clear that an element of dissatisfaction is a necessary precondition to the unionisation 
process. The findings from the cases presented in this thesis would seem to reinforce this 
view. Importantly, dissatisfaction over certain issues considered by employees as 
important and the notion of ‘trust’ (or lack of) between management and employees 
were even more critical to the unionisation process.
Kim’s (2004) research in Korea suggests that promoting NER may not prevent union 
organising and mobilisation completely, since union and NER channels may satisfy 
different needs and outcomes. Given that many employers have previously pursued NER 
to avoid unionisation, these differences may have significant policy implications83. In 
addition, their research suggests that a lack of enthusiasm among employees for NER 
arrangements may reflect perceptions of employees that representatives in NER voice
83 Alternatively, NER may substitute for unionism if NER voice arrangements are given a negotiating 
function similar to that o f unions to enhance employment conditions.
Paul J Gollan 231
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
an d  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
arrangements are de facto subordinates of employers and thus lack the capacity to 
represent employee interests effectively, providing fertile ground for union mobilisation.
The situation at HP Bulmers would appear to reinforced Kim’s research in that two 
channels (one non-union through the EC and the other union through T&GWU) were 
created as part of a collective response to decision-making. One of the EC aims was to 
be a platform from which to discuss issues which affect all employees and which were 
not subject to negotiation with the union (predominantly collective bargaining over pay 
and basic working conditions).
At Ciba Specialty Chemicals, unions were recognised for bargaining proposes at the 
time of the introduction of the Employment Relations Act. Since then, union members 
gradually ‘colonised’ the pre-existing CC, potentially increasing their decision-making 
presence and the scope of negotiation and consultation. While the union agrees to work 
with the CC to improve two-way communications and understanding of common 
objectives, the union is the sole representative body for collective bargaining. According 
to the union, its aim is to have all CC representatives as union members.
At Eurotunnel, the survey and interview responses would seem to suggest a high degree 
of emotion regarding the conduct and behaviour of management. Interestingly, 
employees were not totally convinced that unions alone would solve these problems. 
Only when management was perceived as unresponsive did the union option become 
more of a catalyst for collective action and an instrument for retribution as seen in 
A slefs industrial action against Eurotunnel management.
Applying the frustration and disenchantment path from Figure 3.3, the peaceful pursuit 
of outcomes through consultation with the employer is first used to resolve issues and 
differences. This period is associated with discussion over possible unionisation and 
time to resolve issues and assess management responses.
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However, level and influence of unionisation may be dependent on the success of union 
strategies towards organising potential members. Terry (2003: 498) has argued, ‘The 
clear lesson ...is that trade unions to retain credibility and legitimacy at all levels, may 
from time to time need to demonstrate their continued capacity for the exercise of 
economic sanctions against employers, in particular with regard to the classic, 
distributional issues of pay and conditions’. He goes on to suggest, ‘...paradoxically 
perhaps, the continued availability of such sanctions is one demonstration of the 
continuing strength of the partnership approach. (Controlled) conflict at the sectional 
level, usually over pay and conditions; cooperation at the workplace is the consistent 
formula; the one reinforcing and complementing the other’.
To reinforce this point, in many ways the partnership agreement at Eurotunnel (UK) 
protected the vagaries of management style rather than extracted increased wages and 
conditions with the subsequent unrealised expectations resulting in dissatisfaction, 
disenchantment and frustration. Employees’ perceptions that they were unable to 
influence management decision-making and the subsequent feelings of powerlessness, 
lack of trust in management and ineffective voice through the CC in the face of cost- 
cutting, changes to working hours practices, shift patterns, pay and benefits, staffing 
issues (including recruitment and redundancies) and level of centralisation of decision­
making were facilitating variables of great importance in the unionisation process. 
Another important element in the unionisation process was that over the years 
perceptions of worker power and influence were developed with elected delegates on the 
CC over-estimating their capacity to halt company level initiatives resulting in 
unrealised expectations on the part of employees.
Other factors highlighted by the other cases in this thesis and the literature would seem 
in the Eurotunnel (UK) case to have had little impact on the process of unionisation. The 
site was relatively remote and, as such, the evidence would suggest that micro-level 
factors such as attitudes towards unions, demographics, and job satisfaction seemed to 
have had little influence.
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Regarding unionisation, the principal inhibiting conditions at Eurotunnel would seem to 
be reluctance among a significant number of employees to not belong to a trade union, 
and a willingness to allow management an opportunity to address issues raised by 
employees. It would seem that from the start of operations at Eurotunnel (UK) many 
employees were willing to allow management time to address these issues until a point 
was reached where a widening of the expectation-achievement gap developed and 
produced negative outcomes. However, while some employees were frustrated with the 
CC, many employees were not persuaded of the merits of trade union representation and 
not yet convinced that union representation alone would achieve greater benefits for 
employees. These views were also evident after union recognition with many employees 
reluctant to join the union and calling on management to give greater powers to the CC 
(especially over collective bargaining). However, the events at Eurotunnel would 
suggest that the triggers for unionisation were stronger than the inhibitors, and some 
employees acted accordingly.
The Eurotunnel experience would also suggest that many employees felt they were as 
individuals best able to deal with certain traditional trade union issues. The risk for the 
T&GWU is that the Eurotunnel employees’ perception of a lack of effective union voice 
could potentially impact negatively on the influence that unions have on management 
decisions and undermine its legitimacy at the workplace. Deakin et aVs. (2002: 349) 
research suggests that effective union voice through employer-union partnership 
arrangements is dependent on its perceived strength and sophistication. However, they 
also caution that the sustainability of partnership arrangements will be dependent on 
how employers and unions manage the ‘exogenous shocks’ in the form of economic 
downturns and changes in systems of employment regulations (Deakin, et al., 2002: 
351).
In addition union approaches in terms of a union’s drive to curb management 
prerogatives may be due to the union’s unwillingness to accommodate changes in
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periods of rapidly changing markets and technologies. It could be argued that when 
firms are in financial difficulty, this inability to adapt to the external environment hurts 
the ‘image’ of unions not only to employers but also current of potential members 
further widening trade union legitimacy and authority at the workplace.
The challenge for the T&GWU at Eurotunnel is that certain achievements under the 
employer-management partnership agreement such as increased trade union membership 
and presence have not been accompanied by more positive attitudes towards trade 
unions by a majority of Eurotunnel employees. In addition, the marginalisation approach 
adopted by the T&GWU towards the CC has resulted in a lack of confidence in the trade 
union among non-union employees. In particular, its ability to achieve traditional trade 
union objectives of increases in pay, fairness and protection in disciplinary action, 
making a complaint against management, and changes in employees’ immediate 
workplace was questioned. In fact, many non-union respondents felt they were as 
individuals best able to deal with such issues. The risk for the T&GWU is that 
employees’ perception of a lack of effective union voice could potentially impact 
negatively on the influence that unions could have on management decisions and 
undermine their legitimacy at the workplace.
These issues could also be seen as the challenge for not only employer and union 
partnership at Eurotunnel, but could more generally have implications for employer and 
union partnership in the future. As Brown (2000) has stated, workplace partnership can 
be said to be a reflection of union weakness and to an extent reflects a decline in 
influence and power. Terry (2003: 498) highlights a degree of caution for trade unions 
under partnerships. In particular, thought should be given to the handling of distributive 
issues within partnership agreements in light of the rhetoric of cooperation and shared 
objectives, which can undermine the degree of union independence and restrict the level 
of force that can be brought to bear on management.
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For unions, while having no guarantee of continuing recognition, maintaining high 
membership density creates an environment of strong union organisation and 
representation at workplace level. This was especially so at News International where 
there was a long history of anti-unionism and little prospect of union recognition by 
management. While no union had been recognised at News International since 1988, an 
important tactic adopted by the unions was a colonisation strategy of NISA through the 
appointment of senior union representatives to NISA, including the Father of the Chapel.
The findings at SWW have also raised a number of important issues in relation to the 
unionisation process. It would seem that an important underlying driver in the 
unionisation process was a change in leadership within both SWW and UNISON that 
created a new environment of trust and mutual respect. In addition, the prospect of 
legislation through the introduction of union recognition legislation as part of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 required a pragmatic response to representation issues. 
Another important driver for union recognition was UNISON’s presence at the 
workplace through representing employees in individual grievances. This activity 
provided a means for union activists to colonise the NER arrangements and campaign 
for union recognition. It also demonstrated to employees the potential advantages of 
union membership.
The experience at SWW has also shown that where unions have been excluded from the 
workplace, maintaining a presence through the representation of individual employee 
interests and through colonisation of NER structures has been shown to pay dividends in 
the long run. An important factor in the re-recognition process was the leadership of the 
UNISON representatives at SWW who actively engaged with senior management to 
restore and rebuild the union-management relationship.
These case studies highlight the importance of union strategies towards NER 
arrangements in achieving union outcomes. Overall, the findings from the cases would 
suggest that the marginalisation over bargaining of the CC as adopted by the T&GWU at
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Eurotunnel may be problematic, given heightened employee expectations. Compared to 
the colonisation responses of the unions towards NISA at News International and at 
SWW, the marginalisation tactic used by the T&GWU would appear to have been an 
inappropriate response to management substitution and union avoidance strategies.
These results would indicate while trade unions may provide greater voice than non­
union arrangements, the strength of union voice is dependent on the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of trade unions in representing employees’ interests at the workplace.
8.6 Influences on employee representation and voice
The case studies have identified three main influences, which together can determine the 
level and perceived effectiveness of representative voice: influence and power, 
independence and autonomy, and trust.
Influence and power
The findings from this thesis highlight that many employees felt their respective 
representation structures lacked the necessary power to effectively represent their 
interests. The implications for organisations of not recognising such limitations is that 
this could result in greater union influence on workplace issues as at News International 
or, as in the case of Eurotunnel and SWW, result in forces for union recognition and 
greater employee dissatisfaction.
While it could be argued that some NER arrangements in this study had some formal 
negotiating responsibilities, in reality NER arrangements had limited power and were 
incapable of addressing managerial prerogative in traditional collective bargaining 
issues, such as wage determination. It could be argued that their limited influence and 
power was caused by a lack of employee mobilisation by representatives and a lack of 
autonomy in terms of resources or rights. As Butler (2005: 284) suggests, NER voice 
arrangements are ‘very much a forum for the communication of management’s
Paul J  Gollan 237
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
interpretation of events, ideology and values -  components of a wider ideological 
armoury’. A major issue identified in the research was the inability of NER 
arrangements to influence the decision-making process through utilisation of resources 
to form a power base.
Butler (2005) goes on to say that, instead of viewing power and independence as 
separate entities, they should be seen as part of a complex web or set of relationships.
As such, the lack of power is in effect caused by the absence of latent power resources 
and the lack of visible mobilising leadership on the part of worker representatives. He 
suggests that leadership behaviour fails to materialise due to the lack of autonomy, 
which allows corporate culture and attitudes to be reinforced and to be instilled into 
worker representatives by the use of ‘mental resources’ (Poole, 1978: 19). This in turn 
reduces and mediates the potential for such leadership to emerge as a means to mobilise 
the workforce and challenge the unitary behaviour of management.
The lack of power and independence of NER arrangements was evident in the cases 
studied in this thesis. One of the early problems for the Staff Council at South West 
Water was that no training was provided for representatives and management denied the 
representatives the facility to hold pre-meetings to discuss the meeting agendas (this was 
later changed). Critically the Staff Council has no direct negotiation or bargaining 
powers. As the Head of Personnel stated, ‘At the end of the day the Chief Executive has 
to make the key decisions. He uses the Staff Council to be better informed to make those 
decisions and to understand the impact of those decisions from the people on the sharp 
end, on the ground that deal with the consequences in getting it wrong’.
While in some cases there are signs of ‘manifest power’, in reality such power is limited. 
At John Lewis Partnership, while all issues including pay and conditions can be 
negotiated and bargained at Central Council, in practice agreement must be obtained 
from senior management before a decision is made. In addition, the Chair can veto
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proposed capital expenditure if he/she regards it as ‘too dangerous’ to the Partnership’s 
business interests.
Power may also be muted by other means. Butler (2005) has suggested that the lack of 
leadership behaviour among worker representatives potentially allows 
‘incorporatisation’ to take place, potentially limiting any effective power. At Eurotunnel, 
management endeavoured to incorporate CC representatives into a corporate culture 
with success defined in terms of company achievement rather than worker gains. This 
was reinforced by strong pressure on CC representatives to recognise the vulnerability of 
Eurotunnel operations, and the emphasis on common interests between workers and 
management in terms of company success. It could be argued that this effectively 
reduced the probability of leadership behaviour on the part of CC representatives.
It could also be argued that this form of incorporation not only exists in the non-union 
sector but also can be found,in union settings, such as the partnership arrangement 
between the T&GWU and Eurotunnel management. However, as Butler (2005: 285) 
suggests, ‘what is distinct about non-union settings is the existence of these structures as 
atomised islets of employee voice’ and rendering them, citing Cressey et a l’s (1985: 72) 
terms, ‘naked and isolated’. For example, the lack of negotiating and bargaining power 
of the Employee Council at Grosvenor Casinos was a major concern. The senior 
Employee Council Co-ordinator suggested that ‘the council has very little influence over 
basic salary’. The PUCC at Panasonic (Matsushita) also has no formal negotiation or 
bargaining powers. As an example, in relation to general pay and conditions of 
employment (including performance appraisal, systems of payment and staff planning) 
and organisational restructuring proposals, the PUCC is informed but has no input 
through negotiation into the final outcome.
As Butler (2005: 285) suggests it would be ‘naive to assume that non-union employers 
will necessarily be willing to cede their traditional prerogative to decide the future 
strategic direction of their businesses, or their right to unilaterally determine key issues’.
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This study has identified ways in which management has sought to either suppress union 
mobilisation or alternatively, through tactics of incorporation, used tools and strategies 
to reduce the likelihood of reigniting a worker power base through independent voice. 
For example, a number of issues were problematic for management at News 
International. While management’s stated aim was a union avoidance strategy which 
sought to expand the ECC into what can be described as an ‘in-house union’, giving the 
newly established NISA bargaining power and rights akin to those of a trade union, 
management failed to stop the forces of unionisation, as could be seen in the election of 
a number of key trade union members to the NISA executive. As Butler (2005: 285) and 
Greenfield and Pleasure (1993: 192) note, mandating employee voice might be one 
thing, but mandating effective employee voice is quite another.
Independence and autonomy
The Eurotunnel CC and the News International ECC/NISA arrangements highlight the 
importance of ‘independence’ in workplace representation. It could be argued that the 
perception of a lack of true independence from management, and the lack of effective 
sanctions such as the ability to use industrial action against management and ‘other 
forms of concerted activity to put muscle behind its collective voice’ (Kaufman and 
Kleiner, 1993) may have further undermined the legitimacy and independence of such 
bodies in the eyes of employees.
For some commentators, independence is critical given that the collective voice of trade 
unions has its origins as a vehicle of protest against injustice, or as some have argued a 
focus on various forms of mobilisation theory (Kelly, 1998). As such, an ability to exert 
influence over terms and conditions of work is dependent on a sense of collective 
capacity and identity (Hyman, 2001). Kelly (1996) argues that cooperation at workplace 
level may lead representatives (including union members) to identify their interests ever 
more closely with those of their employers, and as such underline the fear that such non-
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union structures may provide employees with ‘voice’, but on the employer’s terms 
(Kelly, 1996).
Such concerns over independence were highlighted by the CO’s refusal to recognise the 
NISA as an independent trade union, especially regarding NISA’s history, lack of 
voluntary membership, its structure and its dependence on management for financial 
resources. The CO’s reasons for refusing the status of independence flags up an 
important issue in employee representation.
A quote from the NUJ encapsulates this point: ‘Rupert Murdoch’s shenanigans are 
famously devious and he has a team of tough managers to carry them out. They appear 
to be insensitive to the obvious paradox of this one: that they are making the NISA 
“independent” while constantly warning of the dangers of independent unions to News 
International’s prosperity. That is the proof that it is not, because if it really was they 
couldn’t allow it’ (.Journalist, November, 2000: 15).
The findings at Eurotunnel would also suggest that there was a perception of a lack of 
independent voice by employees that undermined the legitimacy, authority and trust in 
both management and the CC. This was reinforced by one survey respondent who stated, 
‘The CC has failed to deliver independent and worker orientated programmes and 
policies. This organisation must have information and not a consultation role due to an 
obvious lack of objectivity and independence. We must have a structure free from 
management influence and career orientated representatives. The CC has lost its 
credibility, influence and focus and must be replaced by new structures (trade unions, 
independent focus groups etc)’.
As a consequence, while the ICE Regulations might provide a level of independence or 
‘institutional distance’ due to the access to legislative protections and to a degree of 
autonomy, it could be argued that the potential for effective influence and power for 
NER voice arrangements under such a unitary context is questionable.
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Trust
The evidence presented in this research would suggest that the level of trust within 
organisations is an important factor in the success and effectiveness of representation 
structures. While trust has not been a central theme in this thesis, it nevertheless has 
been an important influence on the effectiveness and outcomes of NER arrangements.
Trust has been defined as ‘a belief comprising the deliberate intention to render oneself 
vulnerable to another based on confident positive expectations’ (Dietz, 2004: 6) (also see 
Lewicki et a l, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998). The issue of trust has been raised by 
Beaumont and Hunter (2005: 36) in their research into the processes of workplace 
representation and consultation arrangements. They suggest that the term trust ‘is all too 
often used in a rather vague and general way’. In particular, they argue that too little 
attention has been paid to the focus of the trust relationship in terms of the trust between 
whom, and identification of the key determinants of trust, and the extent to which trust 
exists with representatives directly involved in the consultation processes.
Beaumont and Hunter’s (2005: 37) research in the UK highlights three overlapping but 
distinct influences on and drivers of the trust relationship, which highlight the ‘fragile 
nature of the joint consultation process’ by being ‘shaped or disrupted at levels beyond 
the reach of the consulters’. These three influences include:
• The nature of the broader, historical relationship between employees (as 
individuals or collectively through unions and/or NER forms) and management 
(what they term ‘historical baggage’), in particular how ‘contemporary 
perceptions and expectations will be strongly shaped by historical experience’.
• The degree of shared expectations and understanding between the employees 
(including NER and union structures) and management representatives across the 
table (‘the ground rules’) ‘about how the process will, and should be, conducted’.
Paul J  Gollan 242
the  London School of E c o n o m ic !
and  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
• The degree of confidence employee representatives have in organisational 
strategies, especially in the context of complex environmental and market 
changes.
On the other hand, Beaumont and Hunter (2005: 38) state that reputations from 
historical experience along with interpersonal experience over time are an important 
input into the level of trust between employees and management. They cite Lewicki and 
Wiethoff (2000) to suggest that creating trust in a relationship is, ‘initially a matter of 
building calculus-based trust (ensuring consistency of behaviour, with people doing 
what they say they will), and second, ‘moving on to build up identification-based trust 
where there is an increasingly shared identification with the “other side’s” aims and 
objectives’ (Beaumont and Hunter, 2005: 38).
From the cases presented in this research, the loss of trust can have a substantial impact 
on the perceived effectiveness of subsequent representative structures. Notwithstanding 
the change of climate in industrial relations policy and practice, there are clearly a 
number of lessons that can be learnt from the SWW experience over the last decade. The 
evidence indicates that adopting a strategy of substituting unions at the workplace by 
individualising the employment relationship and derecognising the union in a period of 
large-scale redundancies will not produce positive industrial relations outcomes. The 
loss of trust associated with these policies takes considerable time to rebuild. An 
important factor in the re-recognition was the leadership of the UNISON representatives 
at SWW. Management suggested that the personality of the full-time officer was 
extremely important, especially a person that the company can trust.
As the SWW experience indicates, representative structures within firms need to have 
the full support of the majority of employees and be seen as organic to the workplace 
rather than as an imposed arrangement by management. Without such a bottom-up
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approach, the legitimacy and respect for such arrangements will diminish, creating 
obstacles for developing meaningful dialogue and trust between management, staff and 
unions. This was evident from the difficulty in finding sufficient employee 
representatives on the SC due to perceptions of a lack of independence, voice and 
ownership of the process. At SWW dissatisfaction over issues of importance to 
employees and the lack of trust between management and employees appear to have 
created a fertile environment for unionisation.
As Beaumont and Hunter (2005) suggest, trust is a function of individuals that deal 
across the table, is inherently fragile in nature and is often shaped or disrupted at levels 
beyond the control of the consulters, potentially damaging the shared expectations and 
understandings between employees and management. Findings from the employee 
surveys at Eurotunnel would indicate that the issue of trust was an important driver and 
factor in the process of unionisation at Eurotunnel.
More specifically, at Eurotunnel the management response to employees’ views was 
union recognition and the establishment of a partnership agreement between Eurotunnel 
and the T&GWU. However, despite this the move to union recognition did not alleviate 
considerable frustration among employees. In particular, there were two underlying 
sources of discontent. First, management preoccupation with cost-cutting due to share 
market demands, high continuing debt, pressure on market share and the highly 
centralised nature of the decision-making process was incompatible with the norms and 
expectations developed through the growth phase of Eurotunnel’s operations. This 
resulted in a loss of faith in the CC and the T&GWU, and a loss of trust in management.
The second cause of discontent was the incompatibility of an autocratic management 
culture and style within Eurotunnel and the perceived lack of effective voice. These 
findings would suggest that such perceptions further undermined employees’ trust in 
management. Interestingly, unilateral management announcements such as union 
recognition and the partnership agreement with the T&GWU were not considered to be
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positive employee gains by many employees. Judging from the survey responses, many 
employees and representatives felt it showed a further erosion of employee voice and 
influence, and was often greeted with cynicism.
Maintaining trust was also important in those organisations with a long-established 
union presence. Given the long standing union recognition at HP Bulmers, it was 
interesting that the T&GWU Convenor at the Bulmers site suggested that the partnership 
deal was based on: Trust -  You can take them to the brink but don’t shove them over. 
When you have to take industrial action, you have failed’ (Interview, 29-07-99).
Management scepticism of unions at Grosvenor Casinos was also significant. According 
to the Employee Council Co-ordinator, ‘Management wanted a body that knew about the 
business and that they could trust rather than a third body, which could have its own 
agenda’ (Interview, 13-05-99).
8.7 Research limitations and strengths
Limitations
The strategy applied in this thesis has certain limitations, which should be 
acknowledged. Firstly, while the case study method can provide richness and details of 
processes and outcomes within a particular enterprise, generalising to other non-union 
workplaces and firms can be problematic for a number of reasons.
Dietz (2004: 11) has noted, ‘familiar problems surrounding subjectivity with the key 
players’ testimonies especially, of interviewees projecting their experiences on to the 
organisation as a whole, and post hoc reflections being subject to error and bias 
especially those that present the interviewee in a favourable light’. While acknowledging 
the potential limitations of the method, this research has attempted to triangulate the data 
from various sources and to ‘corroborate testimonies’ from different actors within key
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events. In addition, where possible minutes from CC meetings and company documents 
were used to reconfirm events and issues highlighted in testimonies and stated as fact. 
However, as with all case study research, the findings and analysis based on interview 
data should be seen ‘as extrapolated inferences based on carefully corroborated 
testimonies, rather than “facts” as such’ (Dietz, 2004: 11).
Second, this thesis has not directed attention to the relationship between direct and 
representative forms of employee participation, thus potentially overstating or 
understating the influences and processes this interaction may involve.
Third at Eurotunnel, while an acceptable response rate of 40 per cent was achieved in 
the second Eurotunnel survey, the validity of the first Eurotunnel survey due to its 
relatively lower response rate could be questioned. This potentially could undermine 
claims to the representativeness of the sample. To counter this, comparisons were made 
with internal company-based survey results, and findings were reinforced by focus 
groups and interview data to reduce the non-response bias in the data analysis.
Strengths
Methodologically, the research strategy employed in this thesis has a number of unique 
strengths. First, the use of both qualitative (interviews and focus groups) and 
quantitative methods (employee questionnaires) in the case study approach have 
produced rich and detailed information on the processes and outcomes of representative 
arrangements. Second, in three cases (Eurotunnel, SWW and News International) 
internal validity was underpinned by highlighting trends and building an explanation 
through a time series longitudinal analysis. In the Eurotunnel case, in addition to 
interviews and focus groups two questionnaires were administered before union 
recognition and after union recognition (full details in Chapter Four). Importantly, this 
approach assessed how attitudes, expectations and intentions of employees had changed 
over this time period. Overall, the multi-variant nature of the research and the
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longitudinal perspective allowed an assessment not only of the management strategies 
and union approaches to NER, but also provided a unique opportunity to explore the 
relationship and interplay between NER and union-based voice arrangements.
Conceptually, this research adds to existing literature by shedding light on the processes 
and interplay between union and non-union representation channels of voice.
Importantly the findings would suggest that workplace representation is more than a 
simple polarised extreme of union and non-union channels, and should be seen more as a 
mosaic of substance and processes which are influenced by a changing organisational 
and institutional context.
The research has also highlighted the limitations for unions in adopting a 
marginalisation strategy towards existing NER arrangements as a means to consolidate 
its presence through increased membership. For example, the Eurotunnel case 
demonstrates that such a strategy poses serious challenges to a union’s influence and 
effectiveness in satisfying employee expectations over time. In contrast, the experiences 
at SWW and News International have also shown that where unions have been excluded 
from the workplace, maintaining a presence through the representation of individual 
employee interests (union and non-union) through the colonisation of NER structures 
has provided the seeds of union activity and increased union membership.
8.8 The future of workplace representation under the ICE 
Regulations
In assessing the future of workplace representation in the UK, a discussion of the 
implications of the introduction of the ICE Regulations is required. It has been argued 
that the ICE Regulations are likely to lead to a proliferation of employee representation 
structures for different purposes. Bercusson (2002: 234) further states, 'From a tradition 
of single channel employee representation, British labour law moving in the opposite 
direction from the American "trade union representational monopoly" has skipped over
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continental dual channel systems into multi-channel employee representation systems’. 
He goes on to suggest that while the Directive requires European Member States to 
implement regulations that will require the establishment of new organs of worker 
representation in those enterprises that are covered by the ICE Regulations and 
supported by employees, it also raises the question of the criteria for determining who 
the workers representatives are, and who can establish and participate in these bodies. 
Bercusson (2002: 234) also questions whether UK industrial relations is best served 'by 
further multiplying the channels of employee representation with different functions'.
Butler’s (2005) research in the UK examined the utility of NER with findings broadly 
supporting the existing literature in exposing key deficiencies with respect to this mode 
of voice, namely power and autonomy. He suggests that these findings potentially have 
important policy implications for the ICE Regulations based on the Information and 
Consultation Directive, invoking a formal element of ‘institutional distance’ (Butler, 
2005). He argues that set within an often pervasive unitary culture, the potential for truly 
independent scrutiny must be severely diminished and states that on the basis of the 
findings there remains cause for circumspection with regard to the health and long-term 
prognosis surrounding the machinery of non-union consultation.
Some commentators have suggested that the effectiveness of the Directive is 
questionable given the UK Government's less than enthusiastic response to and support 
for the original proposal in November 1998. The UK Government has persisted in its 
reservations by blocking and weakening the Directive during its drafting. It is argued 
that this has resulted in a watered down and potentially ineffective piece of legislation. 
Bercusson (2002: 237) argues,'... The Blair Government's trench warfare had been 
successful in gutting much of what was innovative in the proposal'. This point was 
reinforced by Scott (2002) when he suggested, 'the ferocity with which the UK 
Government represented employers in the four-year negotiation process ... indicates a 
special, systemic fear amongst UK employers'... with significant material and symbolic 
investment in UK's low cost industrial relations regime'. As such, Bercusson suggests
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that the UK will continue along the path of what he has termed ‘British industrial 
relations exceptionalism’ in the European Union (Bercusson, 2002: 209).
While some may accept the view that a ‘seismic’ improvement in employee voice may 
result from the ICE Regulations, it is unlikely to increase employee voice substantially 
in many workplaces. It could be argued that the Directive could easily result in ‘weak’ 
employer-dominated partnerships and non-union firms using direct communications and
O A
information (allowable under the UK ICE Regulations ), while marginalising collective 
consultation. Managers may provide information and insist on employee involvement 
but employees have no guarantee of effective consultation in return.
It could also be argued that if the ICE Regulations are regarded by employers as purely a 
vehicle for communication and information, employees may perceive such arrangements 
as failing to address their concerns and interests and therefore as impotent and 
ineffective. Therefore, by implication the ICE Regulations could in this scenario be 
regarded by employees as accomplishing very little in terms of true consultation and 
thus fail in the Information and Consultation Directive’s objective of ensuring ‘effective 
and balanced involvement of employees’ and providing ‘an essential step in completing 
the EU social dimension and in achieving the creation of an adaptable, high-skilled and 
motivated workforce’ (European Commission, 1998).
Notwithstanding these concerns and reservations, the ICE Regulations will require more 
extensive voice arrangements for employees if the establishment is covered by the 
legislation, and either entered into through a voluntary arrangement with employees, or 
is triggered by the workforce. Thus it is important that an assessment is made of the 
appropriateness of the existing NER and union arrangements in organisations in order to 
satisfy these requirements.
84 However it could be argued that this could contravene the requirements o f the Information and 
Consultation Directive and may be subject to a European Court o f Justice challenge in the future).
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Other commentators are more optimistic about achieving the objectives of the European 
Directive by suggesting that the European Union concept of social dialogue through 
partnership between employers and representative voice arrangements based on more 
‘enlightened’ consensual relations, and cooperation between unions and NER 
arrangements, is not new in the UK, and draws from a long history of modernisation in 
British industrial relations (Coupar and Stevens, 1998; Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2002; 
Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005).
The evidence from this research suggests that without external support, NER structures 
are limited in their capacity and have limited resources to fully mobilise an independent 
power base, further encouraging management accommodation. This insular approach is 
reinforced by few external resources and little assistance in terms of expertise, 
experience, advice and guidance. In this respect, the Information and Consultation 
Directive and the UK ICE Regulations will be fundamental in providing the means to 
influence management decision-making processes. These will grant universalistic 
information and consultation rights over a range of workplace and firm issues not 
previously given in the UK voluntarist context. While some have suggested that this 
may provide an opportunity for greater trade union involvement in the non-union sector, 
this research has raised a number of issues for trade unions in achieving that endeavour.
Implications fo r unions
The ICE Regulations presents some significant implications for unions. As Terry (2003) 
has argued, traditionally unions have bargained over the restricted issues of pay and 
conditions, where the essential union demand was uncomplicated, thus the interests of 
the membership were relatively easy to define. The issue under partnership 
arrangements seems less clear, with employee interests becoming more broadly defined, 
as can be seen by the importance of Eurotunnel employees’ attachment to more micro­
issues such as working practices, promotion ladders, shift patterns, and work and life 
balance. Thus for unions, without considerable additional resources it is very ‘difficult to
Paul J  Gollan 250
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
see how “consultative” workplace unionism along these lines could be anything more 
than an acceptance of management proposals’ (Terry, 2003: 494). In addition, the ICE 
Regulations do not provide any automatic participatory rights to union representatives 
who must stand for election alongside other non-union representatives. Potentially such 
arrangements may operate with, against, or in the absence of union structures, 
threatening the traditional role of unions in collective bargaining.
It is said that this weakening of the Directive could significantly reduce its impact in the 
majority of UK workplaces. Scott argues that it may turn out to be a strategic plan, 
whereby UK unions could find a non-union system of employee representation 
embedded by clever employers who have learnt a lot in recent years about industrial 
relations without unions. He argues that ‘after many valuable years of fairly 
straightforward gains from EU social legislation, despite the loss of closed shops and 
sometimes exhausting legal battles, it now looks as though UK unions have reached a 
difficult set of crossroads ' (Scott, 2002: 1).
Scott (2002: 2) concludes that, 'the UK could find itself in a few years without either 
much in the way of trade union progress on consultation rights, or anything in the way of 
employee representation that would be recognised as such in mainland Europe. In short, 
the wide corridors of interpretation and the specific structuring of the Directive may 
leave the UK with the worst of both worlds, neither decent works councils, nor 
strengthened unions.' While this is arguably an overly pessimistic view, nevertheless the 
Directive does pose a number of challenges for representation in the UK.
The Eurotunnel findings are particularly significant given the introduction of the ICE 
Regulations. In the context of these ICE Regulations, the potential exists for Eurotunnel 
employees to use the CC arrangement to challenge both management’s decision-making 
authority and the union’s legitimacy in representing employees’ interests. While the ICE 
Regulations encourage a more formalised approach, expanding on existing information
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and consultation rights within enterprises, the experiences at Eurotunnel may signal 
difficulties for unions and employers in satisfying the requirements of the legislation.
In particular, it could be argued that while the existing CC satisfies the legal 
requirements and spirit of the ICE Regulations in terms of structure and function, 
T&GWU recognition alone would be unlikely to meet these requirements given that any 
structure must represent all employees at an enterprise on those issues contained in the 
information and consultation regulations, rather than representing one section of the 
workforce. Thus the CC at Eurotunnel could conceivably constitute an alternative 
employee voice to union representation and could potentially legally challenge union 
authority, since it is more likely to be in a position to satisfy these particular 
requirements of the Information and Consultation regulations.
The Eurotunnel experience suggests that any representative structures within firms need 
to have full support of the majority of employees and been seen as organic to the 
workplace rather than an imposed recognition and partnership arrangement between 
management and a trade union. Hyman (2003) argues, ‘Partnership, the evidence 
suggests, may be the framework for a two-level management game, involving a 
sweetheart deal with a favoured union, together with some form of manipulative 
“employee involvement” with the workforce’. He goes to suggest that ‘if partnership is 
understood as replacing negotiation pressure by consultation and consensus, the result 
may be not a recovery but a further decline in trade union capacity. Ironically, this may 
make unions increasingly unattractive as partners for management’ (Hyman, 2003). As 
the Eurotunnel case suggests, without a bottom-up approach, the legitimacy and respect 
for such arrangements could diminish, creating obstacles for developing meaningful 
dialogue and trust between management, staff and unions.
In light of the introduction of the ICE Regulations, Sarah Veale (Veale, 2005), Head of 
Equality and Employee Rights at the Trade Union Congress, indicated at the 2005 
‘Voice and Value’ conference that representatives for workplace information and
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consultation arrangements were likely to want to start putting items on meeting agendas 
that might in the past have been regarded as a collective grievance and, while these 
issues were distinct from collective bargaining, they could well be morphed into it by 
using systems that are in place. She indicated that from a pragmatic viewpoint this 
presented opportunities and could offer unions ‘a chance to be influential in newer 
workplaces’ with collective bargaining as an ideal for the future, ‘but in reality 
information and consultation arrangements may be as good as it gets’.
8.9 Reshaping workplace representation
While the cases in this research are not representative of all firms, they do highlight 
some critical issues for employers, unions and government policy regarding the 
structures needed for effective workplace consultation and representation. The evidence 
would suggest that there were two main drivers for the development of more effective 
voice arrangements -  regulatory change regarding representation and consultation 
arrangements and employee pressure for greater voice. However, the evidence presented 
in this research questions the legitimacy of NER arrangements as true alternatives to 
unions in effectively representing the interests of employees. Three important conditions 
can be identified that have influenced the effectiveness of the voice arrangements -  
managerial attitudes, employee expectations and wider business pressures.
Significantly, the research in this thesis highlights the potential limitations and dangers 
for employers and unions of not addressing the needs and expectations of workers.
Given the devolution of decision-making in many organisations and the greater focus on 
employee commitment and effective organisational change, these findings are of 
particular interest.
As outlined in Chapter Three and drawing on the framework in Figure 3.3, this thesis 
has also explored and highlighted influences on the interplay between NER and union 
voice arrangements. In particular, this framework outlines a number of processes that are
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involved in the mobilisation of union representation and its interaction with employer 
strategies, and the interplay with NER voice arrangements. It starts from the premise that 
certain internal and external contextual variables create an expectation and 
achievement/satisfaction gap, which management tries to fill by creating a voice 
arrangement, either through a single representation channel by buying in a union or by 
making a non-union voice mechanism.
It is suggested that when employer initiated voice arrangements are established they 
create certain employee expectations about outcomes. If these expectations are not 
realised, a widening of the gap between expectation and achievement leads to greater 
frustration, lack of trust and disenchantment in management leading to instrumental 
collectivism. This could manifest itself in either the peaceful pursuit of desired outcomes 
through mutual gains in the form of union recognition by the employer and/or employer- 
employee partnership, or through union readiness for action against an employer based 
on a conflict of interests and a ‘win’ or ‘lose’ strategy. This will be mediated by union 
responses, in particular union strategies to colonise or to marginalise NER voice 
arrangements.
As a result of these strategies, certain conditions and influences may impact on the type 
and level of interplay between union and NER arrangements. As a consequence, this 
interplay may lead to particular partnership and collective bargaining outcomes 
influencing employee responses and perceptions, and in so doing have implications for 
unions, the employer and NER arrangements.
Importantly, the findings in this thesis could have implications for employers, unions 
and government policy regarding the structures specified in the new European Directive 
on information and consultation for providing effective consultation and representation, 
and in satisfying the requirements under the Directive and the UK ICE regulations. It is 
suggested that if employers wish to encourage an alignment of interests between 
employees and organisational goals, they need to place greater emphasis on giving
Paul J Gollan 254
the  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
employees a greater say in the decision-making process and some influence over 
workplace issues, address the expectations of employees, and acknowledge their 
differing interests.
If British unions are to be stakeholders in and not supplanted by other information and 
consultation arrangements established under the ICE Regulations, they will need to 
demonstrate that they are representative conduits of the views of ordinary members. 
Importantly this will depend on their ability to maintain accountability of union 
representatives and officers to the union membership thus reinforcing the linkage 
between democracy and participation. (Flynn et al., 2004).
Flynn et a l (2004) argue that a key to such participation will be an active involvement 
of employees in democratic decision-making in order to articulate their views. Flynn et 
a l (2004) also highlight the need for leadership to effectively channel and inform such 
views for effective impact. However, it could be argued that even after union recognition 
at Eurotunnel the T&GWU failed to achieve significantly higher levels of support, with 
the partnership arrangement restricting the union’s ability to either gain significant wage 
rises or increase their influence on the decision-making processes at Eurotunnel.
Another explanation for the perceived impotence of the T&GWU may lie in 
Eurotunnel’s long-term management strategy. By recognising the trade union it showed 
the workforce its willingness to accept an independent form of employee representation. 
However, given its lack of support for the trade union by ignoring employee and union 
demands for higher pay and greater input into the decision-making process, it could be 
argued that management have effectively undermined the T&GWU’s effectiveness and 
position at Eurotunnel, resulting in lower than expected membership and reduced 
authority.
While it could be argued that the threat of other unions, such as Aslef, rekindling 
activism at Eurotunnel could be a possibility, this could be mitigated by the apparent
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loss of support for trade unions more generally among employees, and the financial 
predicament of Eurotunnel, which provided little prospect of increased wages and 
improved conditions. Thus, in light of the requirement under the ICE Regulations that a 
representative body cover all employees (union and non-union) in workplaces covered 
by the union, a lack of trade union presence and authority could provide management 
with an opportunity to further undermine the T&GWU’s powerbase resulting in 
potential derecognition. This would leave a single dependent CC structure with little 
effective consultation or bargaining power. This scenario could potentially present 
serious challenges for trade unions in general.
The findings also highlight that unions not only have to fear employer hostility but also 
employee apathy and questions concerning union efficacy at workplace level. While 
management may support and sponsor the union arrangements to bolster partnership, if 
employee support is not forthcoming and ebbs away, substitution by an NER voice 
arrangement could be seen as a legitimate alternative strategy.
However, as the Eurotunnel case has demonstrated, while management may go to 
considerable lengths to keep independent union voice out of the workplace, the case also 
raises important issues of the risk for employers in such a strategy and the potential 
negative impact and unproductive consequences that may result. Likewise for trade 
unions in partnership arrangements similar to those at Eurotunnel, the language and 
rhetoric of partnership emphasise consensual business-driven outcomes, but whether 
such arrangements are compatible with the longer-term dynamic of collective bargaining 
and pay determination is questionable.
While such partnership arrangements are often based on complex pay formulae linked to 
productivity and inflation indices, in the absence of traditional conflictual behaviour 
within a largely unitarist arrangement, the success of such arrangements is yet to be 
seen. It could be argued that a necessary condition of effective partnership is the overt 
expression of disagreement, ‘reinforcing the legitimacy and credibility of unions as
Paul J  Gollan 256
the  London School of E c o n o m ic s
and  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
independent bearers of employee interest. Supine trade unions serve neither the interest 
of their members nor ironically, of employers’ (Terry, 2003: 500). As Martin et a l 
(2003: 610) have suggested ‘there is a danger for unions following and promoting 
partnership strategies ... [they] risk endangering their independence and alienating 
sections of the membership who have joined them to provide representation and 
opposition rather than because they were a business partner’.
While the current UK ICE Regulations may also provide the possibility of more 
individualist arrangements, the underlying objective of the European Information and 
Consultation Directive is to broadly provide enhanced employee rights and increase 
employee involvement over a range of enterprise issues. As such, this may provide the 
necessary framework to sustain collectivist representation arrangements in the future. 
This would support Appelbaum and Batt (1994) institutional theory approach. The cases 
explored in this thesis highlight the importance of the legislative underpinning of NER 
arrangements and help explain the trigger of events leading to representative 
adaptations.
In a climate of falling union density, to suggest that there will be an inexorable shift 
away from more collectivist employee relations would be to underestimate the 
complexity of the world of work. The cases presented in this research would lend 
support to the argument that there is an important and enduring role for effective and 
independent collective representation at the workplace.
Importantly the research suggests that the old dichotomy of a union versus non-union 
channels of voice is likely to prove inadequate in shaping future representation 
arrangements. Instead the focus could be more fruitfully directed towards the quality of 
employee representation and resultant climate of employment relations, manifested in a
o c
mosaic of substance and process . Embracing this alternative orientation has important
851 would like to thank Professor David Marsden for this point.
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consequences for management strategies and union responses to NER voice 
arrangements.
In summary, the evidence demonstrates that only by establishing mechanisms that 
enable employees to have legitimate voice and allow differences to emerge will 
managers be able to channel such differences into more productive outcomes. Pivotal to 
this is the effectiveness and power of NER and union arrangements. Processes that 
underpin the representation of employees’ interests and rights are at the core of 
effectiveness of such bodies. Voice, the right to be heard and having influence over 
workplace issues and at times an acknowledgement of differing interests may be 
essential conditions for a more effective decision-making process. The findings in this 
thesis would suggest that incorporating a degree of collective bargaining as a 
complement to or as part of an NER process could provide more productive outcomes 
for employers and more just outcomes for employees.
The findings from the research in this thesis and the future legislative requirements on 
information and consultation indicate that the existence of a mechanism -  union or non­
union -  for communication or consultation between management and employees at the 
workplace may not be a sufficient condition for representation of employee interests. 
This study highlights the importance of the interplay between NER and union voice 
arrangements for effective employee voice over workplace issues. This understanding of 
the interplay between non-union and union representative voice arrangements may be 
essential for achieving and maintaining employee satisfaction. Finally, while trade 
unions may provide greater voice than non-union arrangements (thus the reluctance of 
management to provide such voice arrangements), the strength of voice is dependent on 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of trade unions in representing employees’ interests at 
the workplace. And that in turn depends on the union being perceived by the workforce 
as both representative and able to act effectively. If the union cannot achieve these, it 
will not meet the needs of either employees or management -  and in the UK could run 
the risk of being supplanted under the provisions of the ICE Regulations.
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Sainsbury’s - Carolyn Gray (Senior Manager for HR Policy) 15-10-98 
Sainsbury’s -  Sarah Dormer (HR Policy Manager) 17-11-98
John Lewis Partnership - Ken Temble (Chief Registrar -  Responsible for HR) 12-11-98 
HP Bulmer Limited - Bob Hardwick (T&GWU Convenor and Employee Councillor) 29- 
07-99
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Grosvenor Casinos - Andy Harris (Employee Council Co-ordinator) 13-05-99 
Ciba Specialty Chemicals (UK) - Eric Moorhouse (Company Council Leader and Union 
Site Representative) 18-06-99 
Ciba Specialty Chemicals (UK) - Bill Chard (GMB Regional Organiser) 18-06-99 
Panasonic (Matsushita) (UK) - Sue Grant (Personnel Manager) 10-05-99 
South West Water -  John Ostle (Head of Personnel Pennon Group) 27-03-00 
South West Water -  Roger Randall (Personal and Services Manager SWW) 27-03-00 
South West Water -  Carole Bonner (Former UNISON Representative SWW) 18-04-02 
South West Water -  Erica Hornsby (UNISON Representative SWW) 02-04-00 
South West Water -  Stuart Roden (Former Manager of Personnel SWW) 20-04-00 
News International -  Andy Kemp (Director of Human Resources) 04-03-99 & 04-09-99 
(and other informal discussions)
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Al Hardy (Director of Human Resources) 06-12-98 
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Mark O’Connell (Director of Human Resources) 29-04-99 (and other 
informal discussions)
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Terry Robinson (Director of Human Resources) 15-04-02 & 18-07- 
02 (and other informal discussions)
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Mark Cornwall (Company Council Representatives -  Technical 
Railway Division) 18-02-99 
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Paul Edmondson (Company Council Representatives -  Technical 
Railway Division) 18-02-99 
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Grace Hinder (Company Council Representative & Treasurer -  
Administration) 21-07-99 
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Andy White (Chief Company Council Representative) 22-05-02 
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Milton Marsh (Chief & Technical Engineering Company Council 
Representative) 18-02-98 (and other informal discussions)
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Mark Swaine (Company Council Representative and T&GWU 
Representative) 22-05-02 
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Tim Gough (Company Council Representative -  Train Crew) 18-02- 
99
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Volker Meissner (Company Council Representative -  Call Centre) 
11-11-99
Eurotunnel (UK) -  Michelle Norton (Company Council Representative -  Call Centre) 
11-11-99
T&GWU -  Andrew Dodgshon (Media Liaison Spokesperson) 17-07-00 
T&GWU -  Graham Murfet (Regional Industrial Organiser -  South East and East 
Anglia) 27-06-02
Paul J  Gollan 272
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
a n d  P o lit ic a l  S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
Appendix 2 -  Interview Questions
GENERAL EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVE ISSUES
(Remember to point out that all answers are treated in the strictest of confidence)
A - PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
1. How regularly do you attend Council meetings?
2. How often do you (as their rep) talk to your constituents about Council matters?
3. How important is it to you that management informs you fully about workplace/ 
company issues?
4. Which issues do you believe are the most important issues in your area or section?
5. Which issues do you believe are the most important issues for firm as a whole?
B - ACTUAL INFORMATION RECEIVED
1. To what extent do you feel that you are kept well informed about these issues?
2. How important is the Council in this communication process?
3. To what extent do you feel ‘employees’ in your section see the Council process as 
relevant and effective?
4. Typically when management communicates on these issues, to what extent do you 
believe the information you are given?
5. Are you satisfied with the amount of information management gives you?
6. Are you satisfied with the timing of the information given to you by management?
7. Normally, when management communicates with you either through the Council 
and/or directly, to what extent is there any opportunity for you to personally gain 
further information?
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C - EXTENT OF VOICE AND INFLUENCE
1. To what extent do you think employees at (‘the firm’) have a chance to put their 
views forward and influence management?
2. As a Council representative, do you have sufficient opportunity to express your 
views at Council meetings?
3. How much communication do you receive regarding the following? 
a - Pay and benefits
b - Introduction to new technology 
c - Changes to working practices
d - Staffing issues, including recruitment and redundancies 
e - Employee grievances 
f - Any other issues
4. Do you have an opportunity to influence management decision-making on these 
particular issues?
D - TRAINING AND SKILLS
1. How many hours a week do you spend on Council business?
2. Do you do this in work time or own time? Percentage/Ratio?
3. How long have you been a Council representative?
4. What training have you received?
5. Would you continue to stand for re-election? Why?
E - UNION RELATIONS
1. Are you a member of a trade union?
2. Approximately how many employees are trade union members in your section/area?
3. Do you have regular contacts with other union members and/or union 
representatives?
4. Do you believe management should recognise a trade union? Why?
5. Do you think union recognition would increase Council influence?
Paul J Gollan 274
th e  London School of E c o n o m ic s
a n d  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
Non-union employee representation in the United Kingdom: Management strategies and union responses
6. Would you be a union representative if trade unions were recognised by 
management?
F - COUNCIL MEETINGS
1. How prepared do you believe you are at Council meetings?
2. How prepared do you believe other representatives are at Council meetings?
3. How prepared do you believe manager representatives are at Council meetings?
4. How important and effective are the ‘Agenda’ meetings? Why?
5. Overall, how effective do you believe the Council is in representing general 
employee interests?
6. Do you believe the Council is effective in representing the interests of employees in 
your area?
G - MANAGEMENT
1. How good would you say managers here are in the following:
a - Keeping everybody up to date about proposed workplace/organisational changes
b - Providing everyone with a chance to comment on proposed 
workplace/organisational changes
c - Responding to suggestions from employees
d - Dealing with work problems you or others may have
e - Treating employees fairly
2. In general, how would you describe relations between managers and employees at 
( ‘the firm’)?
3. In general, how would you describe relations between managers and Council 
representatives at (‘the firm’)?
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Appendix 3
Summary of strategy, structure and processes of workplace employee
q z :
representation
Sainsbury’s John  Lewis 
Partnersh ip
Panasonic 
(M atsushita) UK
H P Bulmers L td G rosvenor
Casinos
In d u stry Retail (Grocery) Retail (Department 
Store)
Sales (Electrical 
appliances)
Food and Drink 
(Alcoholic -  
cider)
Entertainment 
(Casinos and 
Clubs)
D rivers for 
im plem entatio 
n and 
continued 
operation
Three main 
factors drove the 
establishment of 
the staff councils 
at Sainsbury’s. 
The first occurred 
in late 1996; when 
in response to a 
company-wide 
employee attitude 
survey conducted 
in February that 
year, managers 
began to explore 
the possibility of 
establishing a 
company-wide 
representative 
structure. The first 
survey to cover all 
115,000 of 
Sainsbury’s staff 
it achieved a high 
response rate of 
80 per cent. The 
‘Talkback’ survey 
indicated that 
many employees 
were dissatisfied 
with the level and 
quality of 
communication 
and consultation 
in Sainsbury’s and 
suggested that 
they lacked 
‘effective’ voice 
in the workplace. 
At the same time 
as the Talkback 
survey, a review 
was underway of 
the existing JCC 
for the 2,500 head 
office staff. This 
review was the 
second major 
driver in the 
establishment of 
the staff council. 
The review found 
that the JCC
The company was 
founded in 1864 
when John Lewis 
established a 
draper’s shop in 
Oxford Street, 
London. In 1905 a 
full department store 
was established 
in Chelsea. At that 
time Spedan Lewis 
was put in charge of 
the store and 
experimented with 
the partnership 
model (a model 
based on all 
permanent 
employees owning a 
share of the 
business), first 
establishing a staff 
council, a 
Committee for 
Communication and 
a house journal. 
These were 
introduced as a 
means to attract 
good workers and 
encourage them to 
work well. From the 
1920s, Spedan 
Lewis started to 
implement an 
inclusive
participation model 
(later known as the 
Partnership) by 
sharing the profits 
with employees.
In 1950 Spedan 
Lewis established a 
written constitution 
for the business and 
transferred his rights 
of ownership to 
trustees.
The Personnel 
Manager indicated 
that while European 
legislation provided 
one of the main 
drivers, other 
drivers were the 
adoption of an 
EWC at the UK 
European 
Headquarters and 
the strong push 
from other 
European 
companies in the 
group to improve 
communication in 
non-union areas of 
the company. She 
also indicated that 
there were: ‘some 
people thinking 
about joining a 
union because they 
saw their rights 
were not being 
represented, and 
this would 
discourage them 
from doing so’. It 
was also suggested 
that the Japanese 
parent company 
philosophy based 
on group decision­
making has also 
been a factor in the 
process to improve 
communications.
Long history of 
paternalistic 
partnership 
practices and to 
diminish ‘class 
distinction’ or as 
Fred Bulmer 
stated ‘Leadership 
is not a Bowler 
Hat’ the company 
set-up a works 
advisory 
committee in the 
late 1950s. The 
‘Fairness at Work’ 
initiatives under 
the Employment 
Relations Act 
1999 legislation 
has provided a 
further rationale 
for the Employee 
Council.
According to 
management, 
previously the 
company 
introduced staff 
forums with 
limited success. 
Management 
recognised there 
was a need to 
replace them with 
a more effective 
and open form of 
staff
representation. 
This was 
supported by a 
new leadership 
team, which saw 
other sister 
companies 
introducing works 
councils.
Concerns over the 
existing culture at 
the company were 
also identified by 
the results of a 
company 
employee survey.
86 All information in this table is at the time of the research in 2001.
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Stated
objectives and 
aims
meetings focused 
on minor matters 
and were too 
limited,
concentrating on 
‘tea, towels and 
toilets’ issues 
rather than on 
more substantive 
issues which 
employees 
required.
The third major 
driver was the 
introduction of the 
European Works 
Council Directive 
in September 
1996 and the 
Directive’s 
influence on 
internal collective 
consultation 
within European 
companies. As the 
Manager of HR 
Policy suggested 
‘Synergy did exist 
between the 
demands of the 
EWC Directive 
and the needs of 
our company’
Staff Councils -  
‘are a
communication 
tool for employees 
to communicate 
upwards to the 
Chairman, and 
also a process for 
the business to 
communicate 
information to all 
employees. The 
Group Council 
‘enables 
representatives 
from all areas of 
the business to 
hear from the 
Chair on key 
issues and 
changes that affect 
them. It also 
provides an 
opportunity for 
ideas from 
employees to be 
communicated to 
Directors’
‘The Partnership’s 
democracy aims to 
resolve differences 
by keeping the 
general body of the 
Partnership fully and 
properly informed 
on what is being 
done and why, by 
consultation and by 
sharing in decisions 
to the greatest extent 
that seems 
practicable’
In addition, an 
internal document 
states, ‘Every 
member of staff who 
works for John 
Lewis is one of the 
owners, with a say 
in how the company 
is run and a share in 
the profits’. In 
addition one of the 
core beliefs was to 
recognise the 
importance of 
participation in 
community life.
As stated in the 
Panasonic UK 
Consultative 
Committee (PUCC) 
Constitution, ‘The 
objective of the 
PUCC is to provide 
a means of 
communication and 
consultation 
between the 
Management and 
the Staff of 
Panasonic UK on 
all matters of 
mutual interest 
including: company 
performance and 
efficiency; physical 
conditions of work, 
health and safety; 
training and further 
education; and 
plans for 
technological or 
organisational 
change; and other 
matters which 
management or 
employee
representatives may 
wish to raise which 
cannot be covered 
elsewhere’ (PUCC
The rationale for 
establishing the 
Employee Council 
is stated in the 
first paragraph of 
its constitution: 
‘The company 
understands and 
welcomes the 
desire of 
employees to 
become more 
deeply involved in 
decisions which 
affect their future 
as it recognises 
and encourages 
the important part 
which employees 
play in ensuring 
the continuing 
success of 
Bulmers for the 
ultimate benefit of 
customers, 
employees and 
shareholders’.
The constitution 
of the Employee 
Council also 
states: the 
‘objective of the 
Employee Council 
is to provide a
A briefing paper 
states their aim 
and puipose of the 
Employee Council 
is ‘To work in 
partnership to 
improve the 
working
environment and 
morale of all staff 
in Grosvenor 
Casinos through 
Employee 
Councils by 
effective open 
communication 
and problem 
solving to enhance 
future prospects 
and
employability’. In 
addition, it states 
‘The model has a 
clear structure and 
purpose, and 
identifiable roles. 
Accountability is 
built into the 
structure, along 
with an ethos of 
working on a team 
basis, with open 
two-way
communication in
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Constitution, 1996). 
The constitution 
also states that 
‘consultation’ 
means the exchange 
of views and 
establishment of 
dialogue between 
employee 
representative and 
senior management. 
Management also 
stated, ‘The PUCC 
is used as a means 
of communication 
between
management and 
staff and acts as a 
sounding board for 
new ideas. It is also 
used to monitor 
suggestions or 
management ideas’
platform where 
discussions can 
take place on 
those matters 
which affect all 
employees and 
hence, their future 
and the success of 
the company; 
these matters 
would not include 
particular areas 
which are subject 
to negotiations 
with the
recognised trade 
union’
order to solve 
issues.
Coverage All 140,000 
employees
All permanent
employees
(Partners)
The PUCC covers 
mainly the non­
unionised part of 
the company (sales 
and administration 
and in theory also 
managers).
All 800
employees at the 
Hereford plants.
All permanent 
employees (95 per 
cent of all staff).
Level of 
operation
Two-tier model 
(Organisational 
and local)
- a 30-member 
company-wide 
Group Council
- 400 local 
councils based on 
a local area/store 
or function
Three-tier model 
(Organisational, 
Branch and local)
- 135 member 
Central Council
- Branch Council (a 
form of local 
government)
- Local committees 
(informal forum to 
express views)
One-tier model 
covering all 
nationally-based 
administration and 
sales sections and in 
theory also 
managers of 
Panasonic (UK). 
The company has a 
European Works 
Council at 
European level.
One-tier model of
non-union
employee
representation
through the
Employee
Council.
However, there is 
a second tier 
representation 
through the 
T&GWU.
Three-tier model 
of the employee 
council structure 
consisting of the 
Casino Council, 
Regional Council, 
and National 
Council.
Constituency
size
Between 50 and 
100 employees at 
store level
Between 50 and 100 
employees at 
store/branch level.
Between 80 to 100 
employees at each 
division or location.
Between 30-50 
employees based 
on teams at a 
functional or 
departmental area.
Varies 
considerably 
depending on size 
of casino and club 
which can be 
between 120 to 
500 employees.
Com position
and
representative
ness
Seats on group 
council divided by 
six UK regions, 
plus two union 
representative’s. 
The Group 
Council is made 
up of board 
members, 26 
elected employee 
representative’s 
and two union 
appointees, and 
group chair (also 
chairs council) 
and group
Elected employee 
representatives, 
regularly brief on 
progress of company 
(all employees are 
shareholders). The 
135 member Central 
Council provides the 
electoral college to 
appoint five 
directors to the 
Partnership’s 
Central Board of 12 
representatives. 80 
per cent are elected 
from Branches and
The PUCC consists 
of 10 employee 
representatives 
drawn from the 
different internal 
divisions and 
locations of 
Panasonic UK. The 
Managing Director 
and two other senior 
management 
representatives also 
attend. Meetings are 
held every two 
months and last for 
approximately three
The Employee 
Council is the 
only
representative 
channel for the 
higher grades 1 to 
5. It is chaired by 
the Group Chief 
Executive (or 
Managing 
Director), and 
consists of four 
shop stewards (ex­
officio) and 17 
elected
representatives
Every casino has 
an elected 
representative 
from each 
department of 
their business who 
meet with the 
general manager 
and manager each 
month. An agenda 
is then produced 
and action notes 
taken.A  
departmental 
representative will 
chair the meeting
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personnel director. 20 per cent to four hours. At it from across the by rotation. These
Local Council - appointed by first meeting in group’s UK meetings normally
maximum of 15 management. early 1996, operations. The last two hours.
people (excluding Chairman cannot employee elected There are a
the chair- reject a Central representatives to representatives are minimum of three
relevant Council the Panasonic voted in for a and a maximum
store/depot recommendation European Congress four-year period. of 10
manager, and without consulting (PEC) were elected. The four union representatives,
secretary -  local the Central Board. There are no union representatives are depending on the
personnel Branch Councils appointed positions appointed for an size of the casino.
manager) local government. on PUCC although indefinite period. Regional Council
Local committees all representatives are In addition to -Every region also
employees in open free to join a union these 22 voting has an elected
discussion. if they wish. The members, there representative
Personnel Manager are three ex­ from each Casino
acts as secretary to officio, non­ site who meet
the PUCC. The voting members. with the regional
election of These ex-officio manager, regional
employee members are the human resources
representatives is by Holdings Board adviser, and one
a ‘free ballot’ (field Director, the general manager
technical staff are District Official of from the region,
also eligible to vole) the T&GWU, and once every three
and all candidates the Personnel months. There are
must be permanent Director, who acts three regions in
employees with a as Secretary to the the company:
minimum of one Council. London/Essex
year’s service. The Council elects with three sites;
Initially, employee an employee South East with
representatives representative as seven sites; and
served three-year the Deputy Chair North and South
terms, although all for a two-year West, which have
subsequent period, who acts 13 sites between
employee as Chair in the them. An elected
representatives will absence of the casino
serve two-year Group Chief representative
terms. Executive. At collates and
The PUCC also has least once a year, agrees the agenda
the power and the Deputy Chair with the regional
authority to appoint addresses the manager and
an independent Board of Directors chairs the
chair to facilitate to communicate meeting. National
the smooth running employees’ views. Council -
of the meetings, Since A national
although s/he does restructuring, the meeting is held
not have the Council twice a year
authority to constituencies are attended by
contribute to now based on regional
discussions. All teams based in a representatives
agenda items are functional or (one from gaming,
forwarded to the departmental area, one from another
Chair at least seven rather than on a department) from
days before the tradition craft or each region (a
meeting and the full professional basis. total of six), the
agenda is circulated The Council has national
three days before considerable operations
the meeting. To autonomy in director, director
assist in drawing up organising of human
the agenda, the elections and the resources, and one
Chair convenes a voting and regional manager
previously nomination (on a revolving
nominated group procedures. basis). The
comprising one meetings are
management chaired by the
(normally the HR national
manager) and one operations
employee director.
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representative (this 
rotates between all 
employee 
representatives) to 
produce the final 
agenda from the 
items submitted.
Resources and 
train ing
Where
deficiencies are 
identified, training 
is given by local 
HR staff. Some 
managers have 
also been given 
training in 
chairing meetings 
and on the latest 
statutory 
requirements. 
Most elected and 
union
representatives 
undertake a three- 
day induction 
programme 
consisting of 
communication, 
interviewing, time 
management skills 
and business 
awareness.
All local council 
representatives are 
given time off for 
briefings (one or 
half a day a 
month) with 
employees and 
also to carry out 
any other duties 
associated with 
council business. 
For group council 
representatives, as 
well as time off 
they are paid full 
travelling 
expenses for the 
twice yearly group 
council meetings. 
They are also paid 
for at least one 
day following 
each council 
meeting to 
communicate with 
their constituents, 
and given time off 
on other occasions 
to fulfil their 
council duties 
following 
agreement with 
their departmental 
director.
The Central Council 
has its own income, 
amounting to at least 
1 per cent of the 
payroll (including 
the Partners’ bonus). 
It also funds leisure 
activities and makes 
charitable donations. 
Training is provided 
to all
representatives.
Employee 
representatives are 
given reasonable 
time-off to attend 
meetings (this is not 
stated formally in 
the PUCC 
constitution but is 
an accepted 
practice) and where 
necessary, pre­
meetings or any 
other task required 
by PUCC, as well 
as time-off to 
discuss and report 
back to colleagues 
on issues discussed. 
The company also 
provides access to 
ACAS training 
programmes and 
equipment (for 
example email and 
meeting rooms etc).
Training for 
representatives 
consists of issues, 
such as operation 
of the business, 
financial matters, 
long-term 
business strategy, 
marketing etc. 
Each half year 
when the latest 
financial results 
are announced, an 
external trainer 
facilitates a 
discussion on 
financial issues. In 
addition, twice a 
year there is a 
development 
programme 
focusing on the 
operation of the 
City, how it works 
and the 
importance of 
maintaining 
shareholder value. 
However, one 
Councillor did 
indicate that a key 
challenge for 
representatives to 
is overturn the 
perception that it 
is a taking shop. 
This is due to 
employees having 
little
understanding of 
the time and 
resources required 
when Councillors 
are not attending 
meetings.
The employee 
council
representatives 
have access to 
basic facilities 
including 
telephone, fax, e- 
mail, computers, 
photocopiers and 
meeting rooms. 
They also attend a 
one-day training 
course (normally 
taken over two 
half-days) 
focusing on how 
to run meetings, 
making a point 
and presenting an 
argument, body 
language, how to 
prepare a meeting, 
and note taking. In 
addition, National 
Council 
representatives 
have access to 
health and safety 
issues and 
employment law 
training. Such 
training is not 
given to local 
representatives.
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Local and group 
council
representatives are 
given time off to 
brief their 
constituents and to 
carry out any 
other work 
associated with 
council, plus paid 
any travelling 
time.
Negotiation
and
Bargaining
None All issues including 
pay and conditions, 
redundancy. In 
practice agreement 
must be obtained. 
Chair can veto 
capita) expenditure 
proposed if  he/she 
regards as ‘too 
dangerous’ to 
Partnership’s 
business interests. 
Local ‘Branch 
Council’ may deal 
with local 
grievances and 
issues.
PUCC does not 
have formal 
negotiation or 
bargaining powers. 
As an example, in 
relation to general 
pay and conditions 
of employment 
(including 
performance 
appraisal, systems 
of payment and 
staff planning) and 
organisational 
restructuring 
proposals, the 
PUCC is informed 
but has no input 
through negotiation 
into the final 
outcome.
None. None. The senior 
Employee Council 
Co-ordinator 
suggested that ‘the 
council has very 
little influence 
over basic salary’.
Union
involvement
Group Council 
- two union 
appointees 
Local Council - 
decided on a local 
site basis 
(open ballot)
No formal 
representation 
although can contest 
open elections as 
Council
Representatives.
There are no union 
appointed positions 
on PUCC although 
representatives are 
free to join a union 
if they wish. 
Management 
emphasised strongly 
that the company 
would rather deal 
directly with 
employees rather 
than unions or the 
PUCC. The AEEU 
has a single union 
agreement with 
Panasonic (UK) 
covering the six UK 
manufacturing 
plants.
Currently the
T&GWU
represents
employees
through the Joint
Working Party
arrangement
involving
management and
union
representatives on 
the lower grades 6 
to 9 (around 340 
employees). 
According the 
trade union 
organiser, about 
96 per cent o f the 
shopfloor are 
union members 
(although office 
staff membership 
is very low at 
around 5 per 
cent).
As well as the 
four ex-officio 
shop stewards on 
the Council, many 
of the
representatives are 
also T&GWU
Management does 
not recognise any 
union. However, 
the T&GWU does 
have union 
members (mainly 
in the London 
region). T&GWU 
membership 
between 5 to 10 
per cent of the 
workforce. 
According to the 
senior Employee 
Council Co­
ordinator 
‘Management 
wanted the 
councils to be an 
alternative to 
unions. 
Management 
wanted a body 
that knew about 
the business and 
that they could 
trust rather than a 
third body, which 
could have its 
own agenda. The 
T&GWU action 
had little effect
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Issues for 
consultation
Discuss matters 
relating to the 
structure, 
activities and 
performance of 
the group where 
these affect staff 
including, 
financial results 
and general 
trading and 
operational issues. 
Does not discuss 
individual issues 
such as pay, 
promotion or 
grievances.
shop stewards, 
and thus involved 
in the negotiating 
forum (union 
representatives 
only). However, 
most issues 
discussed in union 
negotiations have 
been previously 
discussed in the 
Council.
All issues including 
financial 
information and 
performance, 
investment and 
company strategy.
The matters 
discussed at 
meetings include: 
company 
performance 
information; sales 
figures; health and 
safety issues 
(although there is a 
H&S committee, 
many issues are also 
discussed at the 
PUCC); canteen 
and sports facilities; 
technological and 
structural changes; 
employment issues 
(including staffing 
issues); government 
legislation 
(including new 
employment 
legislation); future 
company strategy; 
the salary review 
process (not to 
negotiate actual 
salaries but to 
discuss the methods 
and processes); and 
training and 
education.
Individual 
grievances are not 
discussed unless it 
is considered by the 
PUCC as a 
company issue.
The constitution 
specifies that ‘The 
Council is 
empowered to 
discuss matters 
connected with 
company policy 
and decisions that 
affect the
employees’ future, 
but not the day-to- 
day management 
of the business.
The latter area is 
the responsibility 
of managers who 
must retain the 
fullest authority to 
achieve group 
objectives -  
subject to the 
already 
established 
routines of 
consultation’. 
There is no 
provision in the 
Constitution for 
employee only 
meetings to 
discuss agenda 
items or issues.
The constitution 
further states that 
‘The Council, 
being concerned 
with policy, will 
be consulted and 
discuss matters at 
an early stage 
relating to: 
company 
objectives; 
company
productivity; rules 
of conduct and 
discipline; 
amenities; training 
and development 
of the individual; 
recruitment; the 
company’s 
investment policy; 
company_________
outside London’.
Any matter. The 
Regional Council 
meeting provides 
the opportunity to 
discuss issues 
arising at the 
Casino Council 
meetings, wider 
regional issues 
and to share 
information. The 
National Council 
meeting discusses 
company strategy 
and major issues 
in the business, 
and invites input 
from the regional 
representatives. It 
also provides the 
chairperson with 
the opportunity to 
float some of the 
issues that have 
arisen from the 
Casino meetings, 
review their 
progress and to 
examine whether 
changes are 
required.
Recent issues 
have included: 
wages, job 
security, health 
and safety issues, 
matters 
concerning 
performance 
improvement, 
roster systems and 
hours of work, the 
company bonus 
scheme, working 
time requirements, 
multi-skilling, and 
performance 
appraisals.
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communications; 
human relations; 
trading activities; 
and company 
financial 
position’.
Pay negotiations, 
other matters 
involving union 
negotiations or 
matters which 
may affect share 
price are 
specifically ruled 
out.
F requency of 
meetings
Group council 
meets twice- 
yearly;
Local council 
meets once a 
quarter.
Central Council 
meets six times a 
year. Branch 
Councils meet six 
times a year. Local 
committees meet at 
store level five or 
six times a year.
Meetings are held 
every two months 
and last for 
approximately three 
to four hours.
The Council 
meets five times a 
year, with 
additional 
meetings as 
necessary 
(originally this 
was four times a 
year). In addition, 
the Board meets 
the Council on an 
informal basis, 
normally once a 
year for lunch and 
once prior to the 
Employees’ 
Annual General 
Meeting which is 
held on the same 
day as the 
Shareholders’ 
AGM. This gives 
Directors (and 
non-executive 
Directors) the 
opportunity to 
clarify and 
reconfirm issues 
raised by the 
management and 
allows a direct 
line of
communication to 
representatives.
The Casino 
Council meets 
every month. The 
Regional Council 
meets once every 
three months and 
the National 
Council meeting 
is held twice a 
year.
D ispute and
Conflict
resolution
Outstanding 
matters are 
resolved within 
four weeks either 
by chair of 
committee or 
district/senior 
manager.
None specified. None specified. 
However, PUCC 
representatives can 
represent 
individuals on 
grievance and 
discipline reviews.
None specified. 
However, in a 
recent
restructuring 
exercise it was 
decided to 
establish a sub­
committee to 
monitor and 
resolve disputes 
resulting from the 
subsequent 
compulsory 
redundancy 
programme. 
Individual 
representatives
None specified. 
Although council 
representatives 
can represent 
employees in 
disciplinary cases 
and grievance 
issues, this is not 
one of their 
specified duties.
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may represent 
employees on 
individual issues 
or grievances.
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
Summary of strategy, structure and processes of workplace employee 
representation
Ciba Specialty 
Chemicals (UK)
South W est W ater -  
Pennon G roup
News International E urotunnel (UK)
Industry Chemicals Water utility (Water & 
sewerage)
Media and 
Entertainment 
(Newspapers, 
Television and Motion 
Pictures)
Transport
D rivers fo r 
im plem entatio  
n and 
continued 
operation
The site has had a 
company council since 
May 1973. At that 
time, in the absence of 
any recognised trade 
union, its role was to 
act as the sole 
communications and 
representation channel 
for employees and 
managers. According 
to its early constitution, 
the company 
recognised that its 
success depended on 
‘teamwork, the co­
operation of people, 
both individually and 
collectively by 
departments, to achieve 
the collaboration 
necessary to translate 
ideas through to sales’.
The main driver for the 
establishment of the 
Staff Council was the 
introduction of a 
company-based 
performance-related pay 
system in the 1990s.
The former Nalgo union 
(now part of Unison) 
did not participate in the 
performance-related pay 
process, thus SWW 
needed to introduce a 
mechanism of 
representation that could 
deal with such local 
issues.
In addition, the previous 
Chief Executive (pre- 
1993) had a more 
conflictual style based 
on traditional notions of 
an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
approach. It was 
suggested by current 
senior management he 
saw the rationale of 
setting up the Staff 
Council as a defence 
strategy and necessary 
due to union opposition.
In 1998, News 
International sought to 
expand its Employee 
Consultative Council 
(ECC) (which had been 
established in 1994 to 
provide representation 
for News International 
employees) into what 
can be described as an 
‘in-house union’. All 
unions had been 
derecognised in the late 
1980s. Management 
indicated that this was 
an initiative that had 
come from its 
employees on the 
council and had staff 
support, quoting a staff 
survey carried out for it 
by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers in November 
1998.
The forthcoming union 
recognition legislation 
was also considered by 
the Director of Human 
Resources as an 
important factor.
As part of an early 
policy choice to 
integrate its two 
workforces, the 
company council for 
UK-contracted 
employees was 
established in December 
1992 which is broadly 
similar to the enterprise 
committee (or comitd d’ 
entreprise) under French 
legislation.
According to 
management, the 
company’s human 
resource policy 
systematically takes into 
consideration its bi­
national balance, 
whether regarding staff 
allocation or the fixing 
of salaries and benefits. 
In addition,
management would not 
recognise a union for 
employee
representation. Before 
union recognition in 
2001, the Company 
Council is the only 
representation at 
Eurotunnel.. After 
which the T&GWU was 
sole channel of 
representation over 
collective bargaining 
issues.
S tated
objectives and  
aims
The company council 
constitution states:
‘The company council 
acts as a forum for 
discussion of matters of 
common interest to the 
employees of the 
company. The council 
acts as a means of 
communicating ideas 
and opinions to the 
board, and allows the
As a means to consult 
(but not negotiate) with 
white-collar staff. As 
stated in the SC 
constitution, ‘The Staff 
Council is the primary 
focus for our 
consultation 
arrangements and 
provides the opportunity 
for all employees 
through their
The Staff Association 
Charter states: ‘The 
Staff Associations shall 
each have as a principal 
purpose the regulation 
of relations between 
workers and News 
International. The Staff 
Associations, through 
the Joint Executive 
Committee, shall 
accordingly conduct
Company’s only 
communications forum. 
Three main aims:
- to give information 
and consult on matters 
o f common concern to 
employees
- to be the only form of 
official employee 
representation 
(including bargaining 
and negotiation over
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board to meet and 
consult with the 
employee
representatives. The 
council aims to 
increase the 
understanding of the 
company’s affairs by 
all employees. All 
sections of the 
company’s employees 
should be represented 
on the council’
The company council 
mission statement 
states that ‘the role of 
the company council is 
to ensure all employees 
are treated fairly and 
that matters are dealt 
with appropriately. Our 
goals are to: promote 
effective two-way 
consultation between 
the workforce and 
management; support 
employees by 
providing a
confidential service for 
those who request our 
assistance; improve 
working conditions in 
line with the chemical 
manufacturing sector; 
and promote a culture 
of harmonious 
teamwork throughout 
the Company that 
improves production 
and safeguards jobs’
representatives to 
influence and be 
involved in decisions 
which are likely to 
affect their interests. 
Specific objectives are 
to: encourage employee 
understanding, interest 
and involvement in 
business issues; improve 
the quality and 
timeliness of solutions 
to problems; improve 
communication; forum 
for employees to voice 
their opinions; enable 
employees to 
understand and make a 
contribution to company 
policies and decisions 
that affect them; and 
provide a forum for 
futher development of 
shared values, with the 
view to improving 
understanding, 
motivation, commitment 
and performance within 
the company.
collective bargaining 
with Company 
representatives.... The 
Joint Executive 
Committee will be the 
representative body at 
national level to receive 
information and 
consultation on the 
evolution of work 
organisation, training of 
employees, major 
operational issues, 
development and 
promulgation of 
Company’s legal 
obligations on subjects 
such as appropriate with 
the Joint Executive 
Committee and the 
relevant Staff 
Association where ten 
or more employees are 
proposed to be made 
redundant or when any 
department comprising 
less than ten employees 
is affected by proposed 
redundancies or 
restructuring’.
In addition the Charter 
states, ‘The Staff 
Associations shall also 
be a forum where staff 
ideas, concerns and 
issues are fully debated. 
They shall be the bodies 
through which 
Company decisions on 
major investment in 
plant and equipment 
will be communicated 
and shall be a primary 
means of
communicating with 
employees on all 
matters relating to the 
status and conduct of 
the business. The 
Company takes its 
employees’ ideas and 
suggestions seriously. 
The Staff Associations 
will be the bodies 
through which 
employees at every 
level can propose ways 
to help the business 
foster job creation and 
job security. The Staff 
Associations will be the 
bodies through which 
the Company works 
with employee 
representatives in a 
partnership designed to 
ensure the employees 
are treated fairly’.______
pay and conditions)
- and to manage the 
social and welfare 
budget eual to one per 
cent of payroll (approx. 
£250,000-£350,000 per 
year
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Coverage AH non-management 
employees (including 
union members)
All white-collar 
employees (1,000 
employees).
All employees at New 
International three UK 
sites (Knowsley,
Kinning Park, and 
Wapping).
While all employees are 
eligible and deemed to 
be members of the Staff 
Association electing 
body in the constituency 
in which they are 
employed, they have the 
right to opt out of this 
status if they wish to do 
so.
All non-management 
employees
Level of 
operation
One-tier model 
covering all sections at 
Ciba.
One-tier model. The 
original structure 
consisted of four 
consultative committees 
(one for each of the 
operational divisions 
and one for head office) 
with a percentage of the 
members from those 
committees being 
elected to the SC. 
However are a ballot, 
the SC it was considered 
to modify the structure 
to represent only white 
collar employees 
(1,000).
Two-tier model.
Each plant (Knowsley, 
Kinning Park, and 
Wapping) has its own 
NISA. These three 
NISA are represented at 
national level by the 
News International Staff 
Associations Joint 
Executive Committee 
(JEC).
One-tier model covering 
all sections at 
Eurotunnel. In addition, 
it has European Works 
Council covering all 
Eurotunnel employees 
in Europe.
Constituency
size
Each representative 
covers on average 70 to 
80 employees.
Varies considerably 
depending on region 
and area.
Between 80 to 100 
employees
Representatives and 
deputies represent 
between 75 and 150 
employees in each area, 
which is geographically 
or functionally based.
Com position
and
representative
ness
At present, there are a 
total of 32 employee 
representatives and an 
additional twelve 
deputies to provide 
assistance to the 
representative and to 
represent the 
constituency when the 
representative is 
unavailable for 
meetings. In production 
areas there are usually 
two representatives to 
cover all shifts. The 
representatives elect a 
full-time council leader 
from among the 
members on council for 
a period of three years. 
In addition there are 
three to four 
management 
appointments including 
the managing director, 
safety manager and one 
or two senior managers 
and directors. The 
chairperson is
14 elected members 
representing 
constituents from the 
various functions or 
from ‘natural’ 
communication groups 
within the company. 
There is only one 
elected representative 
per constituency. The 
chairperson is the Chief 
Executive or a 
nominated deputy, and 
the secretary is normally 
the Personnel and 
Services Manager.
Other members of staff 
or managers who have a 
specialist contribution 
may also be invited. 
Representatives must be 
permanent employees of 
SWW and are elected 
for a three-year period.
The Kinning Park and 
Knowsley Staff 
Associations have eight 
representatives each, 
and the Wapping Staff 
Association has 17 
representatives. The 
number of 
representatives to be 
elected to each Staff 
Association reflects the 
size and composition of 
the workforce. Elections 
for representatives are 
held every two years 
and only employees 
with at least one year’s 
continuous service may 
stand for election. 
Representatives must 
also work (wholly or 
mainly) within the 
constituency for which 
they are standing. 
Management staff can 
also put themselves up 
for election. There are 
no limits on the number 
of terms an elected
One representative and 
one deputy are elected 
from each of eight 
constituencies on a joint 
ticket. Election is by 
secret ballot for a two- 
year period. All 
representatives and 
deputies should be 
permanent employees 
with at least one year 
service. They may, 
however, be full-time or 
part-time employees. 
There is a mix of 
employee 
representatives and 
deputies from each of 
the areas (total of 16 
employee
representatives)and 
senior management 
(Chief Executive or 
Chief Operating Officer 
and Director of Human 
Resources)
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nominated from among 
the management 
representatives and 
holds office for a 
period of one year. 
Elections are held 
every March. Half of 
the representatives are 
re-elected each year for 
a two-year term. 
Constituencies are 
based on working units 
defined primarily by 
location and function. 
All representatives 
must have been 
employed by the 
company for at least 12 
months. Elections are 
by secret paper ballot 
and are counted by the 
personnel manager, 
council leader and the 
company secretary. 
Turnout is normally 
low, between 25 and 35 
per cent. Previously, 
elections were 
contested only half of 
the time. Management 
suggested that the 
difficulty in attracting 
volunteers could have 
been contributed to the 
perception that the 
Company Council 
lacked influence and 
was ineffective because 
it was excluded from 
pay negotiations.
representative may 
serve. All elections are 
by secret ballot. The 
election of chairperson 
and deputy chairperson 
is by secret ballot of all 
the representatives at 
each site. The 
chairperson at each of 
the three sites acts in a 
similar capacity to a 
general secretary in a 
union. They are also 
elected for two years 
and are eligible for re- 
election. The 
chairperson and deputy 
chairperson cannot be 
employed in the same 
constituency or area.
The Joint Executive 
Committee (JEC) 
comprises the 
chairpersons and deputy 
chairpersons of the three 
sites plus three 
additional members 
elected from 
representatives at the 
Wapping Staff 
Association. The chair 
of the JEC is rotated 
every six months among 
the chairpersons of the 
NISA. No other 
members may become 
chairpersons. Each 
chairperson of the JEC 
is entitled to one day off 
a month and may if 
required liaise with 
either the General 
Manager, Operations or 
the Director of Human 
Resources to agree on 
additional time-off.
Resources and 
train ing
Company Council 
leader is provided with 
an office, secretary 
and computer. The 
company also pays his 
yearly salary equal to 
his previous position in 
the company. 
Representatives are 
paid for their time if 
they are shift workers 
and if a meeting is 
taking place on their 
time off, although no 
additional travel costs 
are paid. In these 
circumstances, a 
minimum of six hour’s 
overtime pay will be
The Staff Council 
representatives are 
provided with full email 
facilities and access. 
One of the early 
problems for the Staff 
Council was that no 
training was provided 
for representatives and 
management denied the 
representatives the 
facility to hold pre­
meetings to discuss the 
agenda. This was later 
changed.
All representatives have 
up to one hour a day 
paid time-off when 
acting on Staff 
Association business or 
when representing a 
fellow employee in a 
disciplinary or 
grievance matter. Such 
time-off should be taken 
with the approval of the 
representative’s 
immediate supervisor.
In addition, if 
representatives are 
required to perform 
duties outside their 
normal working hours 
compensatory time-off
The CC is allocated a 
social and welfare 
budget equal to one per 
cent of payroll 
(approximately 
£250,000-£350,000 per 
year). This may include 
welfare support for 
needy families, money 
for trips away, nights 
out etc. It must be noted 
that the company 
council are trustees 
only.
This money also 
provides for two 
employees and office 
and meeting 
accommodation and
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Negotiation
and
Bargaining
paid (which includes 
any travelling 
expenses). At present 
there is no provision 
for representatives to 
spend further time on 
council business, 
although most council 
business is done in 
normal company time. 
According to the 
Company Council 
Leader, for most 
representatives this can 
be up to six hours a 
week. Agenda 
meetings for employee 
representatives alone 
are held every two 
months in between the 
full company council 
meetings.
All representatives 
have access to e-mail 
and, when required, 
secretarial assistance 
through the human 
resources department 
and function.
is given. There is also a 
right for reimbursement 
of reasonable travel 
expenses when required 
to travel to locations 
outside their normal 
place of work.
Each chairperson of the 
JEC is entitled to one 
day off a month and 
may if required liaise 
with either the General 
Manager, Operations or 
the Director of Human 
Resources to agree on 
additional time-off.
All Staff Association 
representatives are also 
required to participate in 
a minimum of two days’ 
specialised training a 
year in addition to other 
training provided by the 
company.
All representatives are 
given access to e-mail 
facilities on request and 
where representatives 
are not normally office- 
based, a work station is 
made available. Other 
vehicles for
communication include: 
are notice boards, the 
Intranet, management 
briefings of employees, 
and the NISA page in 
the company 
newspaper.
None. The GMB has 
sole representation on 
collective bargaining 
issues (ie pay and basic 
employment 
conditions).
There is no direct 
negotiation or 
bargaining powers. As 
the Head of Personnel 
stated, ‘At the end of the 
day the Chief Executive 
has to make the key 
decisions. He uses the 
Staff Council to be 
better informed to make 
those decisions and to 
understand the impact 
of those decisions from 
the people on the sharp 
end, on the ground that 
deal with the 
consequences in getting 
it wrong’
Charter states that the 
NISA has collective 
bargaining rights over 
hours of work; rates of 
pay; benefits; and other 
terms and conditions of 
employment; To have 
training provided to 
them in their role as 
representatives of the 
employees; To have 
access to competent 
legal assistance; To 
have a procedure for 
final arbitration of 
collective disputes; To 
enjoy rights equivalent 
to those conferred by 
law upon an 
independent trade union 
in respect of all rights to 
information and 
consultation; To agree 
procedures generally for 
making the 
representative body 
fully effective in respect
facilities on site.
Rules allow around 20 
hours a month to be 
spent on council 
business by 
representatives and 
deputies, although this 
is not strictly enforced 
and is flexible according 
to issues. Minutes are 
publicised through 
noticeboards, 
newsletters and the 
company’s internal 
computer mail system 
(including its intranet). 
In 1995, the company 
council was granted 
membership of the 
Industrial Society, and 
was the first works 
council ever to gain 
such recognition. It was 
stated in the council’s 
1995 information 
leaflet, ‘What this 
means is our 
representatives can go 
on courses and get 
access to the most up to 
date advice about 
working practices, 
dismissal procedures, 
contracts of 
employment, maternity, 
paternity, health and 
safety’.
Pay and conditions
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of all the above matters 
and any other matter it 
is agreed with News 
International.
Union Since 1999, the GMB In effect, initially the There has been no No formal union
involvement has had sole union Staff Council replicated recognised union at involvement. Some
recognition, and a the consultative News International informal union
partnership agreement committee structure that since 1988 after the involvement through
at the Bradford plant. existed before long-running Wapping wage negotiations
Before recognition was derecognition of the dispute which began in (T&G and ASLEF)
granted, the GMB had Nalgo union (now part 1986. In that dispute,
approximately 500 of Unison) but without Rupert Murdoch (News
members; at the time of any negotiation. Corporation Chairman)
the study there were to Employees in SWW sacked around 5,800
be 800 members at the elect representatives print workers and
site. from all levels to the derecognised trade
The partnership Staff Council, which unions when he moved
agreement signed in deals with matters of production from Fleet
March 1999 highlights concern to all staff Street in central London
a number of issues. For employees - both trade to Wapping in east
example: both parties union and non-trade London and to Kinning
‘work together for the union members. While Park in Glasgow. This
mutual benefit of the representatives are free event was regarded as a
business and all those to be union members, turning point in British
that it employs’; ‘the they are not union industrial relations.
company recognises representatives. In Management has
the right of the GMB to practice the Staff estimated that there are
recruit, organise and Council covers mostly currently 500 union
give guidance and traditional white-collar members out of 750
assistance to its employees comprising production workers at
members at the of around 1,000 Wapping. Out of the
Bradford site and employees. The 600 1,000 journalists at
agrees to give other employees Wapping, a significant
reasonable facilities for (including road and majority are National
that purpose; the ‘GMB street maintenance Union of Journalist
agrees to work in personnel, water (NUJ) (previously to get
tandem with the treatment works and a press card you needed
company council in waste treatment works, to be a union member),
improving two way mobile inspection Amalgamated
communications and personnel, and Engineering and
understanding of craftsman and Electrical Union
common objectives’; electricians) are (AEEU) and Graphical
the company represented by as a Paper and Media Union
recognises the GMB as single table bargaining members (GPMU),
the sole trade union for unit of craft and although management
collective bargaining industrial trade unions questions how many are
and the GMB promises (consisting of the active union members.
to train all its site AEEU, T&GWU and However management
representatives with the GMB - see below for concedes that
company giving details). At present, membership is slightly
‘reasonable time off there is no formal higher than national
with pay for the linkage between the trends.
purpose’ ; the company Staff Council and the The Staff Association
encouraging craft and industrial trade charter does not
membership of the unions unit. preclude membership of
GMB and for ‘new It is management’s any other trade union.
employees the intention that the Staff However, while a
company will arrange Council will be used as person may belong to
for the company the mechanism for another trade union they
council leader to meet representation with can not represent them
with them and advise union members as for bargaining purposes.
of the benefits of GMB representatives. It is
membership’; union estimated by
contributions will be management that around
deducted from salaries 15 to 20 per cent of
for those employees employees are union
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requiring this to be 
done; and that the 
company and GMB 
have ‘a common 
objective in using the 
process of negotiation 
to achieve results 
beneficial to the 
company and the 
employee’. Notably, 
the agreement does not 
have a ‘no strike’ 
clause.
The majority of the 
representatives on the 
company council are 
union representatives, 
including the Company 
Council Leader.
members.
Issues for 
consultation
With the exception of 
annual pay adjustments 
and individual 
grievances, at company 
council meetings the 
company discusses and 
consults over a wide 
range of issues which 
concern all employees 
or a large number of 
employees. These 
matters include: 
company financial 
results and other items 
from the board; health 
and safety; the 
performance-related 
pay system, holiday 
entitlements; transport 
to and from the site; car 
parking; and medical 
services etc87. Annual 
pay adjustments (ie 
wages, salaries and 
other financial benefits) 
are negotiated in a 
separate committee 
drawn from six 
company council 
representatives 
(including the company 
council leader and 
union site 
representative), six 
managers, and the 
GMB Regional 
Organiser.
Under the constitution 
the Council is 
‘encouraged to discuss 
any appropriate subject’ 
with the exception of 
issues relating to an 
individual’s salary, and 
grievance or 
disciplinary matters. 
While not an exhaustive 
list, other issues may 
include: company 
performance, objectives 
and strategy; 
productivity and quality 
issues; human resource 
policies and procedures; 
systems for assessing 
individual performance; 
training and
development; health and 
safety; terms and 
conditions of 
employment; 
formulation of staff 
rules and procedures; 
communication and 
participation methods; 
and special events.
Any matter. As stated in the 
company council 
constitution, the 
company consults on all 
matters and issues of 
concern to employees. 
These issues include: all 
terms of employment; 
operational changes: 
shift rosters; workplace 
change; investment 
strategy; terms of 
employment; and 
financial and 
performance data, 
including but not 
limited to profits. In 
general, personnel 
issues and grievances 
are excluded from 
discussion, unless they 
raise issues which have 
implications for the 
workforce as a whole.
Frequency of 
meetings
Council meetings take 
place once every two 
months in work time 
and normally last two 
to three hours.
Meetings normally take 
place four times a year, 
although other special 
meetings may be called 
to discuss extraordinary 
matters affecting the
NISA normally meets 
monthly, although in the 
event o f major issues it, 
may convene additional 
meetings every month. 
The chairpersons also
Once a month
87 Matters involving one or a small number of employees and departmental matters not previously brought 
to the attention of the management are not considered Company Council business.
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thereafter they alternate 
between the Company 
and the JEC. However, 
the JEC/N1SA may also 
call for a ballot for 
industrial action as 
stated in the Employee 
Relations Act.
Individual council 
representatives can 
provide personal 
representation on 
individual issues such as 
individual grievances 
and disputes.__________
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